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ABSTRACT
A GENEALOGY OF CONVENIENCE*
A CRITICAL INTERPRETATION OF TECHNICAL
CULTURE

FEBRUARY 1990

THOMAS

F.

TIERNEY, B.A., MORAVIAN COLLEGE

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos

This dissertation presents a critique of modern,

technical culture.

it focuses on the value of convenience,

and argues that this value underlies, to a great extent,

modern attitudes toward technology, especially attitudes
toward the consumption of technology.

dissertation is meant to be

a

in a sense,

the

complement to that line of

thought which identified the domination of nature as the

value which guided the development of science and
technology.

While the domination of nature may be the value

which underlies the activity of those who develop and
produce technology, the value of convenience is the value

which guides those who consume the various technological

apparatuses which are produced by the modern economy.
Ultimately, the claim of the dissertation is that the

modern prominence of the value of convenience reveals
something not only about modern attitudes toward technology,
but more importantly, it reveals something about current

attitudes toward the human body, mortality, and necessity.
The pursuit of the value of convenience is interpreted as an

vi

attempt to overcome the body and the various
limits which
are imposed by man's embodiment.
The evidence which is used to support
this claim covers
a wide range.
Shifts in religious ideas and doctrines
are
examined, and the decline of Christianity
in modernity is
presented as one factor which has helped to
establish the

prominence of the value of convenience.

Material conditions

in the United States are also accorded an
important role in

the emergence of this value as a dominating force in

modernity.

Along the way, several competing perspectives on

the consumption of technology are criticized.

Among these

perspectives are those of several contemporary Marxists, as
well that of Hannah Arendt.

The objective of the dissertation is to foster a

critical revaluation of modernity's attitudes toward
technology, in the hope that such a revaluation may help to

prepare the way for the emergence of a new attitude toward
the body and the earth.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

In this essay,

I

will offer a critical interpretati<
.on

of technological culture.

While such interpretations were

prevalent in this century until about
twenty years ago,
today they appear outdated and outlandish,

at least in

their broad form.

Narrower critiques, which focus on the

technology of war, are still offered and
received, but
critiques which indict technological culture

itself are no

longer acceptable.

The hope of both the East and the West

is now centered on technological innovation
and development,

and "less-developed" countries look to technology
as the key
to progress.

Any challenge to this technological fetishism,

therefore, is surely and sorely resented.

Nevertheless,

this essay is, on the one hand, an attempt to revitalize
the

critical attitude of such thinkers as Jacques Ellul and

Martin Heidegger, who viewed technological culture not only
as a threat to alternative ways of life but also as a threat

to man's receptiveness to as yet unconceived possibilities.
It is because of this menacing nature of technological

culture that

I

seek to criticize and challenge it.

But,

on

the other hand, this essay differs from many earlier

critiques in several important respects.
To begin with, this essay does not claim to reveal

anything about the essence of technology, anything that is

2

present in, or underlies, every
manifestation of technology.
Rather, what I offer here is nothing
more than a perspective
on technological culture.
As a perspective, it is one
among
others, without any claim to special
status because
it has

glimpsed something timeless in the
phenomenon of technology.
To put it differently, this essay
treats technology as
something which can be thought of along
various
lines, none

of which is capable of revealing the
"heart of the matter"
of technology.
it is only by approaching technology
from

various perspectives that one can begin to
understand and,
perhaps, resist it. And there is no reason
for believing
that after experiencing technology from various

perspectives, one will be able to completely grasp
it and
utter a final word on the subject. So in regard to
those

interpretations which have been offered as revelations of
the essence of technology, it is not so much that

them wrong, but that

I

I

find

find they claim too much for their

insights

Another difference between this and many other
perspectives on technology is that the one offered here does
not trace the phenomenon of technique (Ellul)

machine (Mumford)
origins.

,

or techne (Heidegger)

,

,

or the

back to its

If the goal was to uncover the essence of

technology, perhaps it would be necessary to follow the

leaders back in their search for the original manifestations
of technology.

Even if one abandons the hope of glimpsing

3

essences, however, there is still
the temptation to extend
one's perspective to include some
of the historical
developments of technology. such a
historical foundation
provides a certain legitimacy to one's
perspective, in the
sense that one would appear to have
a thorough understanding
of the issue, and in the sense that
one would be able to

engage other leading perspectives (e.g.
those of Jacques
Ellul and Lewis Mumford) on many points.
But even if one could effectively borrow
the

legitimating form of essential interpretations,
while
renouncing their exaggerated claims, there is
still reason
for resisting the temptation to subsume the
history of

technology under one's perspective.

By tying one's

interpretation of modern technical culture to a long
tradition of technical apparatuses, one recognizes the
important

innovations in technological development, but one risks
losing sight of the web of relations, or better, the lines
of power, through which technology flows in modernity.

And

it is through such an ensemble of lines that technology

helps to form and shape the modern self.

Since the primary

concern of this essay is the fetishistic attitude of the

modern self toward technology,

I

will focus only on modern

technology, and even then the concern will be primarily with
the relation between men and technical culture, and not with
the features of technical apparatuses.

4

It must be emphasized that this
imposition of limits on

the historical treatment of technology
is not offered as a
methodological principle which is to be
universally applied.
I am not making the claim
that modernity can be understood
only on its own terms, that only by
focusing on the modern
can one understand modernity.
On the contrary, this essay
will develop a broad historical
perspective, but one that
does not take the phenomenon of technology
as its central
theme.
Instead, modern technology will be portrayed
as an

element of a different historical line, one
which reveals
aspects of technology which are often overlooked
by

histories of technical development.
In its treatment of modern technology, this
essay

differs in a third way from many other perspectives
on
technology.

This difference lies in what

would describe as the line of attack.

description is telling in itself.

but not they,

I,

(This difference in

Many interpreters of

modern technology focus on the way in which technology
expands and invades every facet of nature and/or society,

establishing an order throughout.

I

have in mind here

interpreters such as Ellul and Heidegger.

1

There is no

doubt that technology does expand in such a manner and that
it does tend to engulf not only nature, but all human

activities as well.

But by focusing on this expansion, and

mapping out the advances of technology, one does little to
foster resistance to the power of technology.

Indeed,

5

Ellul's monolithic portrayal of modernity
in The
Technolog ical Society leaves virtually
no room
resistance.

for

But there is resistance to
technical culture.

A paradoxical example of this
resistance is the rise of
Islamic fundamentalism, which rejects
the technological
culture of the West.
In its resistance to this
culture,

fundamentalism has indeed employed certain
military
techniques and apparatuses from the West, and
has also
developed terroristic techniques of its own,
but the point
is that this technology is directed against
the ever-

expanding technical culture, in order to resist it.

While

the image of black-veiled women carrying automatic
rifles
and grenade-launchers may be disturbing to the logic
of the
West, Islamic fundamentalism, despite its inconsistencies,

does reject technological development.

(Could these Islamic

countries effectively resist Western culture without using
its weapons?)

And even within technical culture itself,

there are subterranean economies which lie beyond the

control of the economic techniques of the state, and there
are acts of sabotage and protests which are intended to

thwart the deployment of new military and nuclear-power
technology.

Without getting into the merits of any of these

forms of resistance, the point is simply that technical

culture is not nearly so tightly ordered, or efficient, as
some have portrayed it.

occurs at various levels.

Resistance, however effective,

6

This essay, in its attempt to
challenge technical
culture, will not focus on the
imperialistic character of
modern technology. This is not to
deny that it might
be

worthwhile to draw

a

map which complements the one of

technological expansionism, and points
out the various ways
in which technology is resisted as
it expands in society and
nature. 2 But the resistance which this
essay strives to
incite is found in a different area, or on
a different
level, and therefore requires a different
approach.

Instead

of focusing on the way in which technical
culture expands,

this essay is concerned with the way in which
it becomes

narrow and pointed, that is, the way it penetrates
and
shapes modern individuals and renders them technofetishists.

In other words, this essay is concerned with

the way in which technology effects the values of

individuals.

There are two basic questions which can be

asked at this level:

What is the value of technology to

modern individuals?; and why do they hold this value in such
high esteem that, even when faced with technological dangers
and dilemmas, they hope for solutions that will enable them
to maintain and develop technical culture?

Before

I

begin

to answer these questions, however, there are a few points

that must be made about inquiries which are carried out at
the level of values.

The first of these points is that the interpretation of

technoloqical culture from the perspective of values does

7

not constitute a novel approach to the
issue.

Early in the

twentieth century Max Scheler pointed out
that despite its
claim of value-neutrality, modern science,
as well as its

technological application, were guided by
a particular value
- namely, the domination of nature. 3
For various reasons,
Scheler -s influence and reputation have not
kept pace with
those of his contemporary German colleagues,
Husserl and

Heidegger/

During the peak of his career, however, he
was

considered one of the most influential of the German
philosophers. 5

Indeed, Heidegger expressed his gratitude

toward Scheler by dedicating Kant and the Problem of

Metaphysics to his memory, saying that the content of that

book "was the subject of the last conversation in which the
author was privileged once more to experience the unfettered

power of his [Scheler' s] mind." 6

Despite the neglect into

which Scheler 's thought has since fallen, there does remain
one area in which his influence is still effective, and this

area concerns his insight into the value of modern

technology.

Several thinkers, such as Herbert Marcuse and

William Leiss, have taken up and developed Scheler 's ideas
about the domination of nature.

There are several reasons for briefly examining
Scheler' s insight into the technological age, as well as the

development of that insight by others.

First, Scheler 's

approach to the question of the value of modern technology
is structurally similar to my interpretation.

An

8

examination of Scheler 's thought will
help to clarify
through examples some of the distinctions
I made above
concerning the differences between my
and other perspectives
on technology.
Second, Scheler and I have both
been
influenced in our attitude toward technology
by the thought
of Nietzsche, and we both seek to
expand Nietzsche's
critique of Christian morality into a critique
of
technology.
Third, the value which Scheler identifies
and
examines is the complement, or shadow, of the
value I
examine. And fourth, the development of Scheler's
insight
by certain theorists constitutes a strand of
thought which
has greatly influenced the perspective offered here.
Nevertheless, this strand of thought succumbs to certain

pitfalls which will be avoided in this inquiry into the
value of technology.

Scheler pointed out that scientific knowledge was not
value-free; for Scheler, no form of knowledge or action
could be.

Echoing Nietzsche's claim that "[t]he question of

values is more fundamental than the question of certainty,"

Scheler wrote that "all perceptions and thoughts, with
regard to the laws governing the selection of their possible
objects, and, not any less fundamental, all our actions, are

rooted in the conditions of valuation and drive-life

8
.

(Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis in quoted material is

that of the author quoted, and any brackets are mine.)

Nietzsche's "profound influence" 9 upon Scheler, however,

7

9

extended far beyond the latter 's general
recognition of th e
primacy of values and valuation.
indeed, Scheler's critical
interpretation of modern, technological
culture was grounded
upon another of Nietzsche's insights.
From Scheler's perspective, the
distinction between the
medieval and modern periods is based on
a difference in
their ethos, or value structure.
In the medieval period,
spiritual values were held in high esteem,
and a caste of
priests and monks served as the guardians of
these values. 10
Nobility and status were also valued in this
age, and there
was, according to Scheler, a strong sense
of community

uniting all levels of feudal society. 11

with the rise of

the bourgeoisie, however, a new ensemble of values
emerged

which challenged the feudal order.

In opposition to the

feudal values of nobility and hierarchy, the bourgeoisie

raised the banner of equality; in opposition to the strong
bonds of the community, individualism was touted.

Most

importantly for Scheler, however, was the bourgeoisie's

elevation of the value of utility to the position of

preeminence which spiritual values had held in the medieval
period.

This elevation of utility above spiritual values

indicated, for Scheler, a fundamental subversion of the

hierarchy of values.

Revealing a certain hesitancy on his

part to fully accept the implications of Nietzsche's

thoughts about values, Scheler had tried to establish an

absolute hierarchy of values against which any culture or

10

age could be measured.

12

m

this hierarchy, spiritual

values were superior to utilitarian
ones.
What is important for this essay,

however,

is not

Scheler's hierarchy of values, but
is rather his explanation
of the motivation for the modern
subversion of that
hierarchy.
in this explanation, Scheler
relied once again
on the thought of Nietzsche, and
claimed that the source
of

the bourgeois subversion of values
was ressentiment.

Nietzsche developed the idea of ressentiment
in The
Genealogy of Morals where he traced the
tenets of Christian
morality back to a moral revolution initiated
by the Jewish
,

slaves.

Unable to live according to the noble,
powerful
13
(i.e. good
standards and values of their masters,
the

)

slaves' resentment and hatred of those masters
festered and

eventually poisoned their minds.

The slaves' frustration

with their inability to live a noble life was compounded
by
their inability to act upon their hatred.

Eventually,

however, the slaves, with the assistance of their priests,

were able to have their revenge, in the form of an inversion
of the existing values.

14

The priests declared to the

slaves that the traits and values of the noble masters were

actually evil, and that those who lived according to that
code were, despite all appearances, not happy, but damned.

Along with this derogation of the masters and their values,
the slaves also exalted their own impotence and servility to

the position of virtues.

Their inability to do great

11

things, to exert power and
influence, was portrayed as
a
choice, and in "choosing" not
to live a life of nobility,
but a life of meekness and
humility, the slaves attained™

other-worldly salvation.
Given the "subterranean- nature
of such a revolt, it
has taken "two millennia to
prevail." 15 Christianity, of
course, has been the primary vehicle
for this revolution,
but in the nineteenth century Nietzsche
recognized that
Christianity had served its purpose and
was becoming
a

hindrance to the continuation of the
revolt. 16

it is at

this point that Scheler took up the
Nietzschean theme.
Scheler was concerned with the post-Christian,
utilitarian
ethos of modernity, and as indicated above,
he interpreted
the emergence of this ethos as another
instance
of

ressentiment.

Unable to live according to the standards of

the feudal aristocracy, the petty bourgeoisie
elevated their

situation and circumstances to the level of the highest
values, and judged all other values accordingly.

As the

slaves had exalted their meekness and humility, and looked

upon their masters as objects of pity, the petty bourgeoisie
elevated their commonness (equality) and usefulness, and

derogated the spiritual values of the aristocracy. 17

in

both these instances, the inversion or subversion of values
was motivated by ressentiment.

But Scheler did not treat

the bourgeois ethos simply as an analogy to the moral revolt
of the slaves; rather, he saw the utilitarian ethos as the

12

latest phase of that revolt.

As Scheler put it,

utilitarianism was the "chief
manifestation of the
ressentiment slave revolt in modern
morality." 18

m

thi
sense, Scheler can be said to
have carried Nietzsche- s
genealogy of morals forward into
the post-Christian era
(It should be mentioned that
Scheler, as in the case of his
interpretation of Nietzsche's thoughts
on values, tried to
pull back from some of the consequences
of

Nietzsche's

genealogy of Christian morality.

m

fact,

Scheler tried to

salvage the essence of Christianity,
as opposed to its particular historical manifestations, from
Nietzsche's
19
attack.
)

Toward the end of his career, Scheler seems
to have
reevaluated his earlier interpretation of the
modern age.
It was no longer the value of utility which
served

as the

distinguishing feature of the technological age.

As Scheler

emphasized
The basic value that guides modern technology is not
the invention of economical or 'useful' machines
It aims at something much higher.
... it is the idea
and value of human power and human freedom vis-a-vis
nature that ensouled the great centuries of 'inventions
and discoveries' - by no means just an idea of utility.
It concerns itself with the power drive, its growing
predominance over nature before all other drives. 20

Scheler pointed out that in the feudal period, the

power-drive had been directed at the domination of other
men, but in the modern period, the domination of nature was

the object of the power-drive; he called this modern drive

13

"the will to control nature."-

Although this later insight
of Scheler's may seem to
mitigate the importance of his

earlier work on modern ressentiment,
he insisted that the
will to control nature was
firmly grounded in "the new
type
of bourgeois humanity, with its
new drive structure and its
new ethos."" The will to control
nature

^

therefQrej
also born of ressentiment, and
carried on the revolt of the
slaves
_

Some contemporary thinkers have
further developed
Scheler's insight into modernity's
drive to dominate nature,
but before turning to this development

I

must point out

certain similarities between Scheler's
perspective on
technological culture and the one to be
developed in this
essay.

To begin with, there is a structural
similarity

between these two perspectives.

As

stated earlier, my

I

essay will focus on the value of technology in
the modern
period.

Scheler was also primarily concerned with the

distinction in values that set the modern age apart from
the
medieval.

And Scheler also ultimately connects his

interpretation of the technological age with
historical trend

-

a

longer

the slave revolt in morality.

I,

too,

will eventually make such a connection with a historical
trend.

More important than this structural affinity between

Scheler's perspective and mine, however, is their
substantive similarity.

Scheler and

I

are both heavily

14

indebted to Nietzsche for the conceptual
schemes that we
develop.
Following up on Nietzsche's insights
into
the

primacy of values and valuation,
Scheler uncovered the
values which underlie the professed
neutrality (i.e. valuefreedom) of modern science and
technology.

And, of course,

the larger historical framework
into which Scheler fits the
modern ethos is a Nietzschean one.
I, too, take my clues
about the value of technology from Nietzsche,
although the
value that I will emphasize is neither the
value of utility
nor the domination of nature.
I take my lead from

Zarathustra, who said upon his return to men and
their

cities
I go among this people and keep my
eyes open: they
have become smaller and are becoming ever smaller:
and their doctrine of happiness and virtue is the
'

cause.
For they are modest even in virtue - for they
want ease.
But only a modest virtue is compatible
with ease.

It is this desire for ease which will be the primary

focus of this essay.

For etymological reasons which will be

discussed in a later chapter,
this desire "convenience,

11

I

choose to call the object of

rather than ease.

In any case,

the main contention of this essay will be that the value of

technology in modernity is centered on technology's ability
to provide convenience.

The aim of my essay, however, is

not to lament the smallness or mediocrity of modern men and

their virtues.

It is rather to throw some light on, and

thereby loosen, the hold which technology has on modernity.

15

The desire for convenience seems
to be an integral part
of
that hold, as well as an integral
part of the modern self.
The larger historical trend
into which I will
ultimately fit my discussion of
convenience is also a trend
which Nietzsche traced. While
Scheler turned to the first
eSSaY ° f The Genealogy of Morals for
his historical
perspective, I will rely on the third
essay, in which
Nietzsche outlines the history of the
ascetic
ideal.

Although a claim that technical culture
somehow fits in with
the history of asceticism may seem
incomprehensible at this
point, this connection should become
clearer once the idea
of convenience has been fleshed out.

One more similarity between Scheler and
myself must be
pointed out, and this similarity has to do with
the manner
in which we approach the values of the
technical age.

in

identifying utility, and later, the will to control
nature,
as the primary values of this age, Scheler 's aim
was to

criticize those values by showing how they emerged from
certain baseness.

a

In this critical endeavor, Scheler can be

thought of as a genealogist, at least in the sense of genealogy expressed by Gilles Deleuze:

Genealogy means both the value of origin and the
origin of values. Genealogy is as opposed to
absolute values as it is to relative or
utilitarian ones. Genealogy signifies the
differential element of values from which their
value itself derives. Genealogy thus means origin
or birth, but also difference or distance in the
origin.
Genealogy means nobility and baseness,
nobility and vulgarity, nobility and decadence in
the origin.
The noble and the vulgar, the high

crftical'^ent!-

^

^

16

trUly

logical

and

must emphasize that the claim being
made here is not
that Scheler was a thorough-going
genealogist; his attempt
to construct an absolute hierarchy
of values belies such a
claim.
But in regard to his interpretation
of the
I

underlying value of modernity, Scheler
was doing genealogy.
He treated neither utility nor the
will to control nature as
the logical outcome of historical
progress, or as a value
which was grounded in some fact of human
existence.
Rather,

these values were regarded as the outcome of
certain shifts
in relations of force, as the outcome of
a reversal
in the

struggle between the noble and the base.
the value of convenience,

I

In my treatment of

too share this genealogical

attitude toward values, which treats them as the signs
of
struggle, and

I

a

also attempt to criticize and reevaluate

this particular value.

In a sense, Scheler and

complementary genealogies of modern values.
which Scheler focused

-

offer

I

The value upon

the domination of nature

-

has been

the value which guides the cutting edge of technology; it is
the value pursued by the leaders of technological progress,
the scientists and technicians.
on the other hand,

The value of convenience,

is the value of the masses,

of those who

are led to consume the products of technical culture. 25

will support this claim in the next chapter.

And later,

I
I

will also claim that there has been a partial shift in the

17

positions of these complementary
values, and that
convenience (in an extended sense

of the word) has come to

lead certain aspects of technological
innovation.
For now,
however, all I want to do is point
out the complementarity'
of Scheler's genealogical project
and mine.

While this genealogical impulse of
Scheler marks a
particular affinity between our perspectives
on modernity,
this same impulse distinguishes Scheler
from certain others
who have followed up on his insight into
the domination of
nature.
I have in mind here theorists
such as Max
Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and William Leiss,
all of whom
can be considered critical theorists in the
sense first

articulated by Horkheimer. 26

These thinkers coupled

Scheler's insight with the dialectic, thereby
eliminating
"the truly genealogical and critical element," or
put

differently, the Nietzschean element, of Scheler's thought.

Since Scheler is valuable to me primarily for that

Nietzschean element,

I

must briefly examine this coupling of

the will to control nature and the dialectic.

Such an

examination will reveal the grounds for my avoidance in this
essay, of any dialectical interpretation of the value of

convenience.

It will also lay the foundation for the claim

which will be made later, that critical theory, rather than

pulling in the reins on technology, actually spurs it on
into new areas of development.

This unintended outcome of

critical theory is not the result of any dialectical tension

18

within the school of thought,
or between it and social
reality; it is the result of
dialectical thought itself.
Critical theorists such as those
mentioned above accept
(tacitly or otherwise) Schelers claim that science
is not
value-free, but rather serves the
value of dominating
27
nature.
But these theorists point out
a shortcoming of
Scheler' s thought: he neglected to
take into account the
social context in which such
domination
is pursued.

Consequently, Scheler remained blind
to the fact that under
existing social conditions of injustice
and inequality, the
scientific domination of nature results
in the everincreasing domination of men through,
and by, technology.
In the words of William Leiss, "Advances
in technology
clearly enhance the power of ruling groups
within societies
and in the relations among nations; and as
long as there are
wide disparities in the distribution of power
among
individuals, social groups, and states, technology
will

function as an instrument of domination" 28

-

the domination

of men, that is.
It is here that the dialectic is grafted onto Scheler'

thought.

The will to dominate nature is rendered

contradictory, irrational by this negativity of social

injustice and inequality.

And through the elimination, or

negation, of this negative social atmosphere, the will to

dominate nature can be rendered rational, and technology

^
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win

be able to fulfil! its
original gQal Qf
freedom and security.

Through the use of the dialectic,
therefore, critical
theory has been able to salvage
the will to control nature.
The irrational, dangerous
trajectory of technology in
modernity stems not from the value
of dominating nature, but
from the injustice of advanced
industrial society.
Critical
thought, consequently, must work
toward the elimination
of

relations of domination and subordination
among men; as
Marcuse put it, this elimination is
"the only truly
revolutionary exigency, and the event
that would validate
the achievements of industrial
civilization." 29 it would
also validate the will to control nature,
and the critical
theorists mentioned here do indeed expect
that any
just

society of the future would have to carry
on the conquest of
nature. 30
This salvaging which is accomplished by critical

theory's use of the dialectic is precisely what
makes it

unacceptable to me.

Instead of carrying out a ruthless

criticism of the bourgeois will to control nature, critical
theory ends up making it acceptable, rational.

This reveals

the extent of the dialectic's critical capacities.

It is

able to turn things on their heads, transforming the

decadent will to dominate nature into a noble goal to be

pursued into the future, but this dialectic is not capable
of cutting off the head of such a decadent value, and being

done with it.

Given the context in which
the dialectic ha
emerged in this essay, Gilles
Deleuze s judgement Qf it
seems particularly appropriate.
,

that exp ressPs its elf in th.

,

a

^ Mr ^^'^^^

create new ways of thinking and
feeling! 31
The underlying ressentiment of
the dialectical
treatment of the will to control
nature is revealed not on
in its formal properties of
negation and reaction, however
It is also evident in the
substance of critical theory,
which includes the valorization of the
will to control
nature, and a concern for justice,
equality, and the
elimination of relations of domination and
subordination.
As was indicated above, Scheler identified
such concerns,
along with the will to control nature, as
modern

manifestations of the slave revolt.

So from Scheler's

perspective, at least as it is interpreted here, any

progress or transcendence that is accomplished by the
negative dialectics of critical theory only amounts to

a

higher development of the slave revolt and another victory
for the masses.

From my perspective, however, the most objectionable
feature of the dialectic is its "bad conscience"

-

that is

its inability to forget, to let go of bad memories and

nihilistic values.

It is primarily for
this reason

treatment of the value of
convenience will not be
dialectical.
I will not portray
convenience

^J

as a certain
negativity which has derailed
the rational progress of
science and technology, and
which must be negated so that
technical culture can become
non-contradictory and capable
of fulfilling its promise
(threat).

M y goal is not to save

technical culture, but to undermine
it.
I will also not
portray convenience as an inherently
noble value which has
itself been sidetracked by some
social negativity, such as
economic and political injustice,
the elimination of which
would allow convenience to flower
in an environment
of

reason and freedom.

From my perspective, the desire
for

convenience is a weed, not a flower, and
my objective is to
uproot it.
While the perspective that

I

am developing may appear

extreme (what with its images of decapitations
and
vegicide), and perhaps unreasonable (in its
implied belief
that a value which has been carried along and
fostered
by

modern tradition can actually be uprooted)

,

such excesses

seem to me to be justified by those very considerations

which would give rise to these objections.

Because it is so

deeply engrained in modern culture, the value of convenience
can only be challenged by an aggressive attack. 32

A

reckless, all-out effort is required just to create the

space from which this value can be challenged.

There are additional
considerations which justify
the
excesses of this genealogy of
convenience, but these have
less to do with the traditional
inertia of convenience

than

with the broader tradition
of liberal individualism.
Any
inquiry into values faces
resistance from this liberal
tradition, which recognizes at
the core of the individual
private realm which lies beyond
the reach of social and
cultural forces." This private
realm

a

is one of beliefs,

intentions, desires, and most
importantly for this essay,
values.
Although liberalism's claim of
privacy in this
sphere was challenged by nineteenth
century social theorists
such as Hegel and Marx, that claim
still exerts enormous
influence on the self-understanding
of modern individuals
and is tightly bound up with their
claim to freedom.
Stuart
Hampshire articulates this influence when
he writes, "The
man who is comparatively free in the
conduct of his life is
active in the adoption of his own attitudes
and of his own
way of life; his decisions and intentions
are the best guide
to his future action; and just this is
the significance
of

calling him free."

34

it is to be expected, therefore, that

an argument such as mine, which claims that
a certain value
is not freely chosen by individuals, but
is demanded by the

technological order, will be met with a degree of self-

preserving (in a very literal sense) denial.
This liberal resistance to inquiries into values is

compounded in the case of my argument, because that argument

2.

is an invasion of privacy in a
second sense,

one which is

derived in part from the classical Greek
conception of
privacy.
For the ancient Greeks, the private
realm was not
located within the individual, as a sphere
of
beliefs,

values, and intentions, but rather, it
was located in the
household. My inquiry into the value of
convenience will

begin in the modern household, which,

I

will argue, still

retains elements of the classical conception
of privacy. 35
I will begin in the household because
it is there that

convenience reigns, and there that the self is shaped
by th
demands of the technological order. To put this
differently, it is through the consumption which occurs
in
the household that individuals "buy into" technological
culture.

These points will be taken up in the following chapter
The point

I

am trying to make here, however,

is simply that

my inquiry faces certain resistance, given that it is an
invasion of privacy, or a trespass, in a double sense.

It

challenges at once the privacy of the individual and the

privacy of the household (although these are not unrelated
spheres)

.

Consequently, the standard of success by which

evaluate my argument is not to be found in the degree to

which it is accepted, but is rather found in the level of
resistance and denial which the argument evokes.

The more

successful such a challenge is to these realms of privacy,
the louder and more vehement the denials should be.

While

I

this point can certainly be
interpreted as a bit of
sophistry (i.e. if you disagree
with my argument, you
have
proven me right), this
resistance to the inquiry
itself
should ultimately be transferred
to the technological
order
and the demands it makes.
it is this transfer, or
shift, in
that which is resisted which
is the ultimate criterion
of
the success of this essay.
For the serious threat posed
to
individuals today does not come
from arguments which

challenge the privacy of the realm
of beliefs, values,
but from unchallenged forces
which penetrate that sphere.
The value of convenience is one
such
force.

The course of this genealogy of
convenience begins with
an examination of the modern
household, interpreted as the
realm of consumption and as the realm
of necessity.
My
position on the household, while being
heavily influenced by
Hannah Arendt s The Human Pnnrtif^n,
runs counter to
Arendt -s thought in several ways.
I deal with these
•

differences in the chapter on the household.
This chapter also points out the relation
between the
things we consume and the modern attitude
toward necessity;
it is in this relation between consumption
and necessity

that the importance of convenience emerges.

Technological

conveniences, from my perspective, are valuable because
they

allow man to overcome, or deny, necessity.
In the third chapter,

I

examine some contemporary

Marxist perspectives on consumption.

These theorists,

I

argue, have made important
strides beyond structural
Marxism, in that they have
expanded their investigations
to
include modern consumption
patterns.
Some have even focused
on the characteristics of
the commodities which are
consumed
in modernity, an approach
which comes very close to my
own
investigation into modern attitudes
toward technology.
Ultimately, however, these
theorists fall short of the
extent to which I would like
ue ro
infn ™^
to nrv
P r ¥ lnto
modern consumption
practices and the value which
underlies them.
I argue that
even though these Marxist theorists
have begun to consider

consumption in their critical
examinations of modern
capitalism, they remain tied to the
idea that, ultimately,
consumption is determined by capitalist
relations of
production.

From my perspective, this assumption
hinders
these theorists' ability to penetrate
the technological
order, to challenge the hold which
technology has on
modernity.
In the fourth chapter,

offer a materialist reading of

I

the consumption practices of the United
States, the country
which has been the leader in establishing
consumption

standards.

In this chapter,

I

develop certain insights Marx

had concerning the uniqueness of the United States,
and

present an interpretation of American consumption practices
which challenges the Marxist reading of these practices,
as

presented in the previous chapter.

My claim, in this

chapter, is that the availability of land, or space, in the
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United States, presented a very
different atmosphere for the
development of capitalism than
that found in Europe.
The
availability of unsettled land in
nineteenth-century America
posed certain threats to
capitalist development which were
not found in Europe, and these
threats were met, I argue, by
the establishment of certain
consumption standards which are
based on the value of convenience.
in the fifth chapter,

I

move away from the strictly

materialist approach to the value of
convenience, and
examine a different dimension of the
problem of

technology.
My focus here moves away from the
spatial conditions of the
United States, and turns to the development
of certain
religious ideas, and the effect which they
have had on the
formation of modern consumption practices.
in this chapter
I examine Max Weber's controversial
argument in The

Protestant Ethic

,

and expand that argument with the help of

Nietzsche's insights into Protestantism and asceticism.

My

claim in this chapter is that modern consumption
practices,
which are based on the value of convenience, are a
uniquely

modern form of asceticism.
In the final chapter,

I

identify this modern asceticism

in the writings of four modern political philosophers:

Hobbes, Locke, Marx, and Marcuse.

My treatment of these

thinkers is not comprehensive, but instead traces the line
of modern asceticism as it runs through their thought.

Ultimately, my claim is that the fetishistic consumption of

technology in modernity is
the latest for™ in whioh
man's
conte.pt for the body, and
amtiety in
Qf
have worked themselves out.
Evidence in support of this
claim can be found in the
writings of those modern
theorists
mentioned above, and in the
direction in which some of
the
latest technological developments
are headed.
its most
extreme form, modern asceticism
manifests itself in

^^

m

Philosphical claims that death
must be seen as nothing more
than a technical limit which
must be overcome if man is to
be free, and in the scientific
attempts to develop computer
technology which will allow the human
mind to inhabit
the

machine, and thereby become free
to leave the planet earth,
and travel among the stars.
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CHAPTER

2

ARENDT, THE HOUSEHOLD, AND
CONVENIENCE

in

The.Huinai^o^

Hannah Arendt points out the
difference between the classical
Greek and the modern

conceptions of privacy.

m

ancient Greece, the realm of

privacy was not found within
the individual or the subject,
as it is for modernity.
instead, privacy was recognized
as
something inherent in the household.
The difference between
these conceptions of privacy was
not limited to the location
of the private, however.
For the Greeks, the household was
considered private not because it was
the realm
of beliefs,

desires, and values, but because it
was the realm in which
biological necessity prevailed. In the
ancient household
occurred the production and consumption
which was required
in order to sustain life, and in the
performance of this
necessary activity, the Greeks recognized the
fundamental
1

similarity between themselves and other animals.

Certain

routines were imposed upon all animals, including
the
Greeks, as a consequence of their embodiment.

However, the

Greeks distinguished the human from other animals
precisely
by its ability to free itself from the routines
imposed by
its body, and to undertake meaningful, unnecessary
activity.

That is, the Greeks distinguished themselves as humans by

their ability to move beyond the concerns which serve the

maintenance of biological, physical life, and to undertake

inquiries about the ultimate
purpose or ends of l ife
For
Aristotle, the unique thing
about humans was not simply
their capacity for rational
speech, but it was their
capacity to rationally
discuss the proper
Qf
set men apart from other
animals.* And it was through
discussions, and the attempt
to live according to the
knowledge revealed by them,
that men became fully human.
in ancient Greece, the
freedom from necessity which
provided the opportunity for such
discussion was attained by
certain adult males through the
practice of slavery and the
rigid differentiation of the
sexes.
Women and slaves
performed most of the necessary
activity in the household,
while free, adult males attained
human status through their
participation in the discussions, debates,
and decisions of
the polis, the public realm.
The Greek household,
.

^ ^^
^

therefore, was private in the sense that
those whose roles
were limited to performing its necessary
activity were
deprived of the opportunity of being fully
human.
As Arendt
puts it, "In ancient feeling the privative
trait of privacy,
indicated in the word itself, was all-important;
it meant
literally a state of being deprived of something,
and even
of the highest and most human of man's
capacities." 3

Arendt argues that this privative dimension of privacy
has been lost to modernity, that the private is no
longer
the realm of subhuman, slavish activity.

On the contrary,

modernity's conception of privacy is closely linked to its

3

ideal of freedom.

The "sphere of intimacy,"
as Arendt call
the private realm of modernity/
is a haven, not a hellhol
e
Arendts perspective on modernity, of course, encompasses
much more than this shift in
the status of the private f
rom
the position of unfreedom in
ancient Greece to that of
freedom in modernity. she identifies
several other

transformations which have occurred
alongside this shift.
On of those related transformations
which is

particularly important for this essay,
and is also
particularly disturbing to Arendt, is
the severance of the
ancient link between necessity and
the household.
The

demands of the body are no longer satisfied
within the
private household, but have been swept

out into the open.

The activity which is necessary to sustain
life is now
performed as social, not private, activity. For
Arendt,
"Society is the form in which the fact of mutual
dependence
for the sake of life and nothing else assumes
public sig-

nificance and where the activities connected with sheer
survival are permitted to appear in public." 5

in other

words, society is a form of public household.

In making

this claim, Arendt is not referring primarily to the

activity of the liberal or socialist state, which provides

certain goods and services to individuals.

Rather, it is

the economy that Arendt has in mind when she refers to the
social.

It is as participants in the economy, as

jobholders, that modern individuals appear in public.

The

predominant concern for members
of mass society lies
in
satisfying the demands of the
life processes for themseH
Lves
and their dependents. 6
"Productive members of society,"
as
opposed to ancient citizens,
are not concerned with
the
ultimate ends of human life,
but are concerned only with
making a living. This is all
there is to the public
activity of the member of society.

Arendt has a certain difficulty
with the emergence of
this social realm (which she
dates as beginning around the
sixteenth century 7
it would appear that the
source of
this difficulty lies with the effect
which the development
of this realm has had on public
activity.
When the guiding
force in public life is the attainment
of the wherewithal to
satisfy the life processes, there is no
longer any
)

.

room or

time left in which to pursue the unnecessary,
and thereby
human, goals of the Greek polis.
The Greek desire to attain
some measure of immortality through the
public presentation
of great works, words, or deeds 8 finds no
quarter in an age

where mortal, bodily considerations prevail.

in such an

age, political life is reduced to bureaucratic

administration, a sort of public housekeeping which tries
to
organize social laboring. 9
It seems, however, that there is more to Arendt

•

dissatisfaction with the modern social realm than its
devaluation of heroic political action.

There is something

else about modernity which bothers Arendt, and this is
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indirectly indicated by her
treatment of Christianity.
As
Arendt points out, the decline
of the ancient public
realm
began with Socratic philosophy,
which identified
contemplative life as superior
to an active life in the
poll.." This denigration of
public activity was maintained
and developed by Plato, Aristotle,
and the stoics, but it
was Christianity, Arendt claims,
which transformed the
contemplative, apolitical life of the
philosophers
into "a

right of all.-"

Indeed, Arendt writes that the
fall of the
Roman Empire and the diffusion of
the Christian gospel of an

eternal afterlife together made any
striving for an earthly
immortality futile and unnecessary.

And they succeeded so well in making
the vita
activa and the_bios politikos the handmaidin~i
of
contemplation that not even the rise of the
secular in the modern age and the concomitant
reversal of the traditional hierarchy between
action and contemplation sufficed to save
oblivion the striving for immortality whichfrom
originally had been the spring and center of
the
vita activa l<
.

If Arendt' s only gripe against modernity
is its lack of
a sphere of public activity

(in the Greek sense),

one would

expect that she would find the denial of earthly
immortality
-

the spring and center of Greek political life

most significant feature of Christianity.
the case.

-

to be the

But this is not

Rather, she identifies the revaluation of life

itself as "the most important reversal with which

Christianity had broken into the ancient world." 13

As was

indicated above, the Greeks held biological life and its

demands to be something less
than human. Aren dt
claims that
Christianity reversed that
Greek attitude toward
physical
life, and elevated life
to the level of the
sacred.- B y
this, Arendt means that
Christianity viewed life on
earth,
or mortal life, as essential
to the attainment of the
eternal life offered to men by
Christ.
it was only through
life on earth that one could
enter heaven. Arendt goes so
far as to claim that according
to Christianity, "to
stay

alive at all costs had become

a

holy duty." 15

The difference which Arendt
finds between the Greek and
the Christian attitude toward
life is revealed by comparing
their different attitudes toward
suicide.
Arendt points out
that part of the Greek contempt for
the slave was based on
his choice of a life of slavery over
death. 16 in refusing
to commit suicide rather than live
as a slave, the slave was
repulsive to the Greeks.
the situation of one who was
about to be enslaved, the Greeks found
death to be a more
noble choice than life.
in support of her claim that

m

Christianity reversed the Greek attitude toward
life, Arendt
cites the Christian refusal to bury on blessed
ground those
who commit suicide. Those who choose to kill
themselves,

instead of continuing to live even the most wretched
existence, cannot enter heaven and are denied eternal
life.

Further support for Arendt »s claim can be found in the

Catholic Church's prohibition of abortion, and its recent

opposition to the reproductive techniques that have been
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developed by m edical science.

Because it is sacred, argues

the church, life should
not be artificially created
or
ended.
One possible reason why
this Christian elevation
of
life is more important for
Arendt than its denial of
earthly
immortality is that this reverent
attitude toward life has
become one of the central
features of modernity. The
Christian belief in an other-worldly
immortality, on the
other hand, has been abandoned.
Christianity's "fundamental
belief in the sacredness of life
has survived, and has even
remained completely unshaken by,
secularization and the
general decline of the Christian
faith." 17 The form which
this reverence for life takes in
modernity is, according to
Arendt, the over-arching concern for
the production process,
or the economy.
it is through the productive
activity of
man that the life of the species is
preserved.
While the
concern for the life of the species, rather
than the

individual, is a significant difference between
modern
society and the Christian community, the
reverence of life
runs through both ages.

In this sense, Arendt sees Marx as

an unwitting smuggler of Christian attitudes
into modernity.

But the fact that the sacredness of life exerts
its

influence on modernity is not a sufficient explanation
of

Arendt 's ranking it as the most important effect of
Christianity.

There is no reason for treating the longevity

of this influence as an indication of its importance.

Another possible explanation
for her ranking can be
found in the detrimental
effect which the modern
form of the

explicitly claims that society,
in which the life of the
species is preserved, continually
encroaches upon political
life, further decreasing
the possibility for public
action.- But this explanation
is also insufficient.
For
if the standard for her
ranking is the effect which
Christianity has had on public
life, it would appear that
the belief in an otherworldly
afterlife, which cast
into

oblivion the desire for earthly
immortality, would be more
important than the revaluation of
life.

A more sufficient explanation of
Arendt's ranking of
the effects of Christianity is
available, but this
explanation is grounded less upon Arendt's
explicit concern
with the decline of politics and public
life than with an
underlying, muted concern of hers. This
concern is for the
loss of the ancient private realm, in
and of itself, and not
because of the effect which this loss has
had on the public
sphere.
Arendt thinks that certain human activities those

associated with the body and the life processes

-

should not

be seen, that they should be kept from public
view.

in

ancient Greece, these activities were hidden in the
household.

And the reason why these activities were, and

from Arendt's perspective should be hidden, is that they
are
not worthy of public exposure.

19
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To put this differently,
there seems to he in
Arendf s
thought a certain conte.pt
for the body and the
l ife
processes, a content she
recognizes and admires in
the
Greeks.
The Creeks considered
the slave contemptible
not
because he hindered public
life (indeed, such a
public lif e
was possible largely because
of the slave,
but because h e
displayed a certain baseness
in clinging to life above
all
else.
in his defense of slavery
in The^olitics, Aristotle
cites as natural slaves those
"whose condition is such that
their function is the use of
their bodies and nothing better
can be expected of them. -»
For the body is inferior to
the
mind, and those whose bodies
are stronger than their minds
are inferior to mentally
developed and active individuals.
Arendt's ranking of the effects
of Christianity, I am
arguing, is similarly based on the
attitude that the body
and the life processes are base.
By making physical, mortal
life an essential element in the
attainment of an eternal
afterlife, Christianity weakened the
stigma that the Greeks
had attached to the life processes. 21
Household activity
was no longer considered sub-human, but
was raised to the
level of a divinely sanctioned element
of human activity.
,

Given the underlying contempt which

I

suggest Arendt has for

such activity, it is understandable that she
would claim
that the Christian revaluation of life is the
most important

reversal accomplished by Christianity; it marked
the

beginning of the end of the ancient realm of privacy.
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This contempt for the life
processes is what I „ as
referring to earlier when I
claimed that there is more
to
Arendt.
dissatisfaction
with
s
society than her concern
for
its lack of heroic public
activity.
For the emergence of
society, which is the modern
form of the sacredness

of life

'

brought about the complete
collapse of the ancient
private
realm.
Even during the long reign
of Christianity, the
demands of the body were still
satisfied within the
household; it was only the status
of the household and its
activity which had changed with
Christianity. 22

m

society,

however, the life processes are
no longer hidden within the
household, but occur out in the
open, in public.
And while
Arendt writes that
i<s <=+->--iv-;„~
1 "itir ls
st nking that from the beginning
of history to our own time it
has always been the bodily
part of human existence that needed
to be hidden in privacy,
all things connected with the
necessity of the life process
itself," 23 my claim is that it is disturbing,
perhaps
disgusting, to her that this is no longer
the case.
Such
necessary activity, by its very nature,
argues Arendt,
should be hidden from public view.

Before

I

move on to an examination of some additional

consequences of Arendt -s contempt for the body,

I

should

briefly mention and respond to an objection that
might be
raised concerning the existence of this contempt.
Some

commentators on Arendt »s thought have pointed out the
important role which "natality" plays in her thought. 24

in
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Xh^Human Condition, Arendt claims
that

"

[t ]he

miracle that

saves the world, the realm of
human affairs, from its
normal, -natural, ruin is
ultimately the fact of natality,
in which the faculty of action
is ontologically rooted." 25
While this reference to natality
may seem to belie my claim
about Arendt's contempt for the
body, in that Arendt places
such great importance on this bodily
function, I think that
her use of natality instead supports
my claim.
'

First, the example of natality
which Arendt cites is
the birth of Jesus Christ.
She could hardly have chosen a
less typical example of human natality.
The birth of Christ
was not the result of the sexual union
of a man and a woman,
but was instead the result of an "immaculate
conception."

Furthermore, Christ did not die the typical death
of an
embodied human. He died, and then rose from
the dead.
The
images of Immaculate Mary, Virgin Mother, and the
risen
Christ, are at best, sanitized versions of the
human body,

and at worst, they are denials of the body.

More important than Arendt's choice of an example of
natality, however, is the use to which she puts this notion.
The last clause of the previous quote, which concerns "the

faculty of action," reveals the point which Arendt is trying
to make.

In the paragraph preceding the one from which the

quote was taken, Arendt discusses the faculty of action.
If left to themselves, human affairs can only
follow the law of mortality, which is the most
certain and the only reliable law of a life spent
between birth and death.
It is the faculty of
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action that interferes with this
law because it
^.^xorable
automatic course of
daily life, which in its turn,
dailv'l?^
as we saw
interrupted and interfered wiih
the cycle of the
biological life process. 26
The faculty of action, in
other words, interrupts the
daily routine of laboring activity
(the inexorable automatic
course of daily life) which is
the human response to the
law of mortality.
Action, in this sense, is a way
,

of

breaking out of the routines imposed
by man's mortality.
Therefore, natality, as the ontological
ground in which
action is rooted, should not be
interpreted as an Arendtian
celebration or affirmation of the body and
the
life

processes.

On the contrary, as Arendt uses the
term,

natality is the source of hope that man can
transcend the
limits imposed by his embodiment, and accomplish
something
immortal.
As such, the concept of natality

supports, rather

than weakens, my claim about Arendt

1

s

contempt for the body.

Although this contempt for the body is an underlying
theme of The Human Condition, it has a profound
influence on
Arendt' s text.

Her interpretations of modernity and

Christianity, not to mention her interpretation of classical
Greece, are all shaped by this attitude toward the body.

More to the point,

I

think that this contempt leads Arendt

to misinterpret each of these cultural periods.

From my

perspective, neither Christianity nor modernity holds life
to be as sacred as Arendt claims, nor did the Greeks find

the body to be thoroughly contemptible.

In each of these

cases,

Arendfs interpretation seems

to me skewed by ner

overreaction to the realm
of the body and its
needs.
Since the primary focus
of this essay is the
modern,
technological age, Arendt
-s j.in-erpreration
interpretation „<=
of modernity is
obviously of concern here,
but ju st as important
is Arenas
interpretation of Christianity.
This is because our
different perspectives on
modernity are greatly influenced
by our different
interpretations of Christianity,
contrary
to the post-modern
infatuation with discontinuity
and

rupture, Arendt and

I

both identify

l

ines of continuity

between Christianity and modernity,
although the lines we
identify are remarkably different.
in emphasizing Christianity's
treatment of physical,

'

biological life as a prerequisite
for entrance into the
heavenly kingdom, Arendt ignores
what might be considered
the other side of the Christian
attitude toward life. This
other side, which is grounded in
the Old Testament's account
of man's fall from grace, treats
the "law of mortality" and
the demands of the life processes
as punishment
for the

original sin.

Initially, God had created for man
a garden

in which he would live, and out of
the ground of that garden

"the Lord God caused to grow every
tree that is pleasing to
the sight and good for food; the tree
of life also in the
midst of the garden, and the tree of the
knowledge of good
27
and evil."
of this last tree, the tree of knowledge
of

good and evil, man was forbidden to eat.

God warned man
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that -in the day that you eat
from it you shall surely
die." 28 It was with the fruit of
this tree that the serpent
tempted woman, telling her that
"in the day you eat from it
your eyes will be opened, and
you will be Uke God, knowing
good and evil." 29

Adam and Eve, of course, ate of
this tree, and were
consequently expelled from the garden
by God.
They did not
immediately die, however, as one might
expect from the
warning that God had given them. But
the point of the
expulsion was to prohibit man from eating
of the tree of
life, and thereby to deny man the
possibility of attaining
everlasting life.
it was in this sense of losing eternal
life that man died. As God said to Adam
upon learning
of

the sin,

"'Behold, the man has become like one of Us,

knowing good and evil; and now, lest he stretch
out his
hand, and take also from the tree of life, and
eat, and
forever'

-

live

therefore the LORD God sent him out from the

garden of Eden." 30

And to keep him out, God stationed

a

band of angels and "the flaming sword which turned every
direction, to guard the way to the tree of life." 31

Man's mortality, therefore, was not part of his
original condition, but was the result of the first sin.
God had not initially forbidden man to eat from the tree of
life, but only forbade that he eat from the tree of

knowledge.

It was only after man ignored God's command, and

ate the forbidden fruit, that he was condemned to his mortal
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condition.

But there was ,ore to the
punishment than the
denial of everlasting life;
God also condemned man,
in his
mortality, to a life of increased
toil and labor.
Before the fall, bodily needs
were easily satisfied.
The fruit of the trees satisfied
man's hunger and water
flowed throughout the garden to
satisfy the thirst of man
32
and the trees.
But after the sin, God said
to Adam,
"'Cursed is the ground because of
you; in toil you shall eat
of it all the days of your life.
Both thorns and thistles
it shall grow for you; and you
shall eat the plants of the
field; by the sweat of your face
you shall eat bread, till
you return to the ground.'" 33

Not only did God make it more difficult
for man to
satisfy the needs of his body; he also
added to those needs.

Before the fall, Adam and Eve had no need
for clothes, and
were unaware of their nakedness. After their

sin, however,

they were ashamed of their uncovered bodies,
and sought to
hide themselves from the view of God. 34 in response
to a

need that they did not have before, God fashioned
clothes
for Adam and Eve before he expelled them from the
garden. 35

There was also a special facet of the punishment,

a

particularly cruel one, that God directed towards woman.
Because she succumbed to the serpent's temptation and led

man astray, God said to the woman, '"I will greatly multiply

your pain in childbirth, in pain you shall bring forth

chil dren; yet your desire

shau

shall rule over you."' 36
I

should emphasize that

I

^

^^^^

^^

am not claiming that
prior

tc

the fall there was no labor,
in either the procreative
or
the toilsome senses of the
word.
Arendt forcefully
criticizes those who make such
claims, and points out
that
the punishment consisted in
making labor (in both senses)
more burdensome and painful. 37
I agree with Arendtinterpretation of the Old Testament
on this point, at least;
before the original sin, there
was some pain in childbirth,
and the fruit trees which God
provided did require some
38
cultivation by man.
As is clear from the quote
in the
preceding paragraph, the pain of
childbirth was multiplied,
not created, as part of the
punishment.
it may not be as
clear, however, that the shift from
man's role as the
cultivator of fruit trees to the producer
of grains (the
plants of the field) was also part of
the punishment.
The
production of grains requires the yearly
preparation of the
fields, and the sowing of the seeds, not
to mention the
unending struggle to keep the field free from
"thorns and
thistles." By comparison, the cultivation of
fruit trees

requires little time or attention (especially in
Eden)

,

and

these trees continue to produce fruit for many
years.
But while

I

agree with Arendt that labor was not

created, just intensified, by the punishment for original
sin,

I

disagree with her concomitant claim that death, or
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human mortality, was not a result
of man's fall from grace,
in support of this last point,
Arendt simply states that
•'[n]owhere in the Old Testament
is death -the wages of
sin."' 39 There is no arguing with
this; the phrase Arendt
quotes is from Paul's epistle to
the Romans
(6:23).

But

this simple statement of Arendt -s
does little to contradict
the last verses of the third chapter
of the Book of Genesis,
some of which were quoted above. On
my interpretation, the
point of these verses is that God expelled
man from the
garden and blocked his return to the tree
of
life,

so as to

prevent man from eating of this tree, thereby
attaining
eternal life.
Before he sinned, man could have eaten of
this tree, but not afterward; this was part of
the
punishment.

Before it gets lost in this biblical quibbling, the

point which

I

am tryinq to make here is that, contrary to

Arendt 's claim, the Old Testament did not hold mortal life
and the life processes to be sacred, 40 but instead viewed

human mortality and the burdensome, painful nature of the
life processes as the results of oriqinal sin.

This is not

to say that the Old Testament held life and biological

necessity in the same contempt which Arendt found among the
Greeks, but that the Old Testament accepted necessity and

mortality in the spirit of guilt for the primal sin.
descendants of Adam, all men share in his guilt and
punishment.

As
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in the New Testament, the
figure of Christ comes to

redeem man from this guilt and to
offer him salvation. And
while it is true that this redemption
was accomplished
precisely by God's becoming man,
and by suffering, dying,
and being buried/ there remains
in Christianity a certain
ambivalence about mortal life that
Arendt misses.
1

On the

one hand,

it is only by living according
to the example of

Christ's life on earth, and then dying,
that one can be
redeemed and attain everlasting life; on
the other hand,
death is recognized by Christianity as a
punishment for sin.
This ambivalence is expressed quite clearly
by Augustine:
Undoubtedly, death is the penalty of all who
come
to birth on earth as descendants of the first
man;
nevertheless, if the penalty is paid in the name
of justice and piety, it becomes a new birth
in
heaven.
Although death is the punishment of sin,
sometimes it secures for the soul a grace that is
a security against all punishment for sin. 42
As for Arendt

's

claim that "to stay alive at all costs

had become a holy duty" 43 under Christianity, the gospels of

Christ's apostles, not to mention the deaths of the martyrs,

clearly refute this claim.

According to Mark, Christ

proclaimed to his followers, "'For whoever wishes to save
his life shall lose it; and whoever loses his life for my

sake and the gospel's shall save it.'" 44

John put it even

more emphatically: "'He who loves his life loses it; and he
who hates his life in this world shall keep it to life
eternal.

1

" 45

So much for the sacredness of life which

Arendt finds in Christianity.
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In fairness to Arendt,

I

should examine a

particular feature of Christianity which
appears, at first
glance, to support her interpretation.
This feature is the
Christian belief that at the second coming
of Christ
to

earth, the bodies of the deceased shall be
resurrected, and
for those who attain salvation, their bodies
will live

forever.

This certainly gives the impression that

Christianity does revere the body, but upon closer
examination, it becomes apparent that the resurrected,
immortal body of the saved is not the same body whose

demands the Greeks found slavish.

Augustine describes the

resurrected body as follows:
Just imagine how perfectly at peace and how strong
will be the human spirit when there will be no
passion to play the tyrant or conqueror, no
temptation even to test the spirit's strength.
And what a body, too, we shall have, a body
utterly subject to our spirit and one so kept
alive by the spirit that there will be no need of
any other food.
For, it will be a spiritual body,
no longer merely animal, one composed, indeed, of
flesh but free from every corruption of the
46
.

.

flesh.

Given this image of the resurrected body, Christianity

accomplishes less of a reversal of the Greek attitude toward
life and its demands (as Arendt interprets that attitude)

than a sanitization of life.

If,

indeed, the Greeks

relegated biological necessity to the shadows of the private
realm, Christianity promises to leave behind bodily demands

and routines when the saved individual ascends into heaven.
If Christianity holds life in high esteem, as Arendt claims,

it is not the life of the
mortal body that is esteemed,
but
the life of the spirit or
soul.

in a later chapter this
discussion of Christianity will
be continued, although not
in the context of a

confrontation

with Arendt.

But the issues raised in the
present

confrontation

-

death and burdensome necessity

-

will also

be central to that later
discussion of Christianity.
To return to her interpretation
of modernity, Arendt
recognizes in the emergence of modern
society a continuation
of Christianity -s reverent attitude
toward physical life.
She argues that the primary concern
of society is the
survival of the species, and that the
productive activity of

men is organized by society in order to
serve that end.
As
was the case with Arendt »s interpretation
of Christianity,
there is some truth to her claim that the
life processes are
highly esteemed in modernity.
I think Arendt is accurate
when she points out that members of society are
primarily

concerned with "making a living," and that, at least
ideally, society preserves the life of the species.

But it

is also the case here that Arendt 's interpretation
is

somewhat one-sided, and that she seems oblivious to certain

attitudes and trends which run counter to her claim

concerning the sacredness of life.

What

I

have in mind here

as counter-trends are not the obvious ones, such as the

proliferation of nuclear weapons or the non-military
degradation of the environment, both of which are social
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threats to the survival of the species,
and both of which
Arendt was certainly aware.
(it is on this point that
the
dialecticians would take Arendt to task,
emphasizing that
social production in the existing
atmosphere

of inequality,

exploitation, and injustice, seeks to
preserve the life of
one part of the species by putting
the rest at risk.)
Rather, I have in mind less obvious
attitudes and trends,
ones which are overlooked probably due
to their mundane
nature, and to the fact that they occur
in what remains of
the private household.

Since Arendt seems to think that there is no
private
household in modernity (for Arendt, all that remains
of

privacy in modernity is the realm of intimacy, and the
activities of the ancient household are now performed
in
society)
it is not surprising that she would overlook

these

,

counter-trends.

However, there are vestiges of the ancient

and medieval household which have survived in modernity, and

these traces have been infiltrated and organized by modern
technology.

An examination of what remains of the household

is therefore in order, both because it will challenge

Arendt' s depiction of modernity, by revealing a certain

modern contempt for the life processes, and because it will
reveal something about the way in which technology has

shaped the modern individual.

In fact, the point I will be

trying to make is that the fetishistic attitude toward

technology which characterizes modernity is based on such
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contempt for the life processes.

This should make obvious

the tension between Arendfs
interpretation of modernity and
mine.

At the beginning of this chapter,

pointed out that in
ancient Greece the household was
the sphere in which
production and consumption occurred.
Even business activity
was considered to be part of household
production/ 7 When
Arendt claims that society has emerged
as a sort of public
household, she has in mind the productive
dimension
I

of

household activity, and there is little doubt
that this
dimension has indeed become a social phenomenon.

in the

modern societies of the West and the East,
productive
activity is no longer organized by various private
households, but by ever-larger corporations (in the
West)
and by the state (in the West and the East). And
the

productive life of the individuals in both types of
societies is spent not as the member of a household, but as
a

worker or employee of an enterprise of much greater

dimensions

When one emphasizes the consumptive rather than the

productive activity of the household, however, it seems that
the private household has not been completely lost to

modernity, at least not in the West.

This is certainly not

to say that the ancient Greek or the Christian models of the

household have survived intact (or even that there were any

monolithic models for either period)

,

but only that certain
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elements of the private household
are still found in
modernity.
What remains of the household
is its role as a center
of economic activity.
it is no longer the primary
locus of
economic activity, as it was for
Greek citizens, and modern
economics, unlike the economics of
ancient Greece,
is no

longer concerned primarily with the
household.
But the
household, in an attenuated sense,
remains an important site
of economic activity.
it is the site where consumption
decisions are made, and where financial
resources
are

directed and distributed in order that the
members of the
household can consume what they need. Even
more
importantly, the modern household is the site
at which lines
of credit attach themselves to individuals,
and where

obligations are incurred for the sake of consumption.

While

all this economic activity may be peripheral to the
modern

science of economics, marketing, the new science of the
household, surely recognizes its importance.
In this capacity as the center of consumptive activity,

the modern household takes various forms.

The procreative

dimension of the household has diminished in modernity, and
motives other than the raising of children are often the
impetus for forming household associations.

Single-parent

households have also become more common, and of course, the

possibility remains for households of single individuals.
What is central to the idea of a modern household is not
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that individuals of certain statuses have
joined together,
but that there exists some source of
wealth or credit which
is used to satisfy the consumption
demands of the household.
In this sense, a single person, a gay
couple, a group of
individuals who share certain living expenses,
are all
examples of households. Heterosexual sex
and children are
no longer at the heart of the modern household,
at least as
I am using the term.
It is not just this consumptive activity which
ties

modern households to their counterparts in previous
epochs;
there is also present in modern households that element
of

necessity which played such an important role in defining
the ancient household.

And as was the case in the ancient

household, necessity directs much of the consumptive

activity of the modern household.

Of course, this is not to

say that the content of necessity has remained the same over

the centuries.

While there is a certain set of needs, such

as those for food, clothing, and shelter, which has remained

necessary from ancient times to the present, necessity
encompasses much more today than it did in the past.

In

fact, the content of necessity tends to continually expand

in modernity, especially in capitalist societies, as what

were once luxury items become necessities.

For example,

refrigerators and automobiles were once considered luxury
items, but changes in the distribution of food, the neglect
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of public transportation, and
shifts in the location of
workplaces and housing have made
such items necessary/ 8

Compared to the relatively limited
needs of the
ancient, by which I mean pre-modern,
household, many modern
needs hardly seem necessary, at
not least in the narrow
sense in which something necessary
is indispensable
for

life.

Life could certainly be sustained
without automobiles
or refrigerators.
But one must beware of making
distinctions such as real versus apparent needs,
biological versus
cultural needs, or even needs versus wants.
While there

undoubtedly is some truth to such distinctions,
and in
certain contexts they may be helpful (e.g
when

one is trying

to budget one's income),

for the purposes of this essay such

distinctions must be avoided because they conceal
some
important points.
The first of these points is made by Herbert Marcuse
in
a

different context, where he stretches the meaning of

"biological needs" to include culturally or socially

generated needs.

To quote Marcuse:

I use the term "biological""and "biology" not
in
the sense of the scientific disciplines, but in
order to designate the process and the dimension
in which inclinations, behavior patterns, and
aspirations become vital needs which, if not
satisfied, would cause dysfunction of the organism.
Conversely, socially induced needs and aspirations
may result in a more pleasurable organic behavior.
If biological needs are defined as those which
must be satisfied and for which no adequate
substitute can be provided, certain cultural needs
can "sink down" into the biology of man. 49
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Distinctions such as those listed in the
preceding
paragraph, therefore, obscure the fact that
certain needs,
despite their social origins, can become so
deeply ingrained
in the lives of individuals that they
are as necessary or as

real as any other need.

Another point, one which is crucial to this essay,
is
also obscured by distinctions such as those
mentioned

above.

Those distinctions, in making such a clear, unequivocal

break between ancient needs and those which have emerged
more recently, hide an important similarity that exists

between ancient and modern necessity.

This similarity is

that modern necessity, despite its comparatively expansive
nature, is grounded in the body, quite like ancient

necessity.

Of course

I

am not claiming that these types of

necessity are identical in their relation to the body; they
are significantly different.

But to distinguish modern

needs as artificial, unreal, or even unnecessary (in the

narrow sense) misses the difference

I

have in mind, and it

also conceals modern necessity's relation to the body.

A

more subtle, ambiguous, and undoubtedly debatable

distinction is required here.
The distinction

I

would like to make between ancient

and modern necessity is that ancient necessity was primarily

concerned with satisfying the demands of the body, while

modern necessity is largely focused on overcoming limits

which are imposed by the body.

By demands of the body,

I
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have in mind needs such as those for
food, clothing, a nd
shelter - the needs which were identified
by the rejected
distinctions above as real, biological,
or natural.
And by
limits of the body, I mean certain
features of embodiment
which are perceived as inconveniences,
obstacles,
or

annoyances.

Both these demands and limits will be
discussed

shortly, but first

I

must point out the difference between

this demand/limit distinction and those others.
In identifying ancient needs as demands of
the body,

I

am not trying to grant these particular needs
a special,

foundational status.

The point in distinguishing the

demands of the body from the limits which are imposed
by it
is not to set those demands apart as something
irreducible
or unavoidable, or to set them up as the measure of all

other needs.

In those distinctions

I

have rejected,

however, such hierarchizing is usually the aim of the

distinction.

The point

I

am making is simply that the

necessary activity of the ancient household revolved

primarily around satisfying the demands which the body makes
for food, clothing, shelter, water, and so on, and that this
is no longer the case in the modern household.

A brief

examination of the ancient Greek household will not only
help to illustrate this point, but it will also point out

another consequence of Arendt's aversion to the body.
In Xenophon's Oeconomicus

.

the activity of the Greek

household is portrayed during the course of

a

Socratic
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dialogue concerning the principles of
household organization
and management.
According to that portrayal, the
activity
which the wife supervised occurred
within the shelter of the
dwelling, and was comprised of "the
rearing of newborn
children ... the making of bread from
the crop

...

working of clothes from wool." 50

the

she did not have to

perform these tasks herself, but it was her
responsibility
to oversee the labor of the servants who
performed
them.

it

was also her responsibility to maintain order
in the house
by seeing to it that all tools and implements
were returned
to their proper place after being used, 51 and
that
all

provisions were stored properly and consumed at a rate
which
would ensure that they would not be prematurely depleted. 52
The wife was also supposed to look after the health of the
slaves. 53
It would seem, then, that Arendt was accurate in

depicting the Greek housewife as one who was occupied
primarily in the realm of the body.
Oeconomicus

But according to the

the husband was not as removed from the

household and necessity as Arendt would have one think.
Ischomachus, whom Socrates had questioned concerning the

principles of economics, answered not only by recounting for
Socrates the manner in which he educated and trained his

wife for her role as supervisor of indoor activities, but he
also discussed at much greater length his role as supervisor
of the household activities which occurred outside the
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dwelling.

Primary among these outdoor
activities was
farming, and this was true not
only in the case of
ischomachus.
Despite the developments which
were made in
various trades and crafts, classical
Greece was

predominantly an agricultural civilization.
estimated that during the fifth
century

it has been

B.C., nearly half of

Athens' population lived in the
countryside and worked the
5
soil. * it was the responsibility
of the husbands of these
country households to produce at least
enough olives, figs,
and grapes to satisfy the demands of the
household, and if
possible to produce a surplus which could
be sold. 55 Grains
were also a staple of the Greek diet, but
Greek households
were only able to produce one-quarter of the
amount

consumed. 56
In ancient Greece, successful harvests depended
on a

great deal of attention and diligence on the part of
the
husband.

The poor soil and arid climate of Greece required

that fields be fortified and replenished frequently, and
that an extensive irrigation system be developed and

maintained. 57

As was the case with the indoor activity,

most of these agricultural tasks were performed by slaves,
but the successful farmer was an active overseer.

Given

Arendt's interpretation of classical Greece, one would
expect that these agricultural obligations would have been

resented by the husbands as an imposition on their freedom,
but this is not the case.

In fact, Socrates declares in the

62

Oeconomicus

that "the pursuit of farming seems
to be at the
same time some soft pleasure, an
increase of the household,
and a training of the bodies so that
they can do whatever
befits a free man.- 58 And it was not
just the training of
the body which made farming conducive to
a good citizenry;
because of their careful attention to the
soil, Socrates
expected husbands to be eager to defend the
countryside
,

against foreign aggression. 59
It appears,

then, that the attitude of the Greek

citizen toward the household and necessity was not
as harsh
as Arendt portrayed it, and that the "gulf that
the ancients
had to cross daily to transcend the narrow realm of the

household and 'rise' into the realm of politics" 60 was not
so wide.

The household activity of farming, at least, seems

to bridge the gap between the household and the polis.

the one hand,

On

farming was dictated by physical necessity,

but on the other, it prepared men for political life, and

thereby improved and strengthened, as opposed to simply made
possible, that political life.

Other household activities

of the husbands, which Socrates lumps together as

"mechanical arts," were not so beneficial to political life.
Crafts and trades, such as metal forging, potting, and
cobbling, were considered inferior forms of economic, or

household, activity.

Not only did such activity ruin the

bodies of the participants, by requiring them to remain
seated indoors for long periods of time or to work close to
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a fire,

but it also deprived them of
"leisure to join in the
concerns of friends and of the city.- 61
For these reasons,
Socrates claims that such mechanics
are "reputed to be bad
friends as well as bad defenders of
their fatherlands." 62

Nonetheless, citizens did participate
in these mechanical
arts, although not to the extent
that metics, the resident
aliens, did. 63 And when citizens did
perform these
arts,

it

was not simply as overseers; the owners
of the various
workshops of classical Greece often worked
alongside the
64
slaves and workmen.

While the development of such crafts and trades
may
appear to indicate that the business activity of
ancient
Greece had moved beyond the demands of the body, this
is not
65
entirely true.
While activities such as mining, gilding,

instrument-making (flute and lyre), and weapon-making (sword
and shield) were not directed by the demands of the body,

many of the other mechanical arts were.

The fuller and the

cobbler were responding to the need for clothing; the potter

provided utensils which made possible the transportation and
storage of liquids such as olive oil, wine, and water; the

carpenter and woodcutter provided shelter from the elements.
Of course, the products of these craftsmen were not purely

utilitarian.

Athenian pottery, for example, was frequently

graced by the black-figures of the vase-painters, and some
pottery was never intended to store anything but was purely
ornamental. 66

Nevertheless, a significant amount of the
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manufacturing activity of Classical
classical rr
00 . 0 was undertaken
Greece
*
in
response to the demands of the body.
This prevalence of bodily demands
can even be
recognized in the extensive trading
activity of Athlens
This trade was not primarily in
manufactured goods, but was
instead an agricultural exchange.
The principal export of
Athens was olive oil, a product of
the husband, not the
artisan. 67 During this period, olive
oil was used not only
as a food, but was also used as a
fuel and a source
of

light.
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The export of olive oil, and to a
lesser extent

wine and manufactured goods, was used
primarily to acquire
grain - usually corn - which was shipped back
69
to Athens.

The maintenance of certain sources of imported
grain, and
the control of the routes by which such grain
made its way
to Athens, were a constant concern of the Athenians,
and a

crucial determinant of their imperial strategies. 70
fact,

in

it was in a battle to maintain the vital flow of
grain

from the Black Sea region that Athens lost the Peloponnesian
War.

In the battle of Aegospotami, the final battle of the

war, the Athenians lost the vast majority of their fleet and

control of the grain trade through the Hellespont.

They

were then quickly starved into surrender. 71
The demands of the body, therefore were of central

importance in classical Greece, and were not as shaded and

hidden as Arendt makes it seem.

The demand for food even

played an important role in the public, political activity
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of Athens.

mdeed, it appears that classical
Greece was not

completely free of the "social
housekeeping., which Arendt
identified as a distinctively
modern phenomenon. since
my
primary concern here, however,
is not to challenge
Arendt.
interpretation of classical Greek
political life, but to
distinguish ancient and modern
necessity, it is the
necessary activity of the private
sphere, the household,
which must be emphasized.
In the household of ancient
Greece, the demands of the body
held sway from the indoor
routines of cooking, cleaning, and
child-rearing
to the

agricultural practices of the husband;
they were even an
important factor in the development of
some trades and
crafts.
Therefore, a great deal of time was spent
in
classical Greece responding to the demands

of the body, and

this time was spent not just by women and
slaves, but by
free men as well.
In contrast, members of the modern household
spend much

less of their time in the service of the body's
demands.

Those demands are still satisfied by the household,
but no
longer through the time-consuming performance of
certain

reproductive tasks. 72

Rather, through the consumption of

technological apparatuses, or the products of such
apparatuses, the modern household quickly satisfies the

demands of the body.
Food, clothing, and shelter are no longer produced by

the household, but are only consumed there.

The production

66

of these and other 73 necessities
takes place in the

"public/private hybrid- which Arendt called
society.
while
technology has certainly been crucial
to the formation and
development of this social production
process, and that
production process has in turn been an
important influence
on the modern self, the concern of
this essay lies not with
the value which technology has for men
as members of this

production process, but with the value which
technology has
for consumers.
in their productive activity, men often
feel
to be constrained in their relation to technology;
they
think of themselves as slaves to the machines; 74
in order to
work, they have no choice but to use the newest

technological developments.

But in the consumption which

occurs in the household, men tend to think of themselves
as

unconstrained consumers.

In their consumption choices, men

are no longer the slaves of technology, but choose to use or

not use technology freely.

Because

I

think that this

liberal notion of the sovereign consumer obscures one of the

important ways in which technology shapes the modern self,
(see p.

19 of Chapter 1)

,

I

will focus on the household

consumption, rather than production, of certain

technological apparatuses.

Later in the essay

I

will

respond to those who would criticize this emphasis on

consumption rather than production.
As an example of the way in which technology is

consumed in the modern household, consider the case of

a
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bodily demand which loomed so large
for the Greeks - the
demand for food. Unlike the Greeks,
members of the modern
household do not spend most of their time
involved in the
production, preservation, and preparation
of food.

Instead,

the modern tendency is to buy food that
is already prepared,
refrigerate it at home until its ready to be
eaten, and then
to use one of the various forms of instant
heat to cook it.
Not only is the food consumed in the modern
household, but
things like refrigerators and microwave ovens
are also

consumed in the satisfaction of the body's demand
for food.
And one can, of course, extend this list to include
the

various agricultural and transportation technologies which
are indirectly consumed along with the food itself.

following chapter

I

In a

will examine the development of some

household technologies, many of which are focused on the
demands of the body, so for now let this example suffice.

I

just want to point out here that the modern household

consumes a wide array of technological products and

apparatuses in order to quickly and easily satisfy the
demands of the body.
It is no accident that

I

have used the issue of time to

distinguish the ancient and the modern households, just as
it is no accident that

I

have used terms like save, consume,

and spend to discuss the issue of time.

Such economic terms

are appropriate to a discussion of temporality because the

issue of time is central to the activity of the household.
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in the ancient household,

it was important that they
way in

which time was spent be properly
organized and managed; it
was through such careful attention to
time that the
satisfaction of the body's demands could
75
be ensured.

The

modern household, however, is less concerned
with satisfying
the demands of the body than it is with
satisfying them
quickly.
The demands of the body are no longer
thought of
as requiring careful attention and proper
planning, but are
seen instead as inconveniences, in that they
limit
or

interfere with the use of time.
am arguing,

The value of technology,

I

lies in its ability to mitigate such

inconvenience
This modern attitude toward the demands of the body is

part of what

I

was referring to above as limits which are

imposed by the body.

When such bodily demands are seen

primarily as something which impinges upon one's time, they
become limits to be overcome, rather than demands to be
satisfied.

But as

I

indicated when

I

first introduced it,

the demand/limit distinction is not unequivocal or

unambiguous, and it does not neatly distinguish ancient and

modern necessity.

This is especially true in regard to the

temporal limits of the body.

As Arendt pointed out, the

ancient Greeks were also concerned with saving time from the
demands of the body.

Instead of technological apparatuses,

slavery and rigid sex roles were the means by which Greek

citizens were able to free up some of their time for public
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activity.

As

tried to show in my discussion of
the Greek
household, however, husbands also spent
a great deal of time
actively responding to the demands of the
body, and this
time was not considered wasted or ill-spent.
Aristotle's
contempt for the body and its demands does
not appear to
have been shared by the citizen farmers who
comprised the
largest part of the Athenian population.
In fact, some
I

scholars now argue that many Greeks found public, not
private, activity to be distasteful or degrading. 76

in any

case, the Greeks did not treat the demands of the body

solely, or even primarily, as limits which had to be

overcome
The difference between ancient and modern necessity is
not restricted to their different attitudes toward the

demands of the body, however.

The limits of the body

include more than just those temporal limits which are
imposed by the demands of the body.

Rather, modern

necessity finds in the body an array of limits, some of
which are not so much temporal as they are spatial.

As

embodied beings, men exist in a world in which other things,
including other persons, are dispersed in a spatial field.
To put this differently, the body of the human delimits a

given space, and other things
are at a distance.

-

things other than the self

Overcoming this distance, by moving

either persons or things, is a concern for men as embodied
beings

-
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This need to move men and things,
which I will call the
need for conveyance, is certainly
not a uniquely modern
need.
The Greeks, after all, were
excellent sailors and
were able to establish an empire
and import grains over
great distances. And before them,
the Egyptians had moved
large blocks of stone to the sites
of the pyramids and then
put them into place. 77 But while
these ancient

civilizations were indeed concerned with
the need for
conveyance, this need held a subsidiary
or derivative status
for them.
By this I mean that the need for
conveyance
was

important for ancient civilizations inasmuch
as distance was
hindrance to the satisfaction of other needs.
The Greeks'
sailing prowess, for example, was largely a
response to

their need for grain.

And in the case of the Egyptian

pyramids, the need to erect an immortal monument to
the

Pharaohs was the impetus for the marvelous movements

accomplished by that civilization.
In modernity, however, distance is no longer treated
as

an environmental feature of embodiment; rather, distance
is

another limit which is imposed upon men by their bodies.
The need for conveyance
limit of distance

-

-

the need to overcome the spatial

is a primary need in modernity.

No

longer is conveyance merely a question of man's ability to
move what needs to be moved to where it needs to be;

movement today is necessary in and of itself, and any
impediment to movement is an obstacle to be overcome or
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assaulted by technology. 78

ftir
Air

travel
„ obvious
u
travel isc aan
example
•

i

of the use of technology to
overcome one of the chief
impediments to movement - gravity.
Another example is

telecommunications, which allows the
conveyance of
information over great distances almost
instantaneously.
Other examples of modern technological
conveyance will be
examined in a later chapter.
This attitude toward distance as a
spatial limit which
is imposed by the body is exacerbated
by the modern attitude
toward temporal limits. A whole group of
needs has emerged
around the point where the concern for saving
time merges
with the disdain for the limit of distance.
As soon as a
spatial barrier has been overcome, a new set of
temporal
limits emerges around this achievement.

Again take as an

example man's ability to overcome gravity and fly
from place
to place.

Once this breakthrough was attained, it became

necessary not only to fly wherever man wanted (i.e. to
overcome all spatial barriers to flight)

,

but it also became

necessary to fly as frequently and as fast as man needed.
The time that is spent travelling is considered an

inconvenience, and must be continually lessened by

technological developments.
The need for speed, both in conveyance and in man's

ability to satisfy the demands of the body, is a hallmark of

modern necessity. 79

The need for speed also helps to

explain the continually expanding range of modern necessity.
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Unlike purely spatial limits, as
soon as a speed limit is
overcome, another limit is simultaneously
established. The
need to do things and get places
as quickly as possible is
a
need that can never be satisfied.
Every advance imposes a
new obstacle, and creates the need
for a more refined,
or a

new form of, technology.
The point of this discussion of
modern necessity is to
reveal that despite its expansive, and
apparently nonbiological nature, modern necessity, like
ancient necessity,
is based upon the body.
However, the modern attitude toward
the body, as it is reflected in the
consumptive activity of
the household, is guite different from the
ancient Greek
attitude toward the body. While the Greeks thought
that the

satisfaction of bodily demands required careful attention
and planning throughout the household, modernity treats
the

body instead as the source of limits and barriers which
are
imposed upon men.

What these limits require is not planning

and attention, but the consumption of various technological

devices which allow men to avoid or overcome such limits.
The value which technology has for the modern

household, therefore, lies in technology's ability to

mitigate the effect of the bodily limits.
to express this value is convenience.

The word

I

choose

The appropriateness

of this choice is indicated, in part, by the simple fact

that the various technological apparatuses which are

consumed by the household are often called "modern
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conveniences."

items such as automobiles,
dishwashers, and
telephones are conveniences in the sense
that they make life
easier or more comfortable. A more
important indication
of

the appropriateness of the word convenience,
however, is
that this sense of the word - in which
convenience means
ease and comfort - is a uniquely modern
sense.

The noun convenience and the adjective
convenient are

Latin in origin. 80

Convenience is an adaptation of

convenientia, which means "meeting together, agreement,
accord, harmony, conformity, suitableness,

fitness."

The

adjective convenient is based on the present participle
of
the verb convenire, which means "to come together, meet,
unite, agree,

fit suit."

Prior to the seventeenth century,

the meanings of the English words remained quite close to

these Latin roots.

Something could be described as

convenient, or as a convenience, if it was in accordance or

agreement with something such as nature or "the facts," or
if it was suitable or appropriate to a given situation or

circumstance, or if it was morally appropriate.

These pre-

seventeenth century meanings, however, are now considered
obsolete
The modern meaning of convenience is "the quality of

being personally convenient; ease or absence of trouble in
use or action; material advantage or absence of

disadvantage; commodity, personal comfort; saving of

trouble."

And the current sense of convenient is
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"personally suitable or well-adapted
to one's easy action or
performance of functions; favourable
to one's comfort, easy
condition, or the saving of trouble;
commodious."
The difference between the obsolete
and the current
meanings of these words lies not just
in the modern addition
of the sense of ease and comfort,
but also in the fact that
what remains of the older meanings' sense
of suitability

has

shifted and narrowed.

Convenience is no longer a matter of

the suitability of something to the facts,
nature, or a
moral code; suitability in the modern meaning
of convenience

refers back to the person, the self.

Something is

a

convenience or is convenient in the modern sense of these
words if it is suitable to personal comfort or ease. This
shift in the reference of convenience corresponds to the

change in attitude toward the body which occurred around the
same time.

The attitude toward the body as the source of

burdensome limits is reflected, however obliquely, by the

modern meaning of convenience.

After the seventeenth

century, something is a convenience if it is suitable to the

modern task of overcoming the limits which are imposed by
the body.

Another etymological shift must also be noted here.
The word comfort, which is central to the modern meaning of

convenience, underwent a corresponding change in meaning,

although it appears that this occurred perhaps as early as
the fifteenth century. 81

Prior to that point, the principal

meanings of cohort, in either
its verb or substantive
for,
were centered upon strength
and
support.

To comfort, or be

a comfort,

meant to support, strengthen,
or bolster, in
either a physical or mental
sense.
During this
period,

there also was a sense of comfort
as the removal or absence
of pain or discomfort, but
this sense was limited to
mental
distress.
it was not until the
fifteenth century that the
verb comfort included the sense
of removing physical pain
or
discomfort.
And the substantive sense of
comfort, as
"a

state of physical and material
well-being, with freedom from
pain and trouble, and satisfaction
of bodily needs," was not
widespread until the nineteenth century.
And it is in this
later, bodily sense that the word
comfort is used in the
definition of convenience.

These etymological shifts, of course,
are hardly
conclusive proof of any change in attitude
toward the body;
indeed, it is doubtful that such a change
could ever be

conclusively proven.

But the changes in the meanings of

convenience and comfort are valuable as linguistic
traces of
that other change.
In some of the chapters which
follow,

I

will examine other inconclusive forms of evidence,
such as

developments of certain technological apparatuses of the

modern household, as well as the development of religious
ideas and doctrines.

Before moving on to these other areas, however, a final

thought on Hannah Arendt must be offered.

After all, it may

appear that

^

have gone out of my way to
challenge
oniy
her interpretation of modernity,
but her interpretation
of
classical Greece and Christianity
as well.
The point of
challenging Arendt
s various interpretations, however,
was
to reveal that despite her
reputation as an unswerving
I

•

critic of modernity, she did
harbor a particularly modern
trait or tendency. This trait,
of course, is that attitude
toward the body which I have
cited as a distinctive feature
of modernity.
While Arendt did not celebrate
the

technological progress of modernity,
and did not appear
concerned with the various limits of
the body, she did tend
to treat the body as a hindrance
or inconvenience to public
life, and I am including here Arendt
s public life
as a

'

writer.

Throughout The Human Condition, Arendt
assiduously
avoids, if she does not exactly overcome,
the body.

In her

interpretation of ancient Greece, Christianity,
and
modernity, Arendt displays a certain
unwillingness to spend,
or waste, time examining the private,
bodily realm.

While Arendt would have argued that her attitude
toward
the body was influenced by the Greeks, and was
therefore

diametrically opposed to anything modern,

I

tried to show in

my discussion of ancient necessity that the public
and
private were not as distinct as Arendt liked to believe,
and
that the demands of the body played a significant role
in
both the public and private realms of ancient Greece.
Arendt" s aversion to the body,

I

am suggesting, kept her

focused on Aristotle's derogatory
claims about the body,
necessity, and privacy, and
kept her from looking
more
closely at the necessary activity
of Greece.
This same attitude toward
the body prevented Arendt
from noticing the essential
ambivalence of Christianity's
attitude toward the body and the
life processes.
By making
the suffering, toil, and eventual
death of mortals essential
to the attainment of an otherworldly
immortality,
Christianity sanctified mortal life,
according to Arendt.
However, this interpretation
completely overlooks the
connection between guilt and the body
in Christianity.
While the mortal body is essential
to the eternal life of
the soul and the resurrected body,
mortality and burdensome
labor are themselves the punishment for
sin.
Mortal
life,

therefore, is not simply sacred; it is at
once

hope and a source of guilt.

a

source of

For Arendt, however, the mere

association of the life of the body with immortality
could
be nothing other than the disastrous sanctif
ication

of life,

and it was this disaster which Arendt found to
be the most

consequential accomplishment of Christianity.
Of course, it is the influence of this attitude
toward

the body on Arendt »s interpretation of modernity which
is

most important for this essay.

Her aversion to the body

causes her to focus on the quasi-public, or social,

production of necessities in modernity.

But even here, she

is so repulsed by the public display of base necessity that

she interprets it as
modernity's reverence for
Ufe and
never closely examines
what necessities are
actually
produced in modernity.
And that same

7

Arendt from looking more
re close!
v into what
u
closely
y
remains of the
private household, a more-details
« more detailed examination of
the
household and modern necessity,
however repulsive, might
have revealed to Arendt
the extent to which
modernity i s
closer to her Greek ideal
than was even Greece
itself,
She
might have realized that
far from sanctifying
the body a nd
the life processes, modernity
is distinguished by
the
ability of the masses to free
themselves from the limits of
the body, through the ravenous
consumption of technology.
The trajectory of modernity
is to render everyone
free not
only from the limits which are
imposed by the body, but even
from the body itself.
(I will get to
poinfc
later.

m-

^

The interpretation of The Human
Condition which I have
offered here is, of course, highly
ironic.
For Arendt and I
begin from similar concerns.
in the "Prologue" of Tj!e_Jiuman
Condition Arendt discusses the space-age
attitude toward
the earth as "a prison for men's
bodies," and the attempt by
scientists to create life in a test tube.
I share this
concern about the direction, or trajectory,
of modern
technology. And while Arendt claims that
no answer to these
"preoccupations and perplexities" is offered in
her text,
she does suspect that these phenomena are
grounded in a
,

desire to escape the human
condition. « j agree with
Arendt
on this much, but from my
perspective, "the very
quintessence of the human condition"
is not
the earth, as

Arendt claims, but the body.
Arendt'

The irony, therefore,

il that

treatment of the body as something
which should
properly be hidden in private,
appears to me as a nontechnological, but nevertheless modern,
attempt to escape
the human condition.
And Arendt- s inability to come
to
s

grips with the body publicly, in her
writing, only serves to
obscure the hold which technology has
on modernity.
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CHAPTER

3

ST PERSPECTIVES ON
CONSUMPTION

in the last chapter,

mentioned in passing that
Arendt recognized Marx as
a unwitting saggier
of Christian
ideas.
By this remark, I mean
t that Arendt saw
in Marx's
concern for the social
dimension of the production
process
and his appreciation for
the develops of these
social
forces, a modern form of
Christianity's reverence for
life.
I
too, am troubled by this
Marxist emphasis
I

,

on production,
but for very different reasons
than Arendt. What concerns
13 n0t that thls f ° cus
Production deflects attention
away from the loss in modernity
of any public sphere in
which action might occur (although
it does do that) ; rather,
the Marxist pre-occupation with
the capitalist production
process disturbs me because it diverts
critical attention
away from the consumptive activity
of the modern household.
In this sense, I see an effective
similarity between Arendt
and the Marxists from whom she sought
to distance herself both obscure an important way in which
technology shapes
modernity. And while I am aware that
this criticism would
bear more directly on Arendt than on
Marxists, since she is
concerned more with the effects of technological
development
than with economic exploitation, I nonetheless
think that my
point has some bearing on current Marxist thought.
Even if

M

™

the primary task of Marxist thought is to uncover
and

eliminate economic injustice
and exploitation, there
is no
doubt that the tenacity of
capitalism in the late
twentieth
century is bound up with the
technological fetishism
modernity.

of
it is no longer enough
to point out that the

capitalistic production and
exchange of things as
commodities conceals the productive
relations among men;
that is, thought which would
challenge capitalism today can
no longer remain satisfied
with Marx's revelation
of the

"secret" of commodity fetishism.'

In the latest stage of

capitalism, the character of the
commodities themselves must
be closely examined, along with
the needs which the
consumption of those commodities
satisfies.
For the
technological character of the commodities
consumed
in late

capitalism harbors a secret of its own,
a secret which may
help explain not only the dominance
of technology, but also
the resiliency of advanced capitalism.
In making this claim that Marxist
interpretations

of modernity over-emphasize the production
process and

neglect the realm of consumption,

I

am aware that

significant steps in the opposite direction were
taken by
several Marxist theorists in the 1970's.
In
fact,

especially those theorists whom
this claim.

Before

I

I

have in mind when

I

does to Marxists.

I

make

examine some of those steps away from

the rigidity of structuralist Marxism,

that the claim

it is

I

should point out

am making here applies less to Marx than it

Writing in England in the nineteenth

century, during the
period

^

which

^

^

^

Production process were
bei n g mec han i Z ed,
„ arx s focuis on
the nature of the
production process is
hardly
.

exceptional.

And even so, Mar.-s
appreciation

f or t hle

transforation of consumption
„ hich was required
by

capitalist relations of
production is a significant,
if
neglected, element of his
thought.
After my examination
Qf
some recent Marxist
thoug h t on consumption,
1 will examine
in more detail Merx's
tre a tment of the
transformation o,
consumption, and
a trv
try to bridge
hr^^ *-u
the gap between Marx
and that
recent thought.
The first of the three
Marxist texts

13

^^^^^

I

will examine

by Edmond Preteceille

and Jean-Pierre Terrail.

This is a collection of
four
essays, three of which were
originally published in French
in 1977, while the fourth
was published in 1985.
the
first essay, entitled "Commodity
Fetishism and the ideal of
Needs," Terrail indicates what
may be considered a very
Plausible explanation for the
Marxist aversion to any
protracted examination of needs and
consumption.

m

The concept of need is inherent
in the
vulgar realism of bourgeois ideology
it is always by reference
to the obvious
nature of needs, taken to be the
very
essence of human existence, that
justifications of the individual's right
to appropriate - and thus to
alienate
through sale - his own person and
are explained; indeed, the whole goods,
structure
of economic liberalism is the work
out
from this pr^misP.
The free expression of
the needs of the free worker in the
.

Despite this bourgeois
aura which surrounds
the
-sue of needs and consumption,
and the risK one runs
of
reinforcing bourgeois ideology
by merely raising this
i ssue
Preteceiile and Terrail insist
that " [t] he guestion of
needl
is at the heart of social
conflict."' Making the same
point
I made above concerning
Marx, they recognize that "
[P] erhaps
in the nineteenth century
Marx might have had a point"
in
claiming that the question of
needs was out of date, "but
growth, opening the way to
abundance, had swept all that
aside."' Therefore, as the
title of their text suggests,
Preteceiile and Terrail face
squarely up to this issue.
To avoid the dangers which
attend any discussion of
needs and consumption, Preteceiile
and Terrail employ two
safeguards which keep them from
implicitly endorsing any
version of liberalism's sovereign
consumer, the source of
all needs.
The first of these safeguards is
a recognition
of the historicity of the consuming
subject and its needs. 6
The bourgeois notion of the sovereign
consumer completely
neglects the historical specificity of
that consumer, and
does not recognize that the idea of
the free consumer in the
market place is something which emerged
in the course of
7
history.
Furthermore, the neglect of the historicity of

consumption and needs obscures the way in which
the needs of
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the consumer continue to be
influenced by historical
developments.
By paying close attention
to the historical
forces which shape the modern
consumer, Preteceille and
Terrail lessen the risk of falling
back into the bourgeois
idealism of the consuming subject.

But a concern for history, by
itself, is not enough
to prevent a lapse into vulgarity.
Preteceille and Terrail
point out that since the end of the
nineteenth century,
bourgeois thought has tried to come
to grips with its
ahistorical tendency by recognizing the
influence which
social developments have on needs and
consumption. 8 While
the idea of a "consumer society," the
upshot of this re-

thinking of consumption, does take into account
the
historicity of needs, it still remains objectionable
Preteceille and Terrail.

to

This is because it retains another

element of bourgeois thought

-

the relegation of production

to a merely instrumental role vis-a-vis
consumption.

From the bourgeois perspective, the production

process exists only as an instrument which satisfies the
needs of the realm of consumption.

It makes little

difference to Preteceille and Terrail whether that
consumptive realm is perceived as isolated individuals or as
a

consumer society.

In either case,

"[t]he logic of

consumption appears as the primary, determining, autonomous
moment, while productive labour is reduced to a simple

instrument for provisioning the market." 9
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To avoid falling into
this flawed logic,
Preteceille and Terrail rely
on a second safeguard:
the
rejection of any "autonomisation
of the spheres of
consumption and need" in
relation to the sphere of
production, and the reversal
of "the order determination
between production and
consumption established by
vulgar
economics." 10 it is nnt
not an autonomous sphere
of consumption
and needs which determine
the production process,
but the
production process which ultimately
determines consumption
and needs.
" [T ]he determination of
needs, like their
satisfaction, is only a moment in
the same process of social
production.
This can only be understood in
one way: the
needs that production satisfies
are the needs of production
itself, the demands of its
reproduction." 11 And the

production process not only produces
needs, but consumers as
well, "well-defined social agents,
historical
.

.

forms of

.

individuality made up of a whole body of
inclinations and
12
"
capacities
.

.

.

There is, of course, nothing new here.

Taken

together, these two safeguards amount to no
more than the
historical materialism Marx outlined in Grundrissa 13
.

instead of distinguishing these safeguards,

I

so

might have

simply written that their historical materialist
approach to
the issue of needs and consumption keeps Preteceille
and

Terrail from sliding into what they call a "substantialism"
of the needs of consumers.

However, the point in breaking
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up these elements of historical
materialism (which I am sure
is a capital offense in some
circles) is to pose the
question whether both of these
elements are necessary to
prevent an examination of needs and
consumption, and the
values which influence them, from
falling into bourgeois
idealism.
It seems to me that an awareness
of the

historicity of the consumer and its
needs is essential to
this preventative purpose.
But it also seems that the
insistence that production is always the
dominant historical
force, that consumption and needs are,
in the last instance,

determined by the mode of production, has
become a hindrance
to understanding the development of needs
under the advanced
capitalism of modernity. Perhaps, like the autonomous
individual of bourgeois economic thought, this aspect
of

Marx's thought is a historically specific idea which
has
come to obscure some recent developments.

(Could it be

anything but a historically specific idea?) Preteceille and
Terrail seem to approach this point of view when they claim
that:

A proper insistence on the determining
character of the social relations of
production has overshadowed not only the
necessary analysis of the specific
structure of modes of consumption, but
also an analysis of the relations between
the two spheres, which has been reduced to
a single, mechanistic determination.
Today, the crisis and the social movements
that have developed within it emphasize
these deficiencies, and demand a new
theoretical effort to go beyond such oversimplification. 14

But in the end, Preteceille
and Terrail, in their
attempt
move beyond an over-simplified
view of

^

^

fc

en

Production and consumption,
remain anchored to Marx's
ide a
of the ultimate dominance
of production. 15
Before briefly examining
the progress Preteceille
and Terrail have made in
their "new theoretical
effort," I
should emphasize that when I
suggest that it might be
time
to move beyond this particular
element of Marxist doctrine,
I am certainly not
advocating a reversal of the
Marxist
position, which would restore
consumption and needs to the
determinant position they held in
bourgeois economics; in
each of the preceding chapters
I indicated that
the

"sovereign consumer" is

a

major obstacle to understanding

the hold which technology has on
modernity.

Nor am

I

arguing that material conditions are
no longer important fo
an investigation of modern needs;
in fact, I am eventually
going to claim that the Marxist
pre-occupation with
production has caused some thinkers to ignore
other
important material considerations. The claim
I am making
here is just that an analysis of the most
recent

developments of needs must consider influences
other than,
or rather, alongside of, the capitalist
production process.

The foregone conclusion that needs are always a
function of
the production process seems to me to be as misleading
as

the bourgeois alternative that is supposed to counter.
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To get back to Preteceille
and Terrains analysis
of needs, their progress beyond
an over-simplified view of

production-consumption relations lies in
their recognition
that a given mode of production
can generate needs which in
turn effect, and can even challenge,
that mode of
production.
This uneven, or skewed, reciprocity
between
production and consumption is possible
because even though
the mode of production is the dominant
force in any complex
social structure - or "structure in
dominance," to borrow
Althusser's phrase 16 - the mode of production
itself
is not

monolithic.

Rather, there are two distinct elements
in a

mode of production: the forces of production,
which
correspond to the productive capacity of a given

society,

and the relations of production, which comprise
the

organization of that society.

17

Social needs emerge when

the reproduction of both the forces and the relations
of

production becomes problematic, or contradictory.
Preteceille and Terrail go so far as to claim that it is
"impossible to consider the historicity of needs without

referring them to the logic of the mode of production as

a

contradictory union between relations of production and
productive forces." 18
An example which Preteceille and Terrail use to

illustrate this point is the English Factory Acts. 19 In the

middle third of the nineteenth century, productive forces
were greatly increased by the mechanization of various

productive activities.

Under the existing relations
of
production, however, in which
laborers had no choice but
to
work for the wages, during
the hours, and under the

conditions which were determined
by each individual
employer, the increased productivity
which was supplied by
mechanization soon came to threaten
the reproduction of the
mode of production itself.
order for the owners of the
mechanized operations to recoup the
value which they
expended in acquiring this machinery,
they had to extend the
working day to the limit of human
capability.
it was
imperative that the capitalists recover
this value before
mechanical innovations made their newly
purchased equipment
obsolete or comparatively inefficient. 20
By increasing

m

the

number of hours worked in

a day,

the owners were able to

increase their daily share of surplus-value,
and thereby
quickly recover the value of their increased
outlay of fixed
capital

Under this mode of production, the labor force
was
eventually exhausted as workers were pushed to their
limit

and then replaced when used up.

The reproduction of the

forces of production, however, requires a supply of
labor

power which is able to reproduce itself over a long length
of time.

This contradiction between the forces of

production, which were enhanced by the introduction of
machinery, and the relations of production, which allowed
the unlimited extraction of surplus-value in order to pay

for this machinery, threatened
the mode of production
itself, and the need arose
for some limitations
on the
length of the working day.
so although the demand
for such
legislation was first articulated
by the laboring class,
in
opposition to the class of owners,
it seems clear that the
need that was to be satisfied
by the Factory Acts was
ultimately a need of the mode
of production. That groups
of

capitalists ultimately began to
call for such restrictions
would seem to bear this out. 21
The legislative regulation of
the relations of
production, however, did not simply
make possible the
reproduction of the forces of production.
Rather, passage
and enforcement of the Factory
Acts "contributed to the
rapid introduction of mechanization,
and gave impetus
everywhere to the acceleration of technical
developments and
the intensification of labour." 22 By
restricting the number
of hours that could be worked in a day,
the Factory Acts
also restricted the amount of surplus-value
that owners
could appropriate daily. This restriction
on the

accumulation of surplus-value made it necessary to
increase
the productivity of the forces of production
even
further.

More powerful engines, faster machines, and a more
disciplined, routinized work force would allow the owners
to

increase the amount of value produced per hour, thereby

offsetting the stifling effect which the Factory Acts had on
the accumulation of profits. 23 This intensification of the

labor process, in its turn,
produces anew the need fo>r
a
shortening of the workday, which
requires further advainces
in the forces of production,
and so
on.

The interplay between the
mode of production and
the needs which it generates
is well-illustrated by
this
example of the Factory Acts; the
need for some limitations
on the length of the workday
brought about changes in the
forces of production.
Preteceille and Terrail find in
this
interplay between needs, or consumption,
and production a
source of hope for the eventual
dissolution of the capitalist mode of production. The needs
which are generated by
the contradiction between the forces
and relations of

production drive the mode of production to
higher stages of
development, and the needs which have
emerged thus far in
the latter half of the twentieth century
may require the
elimination of capitalistic relations of
production
themselves. 24

They cite as examples the recently

articulated needs for:
a slower pace of work
better
conditions of work,
better living
conditions in order to reduce fatigue
outside work
diminution of
travelling time and an increase of
comfort, better housing, leisure
facilities, holidays ... an improvement
in the health system, the development of
preventive care,
antipollution
measures ... a change in the content of
the work, the application of technical
progress to the benefit of living labour
and the development of skills for all
job security and the right to work for
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.
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all
[and ultimately,] some sort
social
Clal
control by the workers themselves.of
25

Needs such as those listed above
pose a challenge
to capitalistic relations of
production because they can not
be readily satisfied through
individual, private ownership
and appropriation of commodities.
Rather, these needs
require for their satisfaction a
"socialization
of

consumption." By this, Preteceille and
Terrail do not mean
the absolute elimination of private
ownership
and

appropriation, but the transcendence of this
form of
consumption "at the point where it becomes an
obstacle to
reproduction and the development of productive
26
forces.""

Where the working class is unable to attain
what it needs to
reproduce its labor power, whether these needs are
for

adequate housing or increased leisure time, collective

consumption facilities are emerging to satisfy these needs.
Since Preteceille and Terrail focus on this sort of need,
and recognize the tendency toward socialized consumption,
it
is not surprising that they call not just for the

satisfaction of the existing needs of the working class, but
also "for the expansion, development and transformation of

those needs themselves.

Breaking up capitalist hegemony

entails an explosion of needs

.

.

.

" 27

To an American in the 1980' s, this tendency towards

socialized consumption may appear outdated, and Preteceille
and Terrail' s confidence in the revolutionary potential of
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the proliferation of needs
may seem unfounded.
But
Preteceilie and Terrail are
not oblivious to the
possibility
that some of the social
needs they identified
might be
satisfied through individual,
private consumption, or that
increases in the private
consumption of commodities
might
deflect attention from those
social needs altogether 28 XT
Nor
are they unaware that there
is a counter-tendency
to the
socialization of consumption which
strives to "privatize"
those collective consumption
facilities which have already
been established. 29 On the
L " e contrary,
contrary they recognize
that
through
"the private character of
commodity
consumption
capital imposes
practices (and the values implicit
in
reinforce its ideological and
Sarii^Sdominance; the objects of
practical
consumption can be seen as representing
so
many ideological messages, which
have
underlying them as many constraints
leading to competitive individualism,
to
the depoliticisation, fragmentation
and
opposition of the dominated classes." 30
(Parenthesis in original.)
.

.

.

Despite this recognition of the counter-

revolutionary potential of private consumption,
Preteceilie
and Terrail never closely examine the
"ideological messages"
or implicit values which are conveyed by
objects
and

practices of consumption.

They point out the danger which

such private consumption presents to their
socialist

objectives, and then quickly return to the promise
of social
needs.

This can be explained in part by the fact that
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Preteceille and Terrail take
as their model of a
capitalistic society France,
not the United states.
As tney
point out in some statistical
detail, France in the
late
1970.
was far-removed from the
s
"myth" of American consumer
society.- In France the
threat from pr vate consumptiQn
may be weaker than in the
United States. Another
element of
an explanation can be found
in Preteceille and
.

,

Terrail-

dialectical perspective.

For them, there is an

inevitability to the development of
social needs, an
inevitability which is grounded in
the contradictions of the
capitalist mode of production and
their dialectical
resolution.
"In the long run," claim Preteceille
and
Terrail, "consumption practices cannot
avoid, and will in

fact be less and less able to avoid,
the class

confrontations which owe their meaning and
bearing to the
logic of relations of production." 32 Just
as "free market"
relations of production had to give way in
the face of the

working class need for state regulation of
the labor
process, so too will the exploitative relations

of late

capitalistic production, along with its individualistic
consumption, have to give way to the social needs
which are

produced by that mode of consumption.

There is no stopping

the force of the dialectic.
In any case, there is little doubt that private

consumption practices and the objects of consumption can be
interpreted along the lines of Preteceille and Terrail'

argument.

Michel Aglietta, in

Sedation, does

A^heori^^itaUst

just that.

Although Aglietta. s text does
not focus primarily on
developments in consumption and

needs, but instead offers a
much broader view of late
capitalism than Preteceille and
Terrains

CapiUlis^

Consump tion and NPPds, it nonetheless
makes important
strides in understanding the way
in which technology has
infiltrated the modern household.
should mention at the outset of
this discussion
of Aglietta another important
difference between his work
and that of Preteceille and Terrail.
As indicated by the
subtitle of his text - The Us ExperiPnr. Aglietta takes as
his model of late capitalistic society
the United
I

States,

not France.

He explains this choice in his introduction:

"the particular selection of the United States
is designed
to highlight the general tendencies of capitalism
in the

20th century.

The USA, in effect, experienced a capitalist

revolution from the Civil War onwards." 33

The outcome of

this revolution, claims Aglietta, was the establishment
of
"the most adequate structural forms for perpetuating

capitalist relations of production that the class struggle
has yet created anywhere." 34

One of the main features of this capitalistic

revolution was the development of a "social norm of
consumption," but what Aglietta is referring to by this norm
is not the potentially revolutionary social needs which

^

^

Preteceille ana Terrail
identified
Qn
social no™ of consumption
is one » in whicn
individual
ownership of commodities
governed the concrete
practices of
consumption.
In his discussion
Qf
.

focuses on the o bj ects or

comities

which are consul by
individuals in the modern
household.
And coming even closer
to the perspective I
a, developing in this
essay, he also
stresses that the evolution
of the social norm of
consumption of the Unite d states
=
° urates "was
governed by the
replacement of direct activity
at home by time-saving
36
equipment," which I would
call conveniences.

According to Aglietta's Marxist
perspective, of
course, the development of
this norm of consumption is
ultimately an effect of the
production process.
it

comprises one part of what he,
borrowing and developing
Gramsci's term, calls Fordism.
This is the term which

Aglietta and Gramsci use to describe
the "semiautonomisation" of the labor process
which occurred in early
twentieth-century America. This development
of the

production process can be explained in
the terms of the
previous example of the English Factory
Acts.
Through that example, it was shown how
the
mechanization of the labor process led to
the workers' need
for a shortening of the workday, and
how the satisfaction of
this need led to further intensification
and mechanization
of the workplace.
Although the eight-hour day was not

established by the United
d states
st»fr= =1
government until 1938
various American labor
unions
nS h»n
had k
been "^ggUng
since the
1840 s, Wlth uneven
success to shorten
fche wQrMay 3?
alongside these e ff orts
to alleviate the
strain of the
mechanized production
process
Process, American
workers were also
able to restrict the
outout
output of fthat
ha f process
from within
Because American labor
unions of the nineteenth
century were
generally craft unions, the
workers were able to
retain
their Knowledge of the
various labor processes,
and use this
Knowledge to exert some
resistance to capital's
attempts to
speed up the pace of
production.* This resistance,
'

^

of

course,

limited the owners- ability
to guickly recover the
value of the machinery in
which they had invested,
and in
America as in England, these
owners sought to increase
the
rate at which they accumulated
profits by further
intensifying and mechanizing the
production process.
The first American attempt
to intensify the
production process, which occurred
around the turn of the
century, goes by the name of
"scientific management," or
Taylorism, after Frederic Winslow
Taylor, forerunner

in the
Briefly, Taylorism sought to
rationalize the labor
process by gathering from workers
all knowledge and infor-

field.

mation concerning that process, and
making such knowledge
the exclusive domain of managers.
These managers could then
reorganize the production process
according to that
knowledge, with the intention of
eliminating all waste of
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time and motion. 39

Fordism, named after Henry Ford,

further

developed these intensification techniques
of Taylorism, and
combined them with innovations in
mechanization,
i.e.

continuous assembly-line.

the

with the semi-automatic assembly-

line, management was able to control
and synchronize the

entire production process; as Aglietta puts
it, "The
individual worker thus lost all control over his
work
rhythm.

...

In this mode of organization workers are

unable to put up any individual resistance to the
imposition
of the output norm, since job autonomy has been
totally
abolished.

" A0

In his essay "Americanism and Fordism," Antonio

Gramsci pointed out that Fordism not only "rationalized" the

productive activity of the assembly-line workers, but it
also sought to control their activity outside of the
workplace.

The regularity of this new phase of production

required that workers' performances be consistent all day
long,

from day to day.

The industrialists' attempt to

prohibit the consumption of alcohol and their exhortations
against sexual licentiousness served "the purpose of
preserving, outside of work, a certain psycho-physical

equilibrium which prevents the physiological collapse of the
worker, exhausted by the new method of production." 41 The

prohibitions of both the consumption of alcohol by the
workers, and the consumption of the workers by excessive

sexual activity, were required by the assembly-line.

While Gramsci emphasized
this prohibitory
element
of Fordism, Aglietta
points Qut another
relation to consumption.
The demands of the
assembly-i ine
required not only that
certain consumptive
activity be
prohibited, hut also that
other forms of consumption
take
Place.
By eliminating any
lulls or gaps in the
working day
Fordism made it necessary
that all recuperation
or
rejuvenation of the work force
take place outside of
work.
To quote Aglietta:

^

C e Sed exhaust i°n of
labour-power
in%h2
K
in
the f
labour
process had to be entirelv

repaired outside the workplace,
resoectina
the new time constraint of
9
a stric?
separation between working and
non-working
nours.
individual commodity
consumption is the form of
consumption
that permits the most effective
recuperation from physical and
nervous
ln
com P act s Pace of time within
!
the day, and at a single place,
the
nome
.

.

l^T*

The needs of modern workers for
various time- and
labor-saving commodities - the social
norm of consumption can clearly be interpreted as needs
of the production
process.
High-speed assembly-line production
requires such
consumption in order to reproduce a stable
labor
force.

But

there is also another sense in which
this consumption norm
is needed by the production process.
The continuous

consumption of commodities by the workers
enables capital to
overcome the dis juncture which had often
occurred between
that section of the production process which
produced
the

means of production,
n, such as
= ».„v.j
machinery (Department
I), and
that section which produced
the means of consumption,
such
as household appliances
(Department H)
Prior to
emergence of Pordism,
developments in Department
I wer e
sporadic and uneven, and
each new development
in the means
of production was character!
7^ k„
mracrerized
by a massive increase
in
fixed capital expenditures,
which was followed by a
depression in such capital
formation.
The reason for this
depression in capital formation
was that the exchange of
consumer items in Department
II did not Keep pace
with the
productive activity in Department
I, and therefore the
demand for the new means of
production by Department II was
not great enough to permit
the firms in Department I
to
;>

^

.

recover the value of their
fixed-capital investments/ 3 of
course, the outcome of this
disjuncture between Departments
I and II goes beyond the
rate of capital formation;
"Factories are closed, clusters of
productive forces
abandoned, while means of production
are destroyed on a
massive scale right across society.""
This whole cycle
begins again with the development of
new techniques
of

production.

45

With the emergence of the social norm of
consumption under Fordism, however, this cyclical

pattern of

capital formation was to a great extent
eliminated.

The

steady consumption of soon-to-be improved
commodities made
it possible for the means of production
to be depreciated

and eventually replaced
in a gradual, stable
ma nner.
As
Aglietta describes this i mp
ortant effect cf the
social nor ra
of consumption:
e

al

faCt is that the
aSalft^r
qualitative ^
transformation of

the forces
of production has become
a permanent
process, instead of being
chicly
int ° ° ne s P^ific phase
of the
alalTT/ ccul™lation. This
change
is due
7a the
IL interaction
?
to
of the two departments
P
of production; each now
provides ?he o?her
S mar ets as ^ey
Zht\£
^ diversify combine to lower
the value and
the commodities of
mass consumption.

Obsolescence becomes
generalized and permanent. 46

The significance of Fordism,
therefore, lies in
this integration of consumption
and production.
The
continuous consumption of various
conveniences by the work
force provides capital not only
with a stable, well-rested
supply of labor power, but it
also allows the two main
sectors of the economy to synchronize
their productive
activity.
This situation is what Aglietta
referred to as
"the most adequate structural form
for perpetuating

capitalist relations of production."

But Fordism, which

came into full bloom after World War
II, eventually ran up
against some limits in the late i960 's,
and the nature of
these limits brings Aglietta 's analysis
close to that of
Preteceille and Terrail.
The private, individualistic consumption
which

flourished under Fordism in the United States,
required a
corresponding expansion of the role of the state as
the

guarantor of the continuity
of

™

-

Pt 10n
Und
Fordism,
remained essential to
h
ilInit f
the
° limit
consequences of
capitalist insecurity on
y °" ""P 10 *""* and on
the formation of
n-xvuta* wages, so as not
to brea k the continuity
of the
consumption process, and
in ord er to enable
tne worKers^ o
»eet the financial
cedents contracted with the
acquisition of their consumer
g oods.
This implied
legislative arrangements,
a homogenization
and socialistic n
of wages, and the
establishment of social
insurance fund s
against the temporary loss
of direct wages.""
A pension
system for retired workers
was also required in
order to
maintain the consumptive
activity of this significant
segment of the population.
it still
-iftm

*

•

While the satisfaction cf
these "social needs" was
prcvided to a great extent by
the
state, in the form of the

New Deal, some cf these needs
were met wholly, or in
part,
by the development of
private pension funds and
insurance
plans.

Private pension funds, which
were usually developed
through labor's collective
bargaining with management,
supplemented the public system of
Social Security.
Private
medical insurance has been the
primary response in the
United States to the need not only
to pay medical expenses,
but also to provide income
during recuperation. Aglietta
points out how these private
responses to social needs
strengthen the position of capital,
since the enormous
amount of value that is accumulated
in these private plans

is administered by capital
itself."

While this point

i,
.s

important for understanding
the strength of capital!,
.sm in
America, as well as the
current pressure to
"privatize.,
public responses to social
needs, the existence of
such
private responses has not
allowed Fordism to avert
its
crisis.

Whether the social needs which
underlie the Fordist
nor* of consumption are satisfied
publicly or privately, the
cost of such "socialized consumption"
is ultimately paid out
of the surplus value which is
available to capitalists.
if

these programs and services are
provided by employers as
part of a collective bargaining
agreement, the cost amounts
to indirect wages paid to the
workers.
if these services
are provided by the state, the cost
either "inflates direct
wages, and the increase is taken back
in the form of income
tax.
or else it is levied on profit in
various different
forms.

in either case, there is a restriction
on relative

surplus-value and consequently an obstacle to
the law of
49
accumulation. "
Furthermore, the cost of these various

preconditions of the social norm of consumption tends
to
increase as the semi-automatic production process
progresses.

This is because the mechanized production

process is unsuitable to the provision of these collective

goods and services.

The savings that capital is able to

extract from labor-costs by using the assembly-line are

unavailable in the area of
collective services, and the
provision of these services becomes
comparatively expensive
as costs in commodity-production
50
decline.

The increasing costs of
collective consumption are
not a problem as long as capital
continues to increase

the
rate at which it is able to
extract profits from the
mechanized production process.
Eventually, however, that
rate of accumulation or profit
reaches its limit.
as
workers begin to resist managements'
attempts to increase
productivity through the further
fragmentation and

mechanization of the production process.
identifies the mid-1960

's as

Aglietta

the point at which labor's

resistance began to halt the decline in
real wage costs that
had been achieved by Fordism. 51 At this
point, the costs of
social consumption are no longer offset by
increasing
profits, and those costs become an unbearable
burden for
capital.
From Aglietta «s perspective, therefore,
"[i]t is
not surprising
that the crisis of Fordist work
.

.

.

organization should at the same time have been the
occasion
for a general drive of the capitalist class to
curtail

social expenditures, and have ushered in a period of

retrenchment in public finances." 52
Ultimately, Aglietta' s analysis leads him to

a

position that appears close to that of Preteceille and
Terrail.
process,

His conclusion that under the Fordist production
"

[t]he socialization of consumption becomes a

decisive terrain an d
battle-ground of the
ec h oes Preteceille an
d Terrain claim
that
needs is at the heart
of social conflict.""
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But there ,.S
an important difference;
for Aglie tta, who
focuses on th
united States, sociali Z
ed consumption and
social needs are
the preconditions or
of a private,
nrw a f Q individualized
norm of
consumption, whereas for
Preteceille and Terrail,
who focus
on France, such needs
are a radical alternative
to private
consumption.
This is not to say that
Aglietta does not
recognize the potential
challenge which social needs
can
pose to capitalism;
m, it is just
ii,=t that the
realization of this
potential will reguire a direct,
sustained critigue of the
•

individualized consumption practices
of late capitalism.
Aglietta -s specificity in regard
to individualized
consumption provides a good starting
point for such a
critique. He claims that the
consumption norm which emerged
in twentieth-century American
capitalism "is governed

by two
commodities: the standardized housing
that is the privileged
site of individual consumption;
and the automohi 1o as the
means of transport compatible with
the separation of home
and workplace." 55 These two
commodities are obviously
important to the perspective I am
developing here, inasmuch
as the automobile, alongside its
function as a means of
transportation between home and work, is
also the source of
a great variety of consumed
convenience; the same can be
said of the standardized house, with
its array of time and

labor-saving devices.

i

w iii
win

re f„*.« to this
return
point of
*.

contact between Aglietta.
s and m y perspective, but
first :
nust very briefly examine
the wor* of one other
contemporary
Marxist, Ernest Mandel

Handel's

l^^tan^,

i

ike Aglietta. s text,

is

an elaborate examination
of the advanced for, of
capitalism
And his analysis of modern
consumption, l ike Aglietta.
s,

comprises only a part of the
broad scope of his work.
so
when I focus on Handel's
thoughts on consumption, I
must
Clear that 1 have
pretension of presenting a
thorough summation of La^e_Ca^italism
The same can be
said, of course, for my
treatment of Aglietta's text.
On the issue of modern
consumption

^

-

.

and needs,

Mandel can be read as taking

a

step back from the work of

Preteceille, Terrail, and Aglietta.

He does not go as far

as these other writers in
recognizing the influence which
the needs of consumers can have
in the development of

capitalism.

Whereas Preteceille, Terrail, and
Aglietta
ascribe to the needs of workers an
important, although nondecisive, role in explaining the proliferation
and

diversification of the commodities consumed in
modernity,
Mandel retreats toward the more orthodox
Marxist position
which underplays the role of such needs.
This is not to say that Mandel is oblivious to
the

new needs of workers under the semi-automatic,
industrial

production process.

Indeed, he points out that "the

m

substantial increase in the i„f„„^
intensity of labour
makes a
higher level of consumption
necessary amon other
g
thin gs
setter c^aHty food,
greater meat consuInption>
labour power is to be
reconstituted at aUand that „ the
increase extension of capitalist
conurbations len g thens
the circulation time
between home and work
to such an extent
that time-saving consumer
goods likewise become
a conditi on
for the actual reconstitution
of this labour power." 56
But
these needs of the workers
oncers are relatively
,
unimportant for
Mandel-s explanation of the
diversification of consumption
in modernity, and he does
not develop this issue
of needs
Much beyond the level of the
above guotes. He simply
notes
that such needs are part of
an explanation of "
(

^^

^

[t ]he

differentiation of the monetarily
effective de m and of the
proletariat in the industrialized
countries,""

and leaves

it at that.

As a Marxist, of course,
Mandel identifies the
capitalist production process as
the ultimate source of any
developments in needs and consumption.
But here too his
argument differs from that of the
other Marxists I have
examined.
it is not that the semi-automatic
production
process, with its new strains and
pressures for workers, has
brought about needs for new commodities.
The development of
various time- and labor-saving commodities
arises not from
the needs of workers (which are
ultimately determined by the

production process)

,

but rather from the need of capital to
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find new areas in which to extract
profits.

From Mandel

s

perspective, "the basic halmark (sic) of
late capitalism"
"the phenomenon of oyer^tcamtalization
or non-invested
58
surplus capitals."
As he explains this phenomenon:

is
"

As long as 'capital was relatively
scarce, it normally concentrated on
the
direct production of surplus-value in
the
traditional domains of commodity
production.
But if capital is gradually
accumulated in increasingly abundant
quantities, and a substantial part of
social capital no longer achieves
valorization at all, the new mass of
capital will penetrate more and more into
areas which are non-productive in the
sense that they do not create surplusvalue, where it will displace private
labor and small enterprise just as
inexorably as it did in industrial
production 200 or 100 years before. 59
1

It was as a result of the pressure of this

uninvested surplus capital that various time-consuming
household tasks, along with services which were provided by

household laborers, were commodified, if
term.

I

may use this

"The housemaid, private cook and private tailor do

not produce any surplus-value," 60 nor does the housewife,

who cooks, cleans, and sews for her family. 61

But vacuum

cleaners, pre-cooked and preserved foods, sewing-machines,

ready-made clothes, etc. are all commodities which expand
the range of exchange, and are produced under the

capitalistic wage relation.

In other words, such time- and

labor-saving commodities are a source of profits which
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exists beyond "the traditional domains
of commodity
production.

Mandel's explanation of the expansion
and
differentiation of consumption, in comparison
to those other
Marxist accounts examined above, does not
appear
to be

particularly helpful in providing an understanding
of the
way in which technology has shaped modern
needs and

consumption.

From his perspective, the need for various

technological apparatuses in the household is really
just
modern form of capital's need for surplus-value;
the

a

needs

of consumers are of minimal explanatory value.

Nonetheless,

Mandel's analysis of modern consumption practices does
touch
upon an issue that is important for understanding the
hold

which technology has on modernity.

Mandel points out that

in order for the consumption of the labor-force to become

diversified, it is necessary that there be

a

decrease in the

portion of laborers' income spent on what he calls the
"'pure' means of subsistence."

When the "purely

physiological" element of workers' consumption decreases in
value, then the "historically and socially determined"

element can increase. 62
of course,

is of the sort that I am trying to avoid in this

essay (see Ch.
terms

I

The distinction Mandel makes here,

2,

pp.

57-9), so to recast his point in the

introduced in the previous chapter, in order for

workers to overcome the limits of the body through the

consumption of modern conveniences, they must be able to
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satisfy the demands of the body with only a
small part of
their wages.

When

I

introduced this demand/limit distinction,

I

used the example of ancient Greek agriculture
to illustrate
the demands of the body, and Mandel is also
referring

principally to food when he uses the term "pure
means of
subsistence." In late capitalistic societies, a
smaller
percentage of income is spent on food than in early

(i.e.

competitive) capitalistic, or pre-capitalistic societies.

This is because

" the

age of late capitalism

...

has

cha racterized by an even greater increase in labour

productivity in agriculture than in industry ." 63

The

"industrialization of agriculture," as Mandel puts

it,

is

another consequence of the "over-capitalization" which

characterizes late capitalism.

Agriculture is one of those

areas into which excess capital flows in its search for

profits
The increased productivity which was achieved

through the mechanization of agriculture has led not only to
a decline in the prices of agricultural commodities,

but

also to a decrease in the number of agricultural workers. 64
So in both these senses (the amount of hourly wages spent

for agricultural commodities and the amount of labor hours

directly spent in agriculture), Mandel' s analysis seems to
agree with my earlier claim that modernity is characterized
by the relatively small amount of time that it spends
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satisfying the demands of the body, or at least the
body's
demand for food (see Ch. 2, pp. 29-31).
As

I

pointed out above, the two consumer items

which Aglietta cites as the governing commodities of
the

modern consumption norm (i.e. standardized housing and
the
automobile) also fit well with my interpretation of modern

consumption practices.

By "standardized housing," Aglietta

is referring to the prefabricated suburban dwelling, which
is built to receive the various appliances which have

reduced domestic labor. 65

Electricity is available

throughout this house, for lighting, as well as for cooking
and cleaning appliances.

Water, for cooking or cleaning, is

available on demand, as is heat.
flush.

And sewage disappears in

a

Such housing, like modern agricultural practices, is

geared toward overcoming the limits which the demands of the
body place upon the use of time, or the temporal limits of
the body.

The automobile, on the other hand, allows men to

overcome what

I

earlier described as the spatial dimension

of bodily limits (see Ch.2,pp. 32-4). In the previous

chapter,

I

used the airplane as an example of a tech-

nological device which allows people to overcome these
spatial limits, largely because air travel clearly portrays
the close connection between spatial and temporal limits, in
the need for ever-faster flights.

But Aglietta 's example of

the automobile has its own particular virtues; the
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production of automobiles is the model of
Fordist production
techniques, and the automobile is more
clearly a consumer
item than is the airplane. And more
and
more, the

automobile is coming to reflect the connection
between
temporal and spatial limits of the body.
I have in mind
here the "drive-thru windows" of fast-food
restaurants, and
the tendency to extend such facilities to banks,
liquor
stores, grocery stores, etc.

In these situations, the

automobile allows people to overcome the limit of distance
as well as save time in various daily routines.

But if these Marxist accounts of modern consumption

end up so close to the perspective

why have

I

I

am trying to establish,

set them up as a hindrance to an understanding of

modern technology?

Why spend the first part of this chapter

criticizing the Marxist emphasis on production, when writers
like Aglietta and Mandel ultimately identify certain

features of modern consumption which are important to my

perspective?

The reason

I

have been critical of these

Marxists is that their pre-occupation with the capitalist
production process results in a certain narrowness in the
historical and material dimensions of their perspective.
Early in this chapter

I

distinguished these two elements of

historical materialism, and indicated that Preteceille and
Terrail employ them as safeguards to keep their analysis of

modern consumption from falling back into the idealism of
bourgeois economic thought.

I

made this distinction in
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order to question the Marxist doctrine
that the ultimate
historical determinant is the production
process (the
materialist dimension), and to suggest
that this doctrine
may have become a hindrance to
understanding modern
technological consumption, if not late
capitalism itself.
At this point, I can further specify
that early criticism.

When Aglietta and Mandel identify modern

consumption practices, which revolve around cheap
and
readily available agricultural commodities,
automobiles, and
technologically organized housing, they have in mind
changes

which occurred primarily after the Second World War.

The

great advances in agricultural productivity, which caused
food prices to decline, thereby freeing up the income of

workers for more diversified consumption, occurred in this
period, according to Mandel. 66

And the social norm of

consumption, which is central to Aglietta' s analysis of
Fordism, emerged in the 192 O's, but flourished after the
war. 67

From my perspective, however, the important shifts
in consumption practices occurred much earlier, as early as

the eighteenth century, and are not simply the effects of

developments in production techniques.

The intensification

of consumption which characterized the 1950

's

can be

explained, in part, by twentieth century developments of the

production process, and Aglietta 's and Mandel' s analysis are
helpful in that regard.

But when it comes to the features
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of the actual commodities which
are consumed, one's analysis
has to expand beyond the twentieth
century.
Conveniences in
agriculture, transportation, and other
household activities
were developed, produced, and consumed
in the nineteenth
century, as will be seen shortly.
But it is not only the

historical dimension of the Marxist
interpretation of modern
consumption which must be expanded; the
materialist dimension must be expanded as well.
The materialism of Marxist analysis is
limited to
the capitalist production process.

Most Marxists are

unaware of any other material considerations which
may be
helpful in understanding certain features of modernity.
What

I

have in mind, at this point, as such an other

material consideration, is the vast amount of unsettled land
that was available in America throughout the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries.

(Another material consideration, also

overlooked by Marxists, will be examined in
chapter.) This spatial condition,

I

a

later

will argue in the next

chapter, played an important role in the development of the

consumption pattern or norm which has been identified with
the United States, and has spread throughout much of the
world.

So although

I

do not ascribe ultimate determinance

of consumptive activity to the production process, my

approach is nonetheless materialistic, inasmuch as land and
space are material considerations.

neglected material condition.

I

will now examine this
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Srnrt^S
produced, or services provided, from outside
the household<

they are consumed on the basis of the
resources of the
household
To the extent that such services and
commodities
are provided gratis by the state, then I
would
agree
that
the household's status as a unit of
consumption
be
displaced but that is not the point that Mandel
is making.
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Preteceille and Terrail
despite their emphasis on the public satisfaction
needs concur with me on this point; they maintain of social
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CHAPTER

4

A MATERIALIST CRITIQUE OF MARXISM

In fairness to Aglietta,

I

must mention at the outset

that he does discuss the American frontier
experience in A
Theory of Capitalist Reg ulation, but for
him the ideological
value of the frontier is predominant. To
guote Aglietta:
The frontier principle was more than is
implied
simply by its literal content, in other words
the
mere domestication of a geographical space.
It
was rather an ideological principle expressing
the
ability of the American nation to polarize
individual activity in a direction of progress.
Indeed the industrial bourgeoisie was later able
to get the whole of the nation to accept the
technological trans-formations induced by relative
surplus-value by presenting these as the building
of a 'new frontier'.
1

There is, of course, no doubt that the "frontier principle"
has served this ideological purpose, and continues to serve
it as the United States races,

and may perhaps cooperate,

with the Soviet Union to colonize outer-space.
a

But there is

material dimension of the American frontier which is

worthy of attention.

Aglietta does not totally ignore this

dimension, but for him the abundance of land in the United

States "enormously favored" the creation of

a

surplus of

agricultural commodities, one of the preconditions for

capitalist industrial production. 2

So from Aglietta 's

perspective, the frontier, in both its ideological and

material dimensions, served the development of capitalism in

America
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My interpretation of the American
frontier is quite
different than Aglietta's. To begin with,
I emphasize the
material dimension of the frontier, the
"mere domestication
of a geographical space." Furthermore,
I view the frontier
not as a boon, but a threat to capitalism,
at least
initially.
Ironically, this non-Marxist perspective
is

supported by certain insights of Marx himself.
and final part of the first volume of Capital

,

The eighth

concerning

"The So-Called Primitive Accumulation," is described
by

Aglietta as "decisive," 3 and

I

would agree, although

apparently for different reasons.
on this point.)

(Aglietta does not expand

In this section of Capital

.

Marx examines

the manner in which feudal society was transformed by and
for the forces of capital.

His concern lies less with the

eclipse of restrictive feudal relationships, which bourgeois

theorists emphasize r than with changes in material
conditions.

In order for capitalism to flourish, a supply

of laborers was needed which was "free" not only from the

obligations of serfdom, but also, and more importantly, free
from any attachment to the land.

Marx stresses this point:

In the history of primitive accumulation, all
revolutions are epoch-making that act as levers
for the capitalist class in course of formation;
but, above all, those moments when great masses of
men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their
means of subsistence, and hurled as free and
'unattached' proletarians on the labour market.
The expropriation of the agricultural producer,
the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the
whole process.
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This is the point

I

was referring to in the beginning

of the previous chapter, when

I

claimed that there exists in

Marx's thought an often overlooked
appreciation for the
transformation in consumption practices
which accompany
capitalism.
The expropriation of the peasant

from the land

destroys the peasant's ability to produce
for household
consumption; the peasant is torn from the means
of subsistence, not just means of production.
Marx recognizes

that

this process of expropriation took different forms
in

different countries, but he identifies the enclosure
of the
commons in England as the classic form. 5
The enclosure of the English commons began in the

fifteenth century, but became widespread during the
eighteenth. 6

Prior to enclosure, the peasant who owned or

rented a cottage on a manor enjoyed several rights of common

which included the right to grow strips or rows of crops in
the arable fields of the manor.

On the remaining land of

the manor, called the waste, commoners had the right to

pasture as much livestock as was required to cultivate their
strips, cut hay for winter feeding of the livestock, collect

timber for building and repairing agricultural implements,
cut peat or turf for fuel, and if there were streams and

ponds on the waste, to catch fish.

These and other rights

of common were defined by, and limited to, the needs of the

household.

These rights were also frequently exercised by
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squatters who lived on or near the
manor, but had no
legitimate claim for such exercise. 7
With the enclosure of the common
arable and waste lands
came the extinction of the various
rights of

common, and the

extinction of the small farmers who were
able to satisfy the
needs of their households through their
own productive
activity.
As compensation for the loss of these
rights,

commoners were given

a

small parcel of land as an element of

the act of enclosure. 8

But these small plots were

insufficient to provide for the needs of the household,
and
often the costs of ditching and fencing the allotment
(which
were also required by the acts of enclosure) were so
high
that the owner had no choice but to sell the land to

a

larger landowner, and join the ranks of agricultural or

manufacturing laborers. 9

Enclosure also had the effect of

rendering the laboring class completely dependent on the
wage relationship with the employer, thereby making laborers
more docile and regular.

As one proponent of enclosure put

it at the end of the eighteenth century:

"'The use of common

land by labourers operates upon the mind as a sort of

independence'.

When the commons are enclosed 'the labourers

will work every day in the year, their children will be put
out to labour early', and 'that subordination of the lower

ranks of society which in the present times is so much
wanted, would be thereby considerably secured.'" 10
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in contrast to this situation in
England, which was
crucial to Marx's understanding of

capitalism's development,

the United States had vast amounts of
unsettled land
throughout the nineteenth century. As
English peasants were
forced off the land, and lost the ability
to provide for
their needs on their own, Americans were
moving West and
bringing virgin forest, and eventually the
prairie, under

cultivation.

This difference, and the important

consequences of it, were not totally lost on Marx
last chapter of volume

of Capital

1

.

.

in the

"The Modern Theory of

Colonization," he discusses this difference.

In 1866 Marx

claimed that, "speaking economically," the United States
belongs to the category of "real Colonies, virgin soils,

colonized by free immigrants." 11

What Marx finds

interesting about such colonies is that they give the lie to

arguments of bourgeois political economists.
Such economists, claims Marx, confuse "on principle two

very different kinds of private property, of which one rests
on the producers' own labour, the other on the employment of

the labour of others." 12

In interpreting the capitalist

economies of Western Europe, the political economist
"applies the notions of law and of property inherited from

pre-capitalistic world"

-

a

that is, one where producers own

the means and the products of their labor

-

and forget that

capital, which is based on the labor of others, "not only is
the direct antithesis of the former, but absolutely grows on
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its tomb only." 13

This confusion is cleared up
for the
political economists once they confront
the situation in the
colonies
In the colonies, the fundamental
antagonism between

pre-capitalistic property and capital becomes
obvious, as
the ideological foundations of
capitalism come to be
experienced as reality. The availability
of unsettled land
provided laborers with an alternative to
the wage relation,
thereby making the relation between employers
and laborers
more truly a contract, since workers were free
to refrain
from entering into it. And the bourgeois
conception that
property rights are grounded in the natural right
individuals have in their bodies and the labor of their
bodies,

14

becomes a reality as laborers abandon the wage-

relation and cultivate their own property for themselves.
The effects of this unfortunate concordance between ideology
and reality, at least as viewed from the perspective of

capital, are described by Marx as follows:

This constant transformation of the wage-labourers
into independent producers, who work for
themselves instead of the capitalistic gentry,
reacts in its turn very perversely on the
conditions of the labour market. Not only does
the degree of exploitation of the wage-labourer
remain indecently low. The wage-labourer loses
into the bargain, along with the relation of
dependence, also the sentiment of dependence on
the abstemious capitalist. 15
In this chapter on modern colonization, Marx cites E.G.

Wakefield's England and America

,

which bemoans the fact that
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in colonies with an abundance of land,

»'[t]he supply of

labour is always, not only small, but
uncertain.'" 16
Marx, of course, did not overestimate
the threat which
open space posed to capitalism, and he

undoubtedly

understood that capital was up to this challenge.

He noted

Wakefield's plan for "systematic colonization,"
whereby land
prices would be raised to a point at which
wage-laborers

would have to save for years to be able to afford

a

sufficient piece of property, and the surplus funds from
these land sales would then be used by the government of the

colony to import replacement laborers from Europe. 17

But in

the case of the United States, Marx recognized that such

a

scheme was being rendered unnecessary by several
developments.

The successive waves of immigrants provided

eastern industry with a reserve of dependent laborers; the

government's debt f-om the Civil War would call for heavy
taxation; and capital was being increasingly consolidated in

mining and railroad companies.

All of this indicated to

Marx that "[t]he great republic" had "ceased to be the

promised land for emigrant labourers." 18
Marx, however, did not note the irony, in the case of

the American colony, of plans such as Wakefield's.

In 1862,

five years before the publication of the first volume of

Capital

,

the government of the United States began to give

away 160-acre homesteads to settlers who lived on and

improved the land for five years.

Obviously, the passage of
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the Homestead Act did not mark the
victory of a peasant
economy over capitalism, so how can
this free-land policy be
explained? it may be tempting to say of
this what Marx said
of the British attempts to legally
restrict the enclosure

of

the commons and retain small agricultural
plots for
cottagers (i.e. laws of tillage): those who
supported such
laws had not yet come to realize that the
wealth of the
nation and the poverty of the people were
complementary. 19

Perhaps the generous American land policy of the
later

nineteenth century was similarly anomalous; Congress
had not
yet caught on to this principle of modern statecraft,

and so

was not using its vast holdings of land to increase the

national wealth (i.e. capital).

There are problems with such an explanation, however.
First, given this explanation, one would expect the federal

government to have learned its lesson quickly in the face of
its enormous Civil War debt, and begun to sell, not giveaway, the public domain.

But this was not the case, and the

Homestead Act remained in effect throughout the nineteenth
and into the twentieth century.

Secondly, this explanation

does not account for the fact that the government had

already learned this lesson about the national wealth in the

eighteenth century, and had initiated a program for selling
public land in order to pay the Revolutionary War debt. 20
So the Homestead Act can not be dismissed simply as a

mistake made by an inexperienced government.

On the
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contrary, the Homestead Act marks the
culmination of a long
trend in the land policy of the United
States away from its
conservative beginnings as a means for
raising revenue,
toward its more democratic role as
promoter and protector of
family farms.
So the question remains, how could
a nation
which was emerging as the leader in
industrial capitalism,
afford to give away land to small homesteaders?
How could a
country with an expanding capitalist economy
undertake a

policy of promoting that form of property which
was the
antithesis of capital, and, according to Marx, upon
whose
tomb only capital grows?
The answer

I

would like to offer to these questions is

that the threat which was posed to capitalism in America
by
the vast amount of unsettled land (unsettled, at least, by

white men) had been largely eliminated by the 1860's.

The

manner in which the threat of American space was neutralized
provides insights into the later development of capitalism
in America,

consumption.

especially in regard to the American standard of
My claim is that the American fetish for

technological conveniences can be understood, in part, as an
outcome of the subjugation of American space.

To support

this claim, it is necessary to discuss not only American

developments in transportation and farm machinery, but

American land policy as well.
a

But to begin with,

I

must be

little more specific about the nature of the threat.
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The problem posed by America's vast
amount of unsettled
land was felt even in the pre-revolutionary
period, although
not so much as a threat to the labor
supply, as a threat to
the lives of frontier settlers. White
settlers continually
encroached upon territory that the colonial
assemblies and
the British crown recognized as belonging
to the Indians.
In an attempt to quell this practice, a
practice which

engendered much hostility among the Indian population,
George in, in the Proclamation of 1763, forbade his
subjects from settling west of the Appalachian mountains. 21
But this measure, along with the various attempts by

colonial governments to restrict the settlement of

unoccupied land, were of no avail.

In 1768,

for example,

the assembly of Pennsylvania passed an act which required

settlers on the forbidden land to remove upon penalty of
death; but by 1775, there were between 25,000 and 30,000

settlers beyond the Appalachians. 22
Even within the colonies themselves, settlers were

quick to establish homesteads on unoccupied land that had
been granted to certain proprietors by the crown. 23

The

proprietors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, and the
Carol inas sought to extract from these settlers a form of
feudal obligation known as quitrent, which was a single

payment made in lieu of all other feudal obligations.
However, these attempts to bridle the clearers and

cultivators of the virgin forests along the Atlantic
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seaboard were unsuccessful, and were
often met with open
24
revolt.
This practice of settling on unoccupied
land, which
eventually came to be known as squatting,
continued after
the American Revolution, and squatters
had as little respect
for the authority of the government of
the United States as
they had for the British crown, at least
when it came to
attempts to restrict their settlement on
unoccupied land.

After the Revolutionary War, several states
eventually ceded
to the federal government the large tracts of
land that
had

been granted to them by the British Crown. 25

As

I

mentioned

above, the Continental Congress sought to relieve
the

federal government's war debt through the sale of these
lands.

In one of the first and most important acts of the

Continental Congress, an ordinance was passed in 1785 which

established a program for selling the land northwest of the
Ohio River, which had been ceded to the federal government
by Virginia in 1784.

To deal with the problem of squatters,

who had settled on the most promising land in this
territory, 26 the ordinance granted the Secretary of War the

authority to use federal troops to remove these
trespassers. 27
This policy of removing squatters by force was largely
ineffectual, due both to the overwhelming number of

squatters who settled illegally on government and Indian
land, and to the tenacity of the squatters, who often
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returned to rebuild their destroyed
homesteads after the
troops had left. 28 Nevertheless, the
policy of removing
squatters from government land remained
in effect until 1841
(with some important exceptions which
will be mentioned
shortly)
And federal troops were obligated to
remove
American trespassers from Indian land
according to the terms
of the various nineteenth century treaties
between Indian
.

tribes and the government of the United States. 29

(The

military campaigns against the various Indian
tribes, as
well as the larger environment of duplicity in
which
relations with the Indians were carried out by the
United
States' government, are beyond the scope of this essay.

This should not be understood as an apology for the genocide

which underpins the formation and expansion of the United
States.

It is just that my concern here lies with the

subjugation of independent white settlers, and the role that
subjugation played in shaping the typically American
attitude toward technology and convenience.)

Although the military response to the problem of
squatters was a failure, other elements of the Ordinance of
1785 were ultimately more successful in undermining the

threat posed by open space to the formation of capital.

It

must be emphasized here that the problem or threat of

unsettled land was not simply that squatters might establish
claims without paying for them; even if the government was
able to exact payment from every family to settle on the

142

public domain, there was still the
problem of independent
homesteaders who would be beyond the
control of capital.
Prohibiting free settlement on the public
domain,

in the

sense of non-payment, was just part
of the problem; the
freedom which could be attained through
the lawful purchase
of land was the more far-reaching
threat.
The response to
this facet of the threat of space is more
varied and subtle
than the violent treatment of squatters, and
it is also more
closely related to the theme of this essay.
To begin with, the Continental Congress
thought it

necessary to regulate the pattern of settlement as
it moved
westward, and toward this end, the Ordinance of 1785
required that the land in a given area be surveyed before
being offered for sale. 30

And the particular surveying

system which was adopted by the Continental Congress further
indicates its serious concern for controlling the westward

movement of settlers.

According to this surveying system,

the vastness of American space was to be dissected into

equally sized squares in parallel rows.

Starting from the

point where the Ohio River crossed the Pennsylvania border,
a line

was to be surveyed due west.

Similar base lines were

to be established every six miles south of this line, up to

the border of the Ohio.

These parallel base lines were in

turn crossed by north-south meridians, which were also drawn
at six mile intervals.

Each six-mile by six-mile square

which was formed by these intersecting lines was a
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"township,

» and these were further subdivided into
36 onesquare mile "sections,
of 640 acres each. 31

The first survey accomplished under
this system was to
consist of seven north-south rows of
townships, called
"ranges," running south from the original
east-west base
line, down to the Ohio River.
Once the survey was complete,
the land was to be sold either by township
or section, that
is, either in 36 square-mile or 1
32
square-mile
lots.

By

limiting sales to surveyed land only, and by
requiring that
entire townships or sections be bought, the
government
sought to reap the full value of its land holdings.

surveyed area had largely been sold, the surveying of
region would proceed.

Once

a

a new

This system allowed the government to

ensure that all land was developed, not just the most

desirable land. 33

The constitutional government which was

created in 1789, retained this system of land survey and
sale, and used it to regulate the settlement of the various

lands which were purchased by, or ceded to, that government.

The rectilinear system of land surveying stands in

sharp contrast to the less "rational" survey system which

prevailed in southern states like Kentucky and Virginia,
where feudal impulses were strongest. 34

Under that pre-

modern system, settlers were free to chose the most
desirable unclaimed land, and to survey it in a haphazard

manner which relied on natural, and therefore changeable,
landmarks, such as streams and trees.

Aside from the
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boundary quarrels that such a loose
arrangement generated
among settlers, it also had the
disadvantage, from a modern
perspective, of allowing certain areas
to remain
"unimproved," or undeveloped. The presence
of such "wastewas one of the obstacles which England
faced in its

modernization, and the enclosure movement was,
in part, a
response to this problem. Swamps, marshes,
and other
"useless" lands were reclaimed through the
enclosure process
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
and were then
used for either pasture or crop cultivation. 35 The
survey

system employed by the United States prevented the

accumulation of such waste land in the first place, by
setting everything in order before legal settlement was
permitted. 36

This American attempt to set its space in

order, to establish a grid of borders, displays a tendency

that has often been cited as a birthmark of modernity.
However, this point cannot be developed here, given the

Marxist context of this chapter. 37
To return to the more narrow examination of American
space, the survey and sale system adopted in the Ordinance
of 1785 helped not only to ensure that all land was

developed, but in conjunction with a restrictive pricing

mechanism, it also helped to undermine the threat of

independent homesteaders.

As

I

mentioned above, the

surveyed land was sold either in townships, to speculators,
or in sections, to homesteaders and speculators; nothing
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smaller than

acre section could be purchased
from the

a 640

government.

The price per acre for these surveyed
parcels
was to be established by competitive
bidding at auction, but
the minimum price per acre was set at
one dollar.
So even
for the least desirable section in a
surveyed area, the

homesteader would have to pay a minimum of 640
dollars, plus
a surveying fee of 1 dollar per section. 38
The price of

l

dollar per acre may today appear to be

a

very generous gesture on behalf of the government
toward
settlers, but state-owned lands were being sold at
that time
for significantly lower prices. 39

So at the outset, the

government of the American "colony" had developed

a land

regulation system which, at least in its pricing mechanism,
closely resembled the price-fixing plan suggested by
Wakefield.

Prices were raised to a level which prevented

the widespread settlement of newly surveyed land by

individual homesteading families.

The 641 dollar minimum

price placed homesteading beyond the means of many, 40 and

speculators could easily raise the price level beyond the
means of other would-be settlers during the auction. 41
It was not just the price which prevented many from

acquiring homesteads
deterrent.

-

the minimum purchase size was also a

Those who had earlier settled the Appalachian

Plateau, just west of the Carolinas and Virginia, usually

established very small clearings of

4

to

5

acres, on which

they planted the food that would feed their family.

The

size of these farms increased gradually over
the years, as
the family did, and might occasionally reach
a size of 400
42
acres.
But after 1785, any settler who legally
purchased
a homestead from the government had
to begin with

64 0 acres.

This is not to say that all of the purchase had
to be
cleared and planted immediately, but since the settler

also

had to pay at least 641 dollars for the land, which
was

quite likely borrowed at interest, there was some pressure
to clear the land quickly and produce surpluses in order
to

repay the investment or loan which had been undertaken.

Of

course smaller homesteads could be purchased from
speculators, but at

a

significantly higher price than the

government minimum.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the early pace of land

sales in the Northwest Territory was not very brisk/ 3

This

was due in part, no doubt, to the resistance which the

Indians offered to white settlement, but the land policy

established by the Continental Congress in 1785 was also
hindrance, at least to the small homesteaders.

a

In 1796 the

policy was revised so that it would be easier to acquire

a

homestead, but this was not accomplished by lowering the

minimum sale size or the minimum price per acre; on the
contrary, the minimum size was maintained at a full section,
and the minimum price was doubled to

2

dollars per acre.

What made it easier for the individual homesteader to buy
land was the introduction of a credit system which allowed
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the settler to pay for the land over a four
year period/ 4
But with the full-section minimum, this policy
still favored
the speculator over the homesteader.
It was not until 1800,

when the minimum size was reduced to a half-section
(320
acres)

and the credit system was refined, that land sales
to

homesteaders flourished. 45

The relatively easy terms of

credit required a five percent initial payment (32 dollars
at a minimum)

,

twenty-five percent payment after forty days,

and another quarter payment at the end of the second, third,

and fourth years.
six percent.

6

The rate of interest on the balance was

In 18 04, the qovernment reduced the minimum

size to a quarter-section, making it even easier for

settlers to acquire their homestead on credit. 47

While the availability of credit for land sales is
often interpreted as a government concession to the small
homesteaders, who otherwise would not have been able to buy
land, this policy can also be read as a subtle way of

undermininq the threat which independent farmers posed to
the American economy.

Under the terms of the Land Act of

1800, small homesteads did multiply, but the owners of these

lands were debtors to the federal government.

These farmers

had little choice but to produce cash crops which could feed
the urban population, so that they would be able to make the

payments on their land.

Self-sufficient farming was not

possibility for these debtor farmers; they had to become
engaged in the capitalist exchange economy, as both

a
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suppliers of foodstuffs and consumers of
industrially
manufactured items, which they no longer had
time to produce
for themselves.
(Of course, the availability of
such
manufactured items and the ability to sell
crops for cash
depended on crucial developments in
transportation. My
focus here, however, is on the way space
was brought to
order, or subdued, by American land policy.
I will get to
the way people and things were set in motion,
or how the
limit of distance was overcome, later.)
The emergence of government sponsored credit at
the end
of the eighteenth century is a significant development,

since credit has become one of the primary features of

contemporary consumption.

Both Aglietta and Mandel indicate

the important role which credit plays in fostering the

current mode of consumption.

But both of these theorists

treat widespread consumption on credit as a twentieth

century phenomenon.

-

From their perspectives, consumer

credit becomes an important feature of capitalism only when
the intensification of the production process in the 1920'

s

demanded the close integration of production and
consumption.

The point

I

want to stress is that buying on

credit was an important phenomenon at the beginning of the

nineteenth century, in regard to land purchases.

As one

land historian put it, credit was "the very life blood of
the West." 49

From my perspective, the government's

extension of credit to settlers was a way of undermining the
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threat which the vast amount of unsettled
land posed to
capitalism in the United States. Credit
emerged not as a
development of late capitalism, but as
capital's response t o
a material condition other than
the capitalist production
process. (Even if one ignores the spatial
situation in the
United States, as do Aglietta and Mandel,
and focuses only
on durable goods other than land, credit
still was important
by the middle of the nineteenth century.
I will get to this
point shortly.)

There appears, therefore, to have been a shift in
the
land policy of the United States between the Ordinance
of
1785 and the Land Acts of 1800 and 1804.

The initial policy

tried both to restrict the settlement of the public domain
(by prohibiting squatting and evicting squatters, by

requiring that surveys of entire regions be complete before
sales could begin, and by establishing a prohibitively large

minimum lot size)

,

and to maximize the revenue generated by

land sales (by selling the public domain at auction, and by

establishing a minimum price of one dollar per acre, and
then doubling it)

.

In 1800 however, the restrictive

character of the land seemed to give way to government
efforts to promote settlement.

The reduction in minimum lot

size from 640 to 320 to 160 acres, plus the provision of
credit, sparked a surge in land sales. 50

Not only did the

land policies of the early nineteenth century foster, rather

than restrict, settlement, but they did so at the expense of
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the other purpose of the original
policies

revenue for the federal government.

-

the raising of

In fact,

the liberal

credit terms of the Land Act of 1800,
which remained in
effect until 1820, caused an explosion
in the debt owed to
the federal government, very little of
which was actually
repaid.
By 1819, the government had sold land
worth 44
million dollars, but had received payment for
only about
half of that, and at that point, the situation
seemed only
to be getting worse.
Between 1815 and 1819, the amount owed
to the government ballooned from 3 million to
17 million
dollars, and the government had to repeatedly pass
relief

legislation for its many debtors, and extend the terms of
their payments. 51
The combination of easy credit and widespread

speculation in land led to a continuing inflation of land
prices.
a

In 1819, this bubble burst and a panic ensued.

As

consequence, the government abolished its credit system in

1820, and required that all future land sales were to be

paid for in cash at the time of purchase. 52

Although the

abolition of credit did make it harder for the settler to
acquire land, the minimum price and size requirements were

both reduced, from
to 80 acres. 53

2

to 1.25 dollars per acre, and from 160

So despite the tremendous debt owed to the

federal government, land policies continued to move away
from their original, conservative form toward what appears
to be a more populist model.

It was not simply the credit system of
1800 which

undermined the profitability of government land
sales,
however.
From the outset, the practice of selling

land by

public auction had been manipulated by
speculators to their
own advantage.
Before credit was offered in
1796,

the land

policies favored speculators who were willing
and
financially able to pay for townships and full sections
the minimum price.

at

These large holdings would then be

subdivided and sold for a profit.

But these speculators,

who at that point could only be challenged at auction
by

other wealthy speculators, often made arrangements before
auctions, whereby they would determine who would buy what

piece of property, and then agree not to bid against one
another.

The result of this collusion, of course, was that

prior to the introduction of credit, land prices were not
raised much above the minimum at auction. 54

So even before

the credit explosion of the first two decades of the

nineteenth century, the federal government was not receiving
the revenue expected from its land sales.

Speculators were also able to frustrate governmental
attempts to encourage the settlement of the land by
homesteaders, inasmuch as the speculators were able to take

advantage of every land policy revision in that direction.
The reductions in the minimum price and size, along with the

availability of credit, could be taken advantage of by the
speculator as well as the settler.

Speculators could still
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outbid homesteaders, and after making
the small downpayment, sell the land for a profit, and
then default on the
debt to the government. 55 Alternately,
they could outbid
competitors, but then forfeit the land
shortly after
the

sale, unbeknown to competing bidders.

The speculator could

then buy the land again after the auction
closed, but at the
minimum price, according to the usual practice
for disposing
of sections which were not sold during the
bidding. 56

With the abolition of the credit system,
homesteaders
lost whatever little advantage they had gained
against the

speculator, and land sales to homesteaders dwindled in
the
182 O's.

however.

This is not to say that settlement dwindled,

Squatters settled on the public domain, in the

hope that they would be able to afford their 80 acre claim

when the surveys were completed and the auctions held. 57

These squatters, of course, were easily victimized by
speculators, who would often agree, for a fee, to refrain
from bidding against the settlers.

The squatter might get

his land at the minimum price, but only after paying off the

threatening speculators. 58

And if the speculator wanted the

land, not just a pay-off, he could easily outbid the settler

and take the homestead.

Another method commonly used by speculators to
undermine the independence of squatters, was to lend them
money for the purchase of their claims, at exorbitant
interest rates, of course.

Such lending, claims one
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historian, "proved to be one of
the most lucrative business
opportunities on the frontier." 59 Here
too, the speculator
skirted the law, but in this case
he was avoiding state and
territorial laws against usury, not
federal land
laws.

While the usury laws limited interest
to 10 or 12 percent,
speculators entered the squatter's claim
in the name of the
speculator, and bonded the squatter to
pay a specified
amount by a specified date, in order
to receive the title.
Through this technique, the speculators
were able to collect
interest at rates as high as 100 percent. 60
So although the United States' land
policies in the

early nineteenth century appear to have been
moving in the
opposite direction from Wakefield's plan for
"systematic

colonization," the effect of these policies was the
same.
Land prices, directly or indirectly, were raised to
a

level

which made it difficult for independent homesteaders to
acquire property.

The profit from this policy, however,

went not to the government, as Wakefield had suggested, but
to private speculators.

In either case, the threat of an

independent agricultural population was undermined.
In order to avoid painting too pathetic a picture of

the vulnerable, hapless squatter,

I

squatting increased in the 1820

and thereafter, squatters

's

must mention that as

did learn the lessons which were presented by the practices
of the hated speculators.

They adopted the speculators'

technique of uniting in an organization which would allow
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them to prevent land prices from rising
at auction.
These
"claim clubs- or "claim associations," as
they have come to
be known, sprang up throughout the
frontier. 61 Besides
making arrangements to prevent competitive
bidding among
themselves, the squatters also had to prevent
speculators
from bidding at all.
They did this by a show, and often an
act, of force at the auction.
The register of the club did
all of the members' bidding, and any other
bidders, be they
speculators or non-member settlers, were quickly
stifled by
the club-wielding membership. 62 Where claim clubs
were
established, therefore, auctions were

a sham,

just as they

were where speculators organized themselves, and land
prices

were held down to the established minimum. 63
And to avoid painting too noble

organized squatters,

I

a

picture of these

must also point out that many members

of the claim clubs were not merely protecting their right to

that with which they had mixed their labor, to paraphrase
Locke. Often squatters were speculators themselves.

By

acquiring de facto title to their claim through the claim
club, those squatters who were unable or unwilling to pay

for their land, even at the minimum price, could sell their

title to another before the auction.
a title,

auction.

The purchaser of such

of course, also had to buy the land again at the

The profits which squatters made from such sales

could be used to buy a smaller piece of land, or it could be
saved, and the process repeated in other unsettled areas,
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eventually allowing the squatter to save
enough to buy a
sizeable, desirable homestead. 64 And
these speculating
squatters sometimes claimed tracts of land
which were larger
than the amount they could cultivate,
and used
the force of

the claim club to keep other squatters
off their extensive
65
holdings,
So much for the noble squatter.
In any case, the primary target of the
claim clubs was

not other settlers, but wealthy speculators.
183 0,

the squatters were no longer on their own in
their

struggle against speculators.
1830

But after

's,

Throughout the decade of the

Congress repeatedly passed Pre-emption Acts, which

allowed those who had settled on the public domain, and
had
made specified improvements on the land, to buy up to 160
acres of such land at the minimum price of 1.25 dollars per
acre. 66

As a result of these acts, settlers no longer had

to vie with the speculators at auction, and were no longer

susceptible to their extortive tactics. 67
The Pre-emption Acts of the 1840' s applied only to land
that had already been improved prior to the act.

In other

words, these acts were retrospective, and in a sense, they

forgave past transgressions by those who illegally settled
on public land.

In 1841, however, Congress passed a Pre-

emption Act which was prospective.

This act extended the

terms of the earlier acts to all those who would settle and

improve the public domain.
illegal. 69

Squatting was no longer

The government finally seemed to recognize that
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the squatters had some right
to the land which they had
improved.

This right, of course, was not
the pre-capitalist
property right which was espoused by
political economists
like Locke (see note 12).
By the pre-emption process,
squatters only gained the right to buy
the land they
improved through their labor.
But in 1862, with the passage
of the Homestead Act, something very
close to that precapitalist property right was established.
Under the terms
of this act, any man at least twenty-one
years of age, the
head of a household of any age, or a widow,
could gain title
to any surveyed public land, up to 160
acres, which they

lived on and improved for a five year period. 70

Through

their labor on the land (or the labor of someone in
their
hire, as Locke intended), settlers gained a property
right
in that land.

As

I

wrote at the outset of this discussion

of American space, there is an element of irony in the

passage of the Homestead Act at the very moment when
industrial capitalism was expanding in the United States.

There is such irony, at least, if one takes Marx's thought
into account. 71

But at this point in my discussion, the

irony has already begun to dispel.
As has already been noted, in the development of

American land policy from 1785 to 1862, the shift from its
conservative origin to its populist conclusion was
accompanied at every turn by widespread speculation.

Every
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policy revision which favored the small
homesteader was
turned by the speculator to his own
advantage.
The

reductions in price and size limits
and the provision of
credit all helped the speculator as
well as the settler.
And the Pre-emption Acts, which forgave
and ultimately
legalized squatting, were fraudulently
abused by speculators
(see note 72).
Even the Homestead Act was a boon to
speculators.

According to the terms of the Act, a settler

could commute the five year residence requirement
after six
months, upon payment of 1.25 dollars per acre.
After 1880,

speculators began to fraudulently take advantage of
this
provision to increase their land holdings. 72 since

speculators had been able all along to acquire vast holdings
of desirable land, or alternately, to extort money
from

settlers, it is not that surprising that the United States

could afford in the middle decades of the nineteenth century
to legalize squatting, and then to give land away.

The best

farm land was largely owned or occupied by 1862, and most of

the remainder of the public domain was unfit for

agriculture. 73

If a settler wanted good farm land, he still

had to pay the speculator's price.
But aside from the wiles of speculators, there were

other forces operating in the first two-thirds of the

nineteenth century which helped to undermine the threat of

American space.

Consideration of these forces will help to

further dispel the irony surrounding the development of
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American land policy, and will also
shed some light on the
blindspots of those Marxists whom I
discussed earlier.
These other forces also bear more
directly on my argument
about convenience than does the problem
of speculation.
I
have already touched on one of these
forces in my discussion
of Mandel's Late Capitalism.
I am referring here to
the

"industrialization of agriculture," which Mandel
treats as a
feature of the advanced capitalism of the
twentieth century
(see Chapter 3, p.

117).

To reiterate Mandel

-s

point, the

industrialization of agriculture was a result of overcapitalization; agriculture was one of the areas into
which
surplus profits flowed after the "traditional domains
of

commodity production" were thoroughly industrialized (see

Chapter

3,

pp.

The point

114-6).
I

want to make is that the industrialization

of agriculture, or perhaps mechanization is a better term,

occurred in the nineteenth century, and was actually well-

established by the time the Homestead Act was passed.
Furthermore,

I

read this mechanization not as the result of

advanced developments in capitalism, but, as

I

read American

land policy, as an attempt to undermine the threat of

unsettled space.

In fact, the mechanization of agriculture

is closely bound up with the restrictions which were imposed

by land policy.
As

I

mentioned above, the minimum lot sizes established

by the various land acts, along with the minimum prices, had
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an effect on the way in which the
land was settled.

Those
who sought to legally settle on the
public domain in the
nineteenth century could not afford to
clear and cultivate
the land at the pace which was common
in the eighteenth
century.
A small clearing which provided food
for the
family could no longer be gradually expanded,
so that after
several years it could produce commercially. 74
if a settler
purchased land from the government, he had to buy
at least
the minimum acreage at the minimum price.
He could buy a

smaller homestead from a speculator, but at
price.

a

much higher

In either case, he most likely bought on credit,

either from the government or the speculator, and had to
begin making payment soon thereafter.

It was imperative

that the settler clear and plant as much land as possible as

quickly as possible.

The objective of such settlers was not

so much to produce food to satisfy the demands of the

family's bodies, as it was to produce surpluses which could
be used to pay off land debts.

Farming had become less the

satisfaction of a demand of the body, than the practice of
overcoming limits which hinder the production of food as

a

commodity.

The first limit to be overcome was the clearing of the
land, and in almost every area of the country, the axe was

essential to this task. 75

If it was not needed to clear the

enormous trees of the virgin forests, it was needed to

produce the implements which would be used to farm the land,
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and to construct fences and buildings.

Consequently, the

axe underwent a complete transformation
in America.
The
broadaxe, which had remained unchanged
for centuries in
Europe, was made broader and straighter
in the blade,

heavier in the head, and lighter and more
flexible in the
handle.
Felling trees was accomplished much more
quickly
and with less effort by the American, or
Kentucky,

axe than

by its European predecessor. 76

Various other types of axes

were also developed, each capable of accomplishing
its
particular task, for example, bark-stripping or railsplitting, in the quickest and easiest manner.

These

various tools had reached standardized form by the mid-

nineteenth century, and were being mass-produced. 77

Although the technical development of the axe appears to be
quite modest, it does reflect the early form of the American

tendency to produce the most convenient tool for the task at
hand.

And these axes were convenient not just in the pre-

modern sense of being appropriate to the task; they also
were designed to promote the ease and comfort of the user,
and were therefore convenient in the modern sense of this

word as well.

(See Ch.

2,

pp.

73-4 for the discussion of

these two senses of convenience.)
The other tool which was essential to clearing the land
was the plow.

Well into the nineteenth century, this tool

was produced by the farmer himself, and was made of wood. 78
The problem with wooden plows, of course, was that they
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often needed to be repaired, especially
in areas with
soil, and in the prairies, where
the wooden share,

heavy

or

cutting prong, was no match for the
extremely thick sod.
With the changes in land settlement
that occurred in the
nineteenth century, the settler could
ill-afford to spend
time refashioning and replacing the
broken or worn-out parts
of his plow.
Around the turn of the century, attempts
were
made at constructing plows out of cast-iron,
and by
1819,

plows with durable, replaceable iron parts
were being

produced commercially. 79

By 1850, tens of thousands of

plows, of over one hundred different varieties,
were being

produced each year in cities such as Worcester,

Massachusetts and Pittsburgh. 80

And in the 1850

's

John

Deere was successfully producing plows made of cast steel,

which were strong enough to handle the prairie sod without
needing frequent repair, and smooth enough so that the soil
no longer had to be periodically scraped from the plow, as

was the case with iron plows. 81
As a result of these technical developments of the
plow, settlers were able to clear much larger areas much

more quickly than with the wooden model.

Siegfried Giedion,

in noting the contrast between the settlement of the plains

of Europe and Asia and those of North America, raises the

point which

I

would like to stress.

Other great plains had been brought under the
plow.
But the opening of the Russian plains and
of the vast tracts of China extended over
centuries.
Compared to these the development of
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the Middle West took place within
a few decades
almost by elimination of the time
factor 82
(mv
y
emphasis)
1

This concern for eliminating the
time factor, or
overcoming the limits on time imposed
by the task of
clearing the land, arose in part, from
the way in which the
space of America was dissected and sold
to settlers.
And,
of course, it was not just the clearing
of the land which
had to speeded up. The planting of seeds
and the harvesting
of crops had to be guickened as well, if
the settler was
going to be able to take full advantage of his
holding, and
be able to pay off his land debt.
By 1860, many devices had
been developed to guicken the various facets of crop

production, and were in widespread use.

Most of these

developments were centered on wheat, the primary commercial
crop of the mid-West. 83

The other important crop was corn,

which was the principal grain consumed by the farm
household, including the livestock. 84
Seed drills, which uniformly plant and cover seeds,

were first developed in England in the eighteenth century, 85
but they attained a workable, efficient form in the United

States between 1840 and I860. 86

The use of seed drills,

which were drawn along by horses, not only accelerated the
seeding process, but made it more uniform.

Hand-cranked

broadcast seeders had already been developed, and while
these were faster than sowing by hand, they still scattered
the seed in every direction.

While such broadcasting may
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have been acceptable for wheat seed,
it was not for corn,
which had to be weeded, or cultivated,
periodically.
Drills
planted the seeds in straight rows with
uniform spacing,
which allowed the farmer to cultivate
the soil between rows
of corn with a horse-drawn hoe, which
again was much faster
than hoeing by hand.
in any case, by 1860, most wheat and
much corn was planted by the seed drill, 87
which cost around
125 dollars. 88

Another very important development in farm machinery
also occurred about the same time that the seed
drill was

being perfected.

The traditional method of harvesting wheat

was to cut it by hand using a sickle or a cradle, the
latter

being larger and more cumbersome, but also faster, than the
sickle.

With a sickle,

a

farmer could harvest one-half to

three-quarters of an acre in a day, and with a cradle, two
to three acres could be cut. 89

Unlike other crops, such as

corn, wheat has to be harvested within a narrow space of
time.

As long as farmers had to rely on hand tools for

harvesting, their income from wheat was severely limited,
and any extension depended on an uncertain and expensive

supply of migratory labor to help at harvest.

Wakefield's

lament about the labor supply in colonies (see pp. 13 5-6)

applied to farmers as well as industrialists. 90
In 1834, however, Cyrus McCormick patented a mechanical

reaper, which was able to harvest up to twelve acres in a
day, with the assistance of two workers - a two-fold
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improvement over the cradle. 91

while other reapers had been

patented before Mccormick's, both in the
United States and
England, his was the first to gain
widespread use. After
years of contracting other firms to build
the reapers, in
1848 Mccormick opened a main plant in Chicago. 92
He began
with thirty-three employees, and in 1849
had one hundred
twenty.
In light of Aglietta's and Mandel s
emphasis on the
•

production process of the twentieth century, it is
interesting to note that Mccormick's factory had
features
which are usually considered twentieth-century innovations.
The Chicago factory had a central source of power

engine

-

- a

steam

which drove fourteen or fifteen machines, such as

metal lathes, and the material was moved on a rail system.

After this factory burned in 1851, a new factory was built
which had a conveyor system and used automatic-feed
machinery. 93
But in regard to farm practices, Mccormick's reaper,

and the thirty or so competitors which emerged in the mid-

nineteenth century, revolutionized the production of grain.
A mechanized rake was added, which performed the task of

raking the cut wheat off of the reaper and laying it in
row on the ground. 94

a

This addition doubled the efficiency

of the reaper, since one of the two laborers had previously

performed that task.

By 1869, around 80,000 such reapers

had been sold, and the average price was 125 dollars. 95
1864,

In

70,000 reapers were produced, but even more could have
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been sold. 96

The widespread use of the mechanical
reaper
was a major reason, along with
increased land sales under
the Pre-emption Act, for the
seventy-two percent increase in
wheat production which occurred in the
United States in the
97
1850»s.
By 1880, the harvesting of wheat had
been completely

mechanized, as the last time-consuming task
involved in
wheat production was brought up to the pace
required by

nineteenth century American agriculture.

The binding of the

grain into bundles, or sheaves, in which it
would dry, had
been traditionally performed by hand, of course,
as the

grain lay on the ground.

Around 1870, a conveyor was added

to the reaper which carried the cut grain up to a
table,

where the wheat could be bound, still by hand. 98

But the

binder no longer had to walk through the field, picking up
the fallen grain.

The continuously fed binding table

allowed the binder to perform his task as the grain was

brought to him.

In 1880,

a

commercially viable mechanized

binder was developed, eliminating the many hours which had
been spent in binding. 99

By 1880, therefore, a single

farmer could harvest his wheat and bind it into sheaves, by

simply driving across the fields his horse-drawn reaper,
upon which he sat.
The threshing of wheat had also been mechanized by the

mid-nineteenth century.

Horses on treadmills were first

used to drive the threshing machines, but after the Civil

166
War, steam engines gradually replaced
the horse tread as the
100
motive force.
These machines were capable of threshing

thirty bushels of wheat per hour, compared
to the seven
bushels that could be threshed in an hour
by a man swinging
a flail, the traditional method. 101
The cost of a threshing
machine, including the horse tread, was 230
dollars in 1839,
but dropped to 175 dollars by 1851. 102

Along with these various mechanical innovations
in the
production of wheat, came a wide array of devices and
implements which accelerated the accomplishment of all
other

agricultural tasks.

Horse-drawn grass cutters, for making

hay, were perfected in the 1850 's, and horse-drawn rakes,

tedders, and forks, all used for haying operations, were

also available.

Machines were also developed for

harvesting, shelling, and crushing corn, pressing cheese,
...

.

Without continuing this list or going into any further

detail, there is little doubt that by the time the federal

government began giving land to settlers in 1862,
agricultural practices in the United States had been

thoroughly transformed.

transformation which

I

There are three features of this

want to stress.

First, the various farm tasks which had traditionally

been performed by the farm family and hired hands, had come
to be treated as impositions on the use of time.

Every task

upon which time had to be spent became an obstacle to be

overcome through technological ingenuity and animal power,
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the latter which would eventually be
replaced by steam, and
then gasoline, engines.
in other words, farming had become
convenient, in the modern sense which I outlined
in the
second chapter.
The production of food, as a means of

satisfying a demand of the body, was transformed
into an
array of limits to be overcome through technology.
This is not to claim that all American farming prior
to
the mechanization which occurred in the nineteenth
century

was simply self-subsistent farming, concerned only with the

bodily demands of the household.

But those farmers who

first settled west of the Appalachian mountains in the

eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, ahead of the
surveys and land auctions, produced agricultural items

primarily for household consumption.

In the course of the

nineteenth century, however, as American space became
increasingly ordered according to the United States' land
policies, farmers came to be less concerned with producing
for household consumption than with production for commerce.
In the twentieth century, this shift has been carried to the

point where farmers produce only cash crops and purchase
their household foodstuffs from a grocery.

But what

I

really want to stress here is not the subsistence/commercial
distinction, as much as the demand/limit shift.
Of course, the situation of the nineteenth century farm

household, in regard to limits, is not the same as that of
the modern household which

I

described in the second
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chapter.

Overcoming temporal limits in the production
of
food for commerce, is not the same as
overcoming limits

imposed by the preparation and consumption of
food in the
household. There is a difference between the
nineteenth
century farmer's purchase of a reaper, which speeds
up

production, and the modern household's purchase of a

microwave oven and frozen foods, which accelerate
consumption.

But this leads to the second point that

I

want

to stress: the quickening of agricultural production in
the

nineteenth century was accomplished by turning the farmer,
the traditional producer, into a consumer of technology.

To

put this in Marxist terms, the production of food became,

in

the nineteenth century, a Department II enterprise, which

produced commodities for mass consumption, while consuming
the means of production produced in Department

I.

By 1860,

the production of farm implements and machinery (Department
I

agricultural production) had grown to be one of the top

ten industries in the country.
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Farmers had become not

just commercial producers, but commercial consumers as well.

Aglietta and Mandel both point out, in regard to late
or advanced capitalism, that the integration of these two

departments, along with the integration of individual

consumers and Department

I,

availability of credit.

This holds true for the

depends to a large extent on the

integration, or subduction, of independent farmers into the

capitalist economy of the nineteenth century as well, and
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this is the third point

I

want to emphasize.

The threat

posed to capitalism by the vast amount of unsettled
space,
which might have allowed farmers to gain some
independence
from capitalist relations of production, was
undermined

largely by the extension of credit.

First, credit was

extended by both the government (1800-20) and private
lenders, to the settlers who sought land upon which they

could establish

a

homestead.

Then in order to pay back his

land debt, the farmer had to buy machinery which would speed
up production to the point where he could quickly bring all
of his land into commercial use.
I

The purchase of Department

products was, like the purchase of land, accomplished on

credit
Cyrus Mccormick, who had developed the first

commercially successful reapers, as well as

a

highly

mechanized process to produce them, was also an innovator in
marketing the new machines.

He introduced the practice of

selling farm machinery on credit, and in 1856, two-thirds of
his sales were made in this manner.
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To keep pace with

Mccormick's sales, his competitors had to follow suit and
offer credit to their customers.

But even where credit was

not available from the producers themselves, banks and other

private lending agents were willing to loan the farmer the
money needed to purchase machinery.
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This is hardly surprising, given the prices of the

various machines which have already been mentioned.

Reapers

and seed drills were around 125 dollars
apiece in 1850, and
a threshing machine was about 175
dollars.
in comparison,
the 160 acre parcel purchased by the
settler in 1850, under
the terms of the Pre-emption Act of 1841,
would have cost
200 dollars.

An investment in the new farm machinery was,

on the same scale as the investment in the land
itself.
By the mid-nineteenth century, therefore,

been transformed not just into

a

farming had

primarily commercial

endeavor, but into a commercial endeavor which reguired
the

consumption of expensive time- and labor-saving technology.
There was no danger posed to capitalism in 1862, when the
federal government began to give land to settlers free of
charge.

Even if these settlers were not burdened by the

land debts which weighed on their predecessors, their

commercial success depended on their ability to produce
crops as cheaply as those farmers who used the new
machinery.

If the settler wanted to sell even a small

amount of his total output, he had to be able to keep the
cost of production down to a competitive level, and this

meant employing the new technology. 106
This discussion of nineteenth-century agricultural

technology may seem irrelevant to an understanding of the
techno-f etishism of the late twentieth century, since in

technologically advanced countries, relatively few people
are engaged in agricultural activity.

But that is the

peculiar nature of agricultural technology; the more
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successful this technology was in freeing
up the time
involved in the production of food, the
less visible and
prevalent this technology became, as fewer
people were
required to spend their time in agricultural
production.
Nevertheless, the nineteenth-century advances
in

agricultural technology are important for
understanding the
role which convenience plays in modern
techno-f etishism.
it
was the success of agricultural technology
in reducing the
time which had to be spent in agricultural
production which
enabled technology to further establish itself in the
modern

household.

it did this in two related ways.

First, the increased productivity which was provided
by

agricultural machinery allowed a greater proportion of
laborers to become employed in other industrial enterprises,

many of which produced items which were consumed by

households (i.e. Department II enterprises).

Many of these

consumer items which emerged throughout the nineteenth
century were conveniences.

This leads to a second way in

which the proliferation of farm machinery fostered further

technological consumption; the consumption of various
technological apparatuses which quickened and lightened the
many tasks and chores of a large farm, helped to groom, or
train,

individuals for the consumption of other time- and

labor-saving devices which were not strictly agricultural.
In other words, advances in agricultural technology, along

with a land distribution system which fostered the

consumption of that technology, promoted

-

but did not cause

the production and consumption of other
forms of household
technology.
-

I

must stress here that the role which

I

ascribe to

farm technology in the development of
modernity's technofetishism, is not a determinate one; there are
no iron

chains of causality or necessitation here.

I

am not

claiming that the industrial production and consumption
which have characterized the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries were possible only because of technological

breakthroughs in agriculture, nor am

I

saying that the

blooming industrialism in nineteenth-century America
required the mechanization of agriculture.

I

am claiming

only that the mechanization of agriculture and non-agri-

cultural industrialization under capitalism were
complementary, and

I

effect of the other.

refuse to reduce either one to a simple
But most importantly,

third element into this blend
space.

-

I

want to add

a

the problem of American

The mechanization of agriculture actually began in

England, among the commercial farmers who owned the land

that had been removed from common use.

But it was in the

United States that this mechanization became most fully
developed.

In England there was plenty of cheap

agricultural labor among that class that had been "torn from
the soil," as Marx put it.

In the United States, however,

there was plenty of space, at least in the first half of the
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nineteenth century, upon which settlers could
produce for
their own benefit. The mechanization of
agriculture,
I

am

arguing, helped to undermine that threat, while
preparing

a

foundation for American techno-f etishism.
The restrictive, regulatory land policies adopted
by
the United States' government, and the mechanization
of

agriculture, are two closely related elements of

capitalism's response to the problem of American space.

Although this chapter has turned out to be rather long,
there is a third element of this response which must be
examined.

I

have alluded to this dimension earlier, when

I

discussed the commercialization of agriculture, and pointed
out that such commerce depended upon developments in

transportation.

But the point

I

want to make about

transportation is not that commercial farming required, or
was made possible only because of, an elaborate

transportation network and rapid means of transportation,
which facilitated the movement of food and industrial
products. In fact, it is not the movement of things which

want to primarily stress, but the movement of people.
far,

I

I

So

have presented the problem of American space as a

threat posed by independent settlers who produce for
themselves, not capital.
of space than this alone.

But there is more to the problem

Not just settlement, but movement

itself presents a problem for capitalism, although Marx did
•

.

not pay much attention to this.
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Paul Virilio, whom

have already mentioned in a

I

endnote to an earlier chapter (see Ch.

2,

note 79),

is a

writer who has paid attention to the way
in which movement,
especially mass movement, has been used
and regulated by
capital and the state. 108
broad terms, Virilio claims
that modernity has been characterized by a
shift

m

in

political and economic authority's use of the
movement of
the masses.
Prior to the nineteenth century, writes
Virilio,

society was founded on the brake. Means of
furthering speed were very scant.
... In
general, up until the nineteenth century, there
was no production of speed. They could produce
brakes by means of ramparts, the law, rules,
interdictions, etc. They could brake using all
kinds of obstacles. 109
Then, however, occurred the revolution, characterized
in so many ways by so many writers, which ushered in

modernity.

From Virilio'

s

perspective, the significance of

this revolution was not that industrialization introduced

mass-production, or that liberal democracy permitted masspolitics, but that speed production became possible.

"And

so they can pass from the age of brakes to the age of the

accelerator.

In other words, power will be invested in

acceleration itself." 110

Given his unique perspective,

Virilio describes the revolution which opened up the modern
period not as an industrial or democratic revolution, but as
a "dromocratic" one.

To quote him once again: "In fact,

there was no 'industrial revolution,' but only

a

175

'dromocratic revolution'; there is no democracy,
only
dromocracy; there is no strategy, only dromology
The point of Virilio's substitutions, which
are based
on the Greek dromos, meaning running, or
race, course, is to

emphasize the revolution in movement which
characterizes
modernity.

While

I

am not going to defend Virilio's

hyperbolic claim that there was no industrial or democratic
revolution,

The affinity

do want to develop his claim about dromocracy.

I
I

have with Virilio centers on his insight that

the freedom to move, an achievement of modernity, has
become
an obligation to move.
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As

I

mentioned in that earlier

endnote, Virilio focuses primarily on military developments,

not on the realm of consumption, and it is in military

matters that he notes the obligation to move.

However, he

does mention the importance of the American automobile for
the dromocratic revolution, and, like Aglietta, he

recognizes that the mass-production of the automobile was

capable of transforming consumption practices. 113

But even

when Virilio does consider the consumption of movement,
again, like Aglietta, he neglects those developments in

transportation which preceded the mass-production and

consumption of the automobile.

These developments in

transportation technology, along with the concurrent
developments in farm technology, helped to undermine the
threat of American space and prepare the way for technofetishism, in this case the consumption of technologies of

176

speed.

The brief description of American transportation

developments which

I

will now offer should make this last

claim clear, while extending Virilio's unique
perspective
little further into the realm of consumption.

a

The first westward movement of American settlers
away
from the Atlantic coast was accomplished by following
the

example and routes of the indigenous population.

Narrow

footpaths, called traces, connected the various navigable

streams and lakes.

Settlers walked along these traces, and

used pack animals (either oxen, mules, or horses) to carry

their household supplies. 114

When they reached

a

waterway

that led toward their destination, they would purchase,
rent, or construct a canoe made from a large log,

they would pack all their possessions. 115

into which

In those areas

which could be reached by travelling up the Connecticut and

Hudson Rivers, sailing vessels were used to bring the
settlers' supplies close to their new home, but the settlers

themselves and their livestock followed the traces through
the forest.
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It was in this manner that Connecticut,

Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania were settled in
the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth centuries.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, after the
Revolution, the movement of settlers into New York and

Pennsylvania, and beyond to the public domain in the Ohio

River Valley, began to increase. 117

As these settlers

established themselves in the new area, they also widened
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and cleared the land routes over which
the indigenous

population had earlier travelled, turning the
traces into
118
pack trails.
These pack trails became arteries for
commerce as well as the westward movement
of settlers.

The

movement along these trails was at first slow
and
unpredictable.

Blown-down trees, washouts, and floods were

obstacles which could emerge unexpectedly on any
journey
along these trails.
But while these routes were frequently obstructed
by
the effects of the weather, they were, on the other
hand,

free of any effective political obstructions, such as the

settlement laws of eighteenth-century England (see note
107)

.

While it is true that George III did prohibit

American colonists from moving beyond the Appalachian

mountains (see

p.

139),

and the United States' government

prohibited movement into unsurveyed areas of the public
domain (see pp. 140-2)

,

these attempts at restricting

westward movement were ineffectual, due to the vast and
unorganized space of America.

Trappers, miners, squatters,

and legitimate settlers were able, notwithstanding natural

obstacles, to move freely along those trails which had been

etched into the land over the years.

But toward the end of

the eighteenth century, this unregulated westward movement

began to be set in order, just as the land itself was being
set in order through rectilinear surveys.

This regulation,

however, did not take the form of a prohibition or restric-
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tion of movement, but an acceleration.

By making travel

along these routes more convenient, that is,
easier and
faster, such travel was also brought under
control and
integrated into the established order.
The manner in which this regulation of movement
was

initiated was the granting of turnpike charters by state

governments to private companies. 119

These companies would

improve existing routes by grading and draining them, and

replacing their dirt surface with gravel, which was
sometimes placed on a firm bed of larger stones. 120

These

roads were more resistant to the ravages of rain than were

dirt roads.

In particularly wet areas, corduroy roads were

built by laying logs tightly together, perpendicular to the
flow of traffic.

Charters were also granted for the

construction and operation of bridges and ferries. 121

As a

result of these improvements, the various pack trails

leading west from New England into Pennsylvania and New
York, as well as those connecting the commercial centers of

these states, were transformed into roads over which wheeled
vehicles, such as stage coaches and wagons, could travel.

One of the first and most successful of these turnpikes
was the one connecting Lancaster and Philadelphia in

Pennsylvania, which was completed in 17 9 4

122
.

It was over

this route that the Conestoga wagons established their

reputation as the most efficient means available for

transporting goods overland.

These large, sturdy, wide-
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wheeled wagons were developed around Lancaster in the middle
of the eighteenth century, and were essential to the

settlement of the public domain.

These wagons, or

facsimiles, were the ones used in the wagon trains which

brought settlers into the West, and were the prevalent means
of land transportation until the middle of the nineteenth

century
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It was not until the turn of the century, however, that

these horse-drawn wagons were able to travel beyond the

Appalachian mountains.

The Wilderness Road (originally

known as Boone's Trace, after Daniel Boone, who first marked
its course in 1774-5) was the primary land route into the

Northwest Territory during the eighteenth century.

But it

was not until 1795, when the Kentucky legislature passed an
act requiring that improvements be made in the trail, that
it became suitable for wagon travel.
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But even then, the

Wilderness Road was not constructed out of gravel and stone,
but remained a dirt road. 125

The project of establishing a "macadamized" road

through the Appalachian mountains was undertaken early in
the nineteenth century by the federal government.

Construction of the National, or Cumberland, Road began in
18 08,

and it was completed from Cumberland, Maryland to

Wheeling, Virginia, on the Ohio River, in 1818.

126

The road

was eventually extended, as originally planned, through the
state of Ohio and into what would become the state of
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Illinois.
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Eventually, the federal government
relinquished

its interest in the road, and turned
it over to the control
of the states through which it passed. 128

Nevertheless, it

remained, until the middle of the century,
the main artery
through which western settlers, as well as
their commercial
products, had to move. 129

Alongside this massive public transportation project,
many private turnpikes were constructed in Ohio,
under
charters issued by the state.

The state government

frequently invested in these projects,

stockholders of the companies.
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alongside private

And the federal government

still was involved in financing these improvements, although

indirectly, through its land policy.

Since the admission of

Ohio to the union in 1803, three percent of all sales of

public lands went to the states in which the sales occurred,
and this money was earmarked for development of roads (and

eventually canals). 131
This first step in improving transportation, or

facilitating movement, in the territory of the United
States, appears to lie somewhere between Virilio's

characterization of the modern and pre-modern eras.

The new

techniques of road construction greatly increased the speed
of movement throughout the frontier, by allowing wheeled

vehicles to cross terrain that had been previously suited
only to slow-moving pack animals.

cover twenty-five miles in a day,

Whereas pack-trains could
1

stage coaches could
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travel much farther in the same period, moving
at a rate of
6 to 8 miles per hour. 133
But this acceleration was accomplished with
the

simultaneous obstruction of movement,
the pre-modern period.

a

characteristic of

On the National Road,

»[a]t average

distances of 15 miles toll-houses were erected and
'strong
iron gates hung to massive iron posts were established
to

enforce the payment of toll in cases of necessity."' 134

on

some of the private turnpikes, toll-gates were established

every

4

or

5

miles.
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it is as though the acceleration

provided by the stone and gravel roads was both an advantage
and a threat to the existing order.

The westward movement

of settlers still had to be restricted, and the settlers'

connection with the capitalist economy reinforced

periodically by the payment of tolls throughout their
journey.

(Of course,

the largest portion of the tolls

collected was provided by commercial traffic, but my concern
here lies primarily with the way in which transportation

improvements helped to control and regulate the movement of
the settlers themselves.

Once the settlers had established

homesteads, their commercial activity, which was intensified
by land policies, was indeed regulated by the turnpikes; but
in this discussion of transportation,

I

want to emphasize

how the movement of people was regulated.)

Along with the above improvements in land travel,

various developments in water travel also occurred around
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the turn of the century.

The usual eighteenth-century

method of travelling by water into America's
unsettled land,
was by flatboat. When settlers finally
reached the Ohio
River, either by wagon on the Wilderness Road,
or by packtrain along one of the several routes through the

Appalachian mountains, they usually built their own
flatboat,

in which they would continue their journey.
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These large boats, which ranged from twenty to sixty feet
in
length, and ten to twenty feet in width, carried the family
of settlers and all their household possessions,

livestock, downstream with the current.

spent weeks on these floating barnyards.

including

The settlers often
137

Since these

boats were incapable of travelling upstream, they were

usually dismantled once their destination on the river was
reached.
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For travelling upstream, a different type of boat was

developed, one which had a v-shaped hull, at the point of

which was attached a wooden keel, which ran the length of
the boat.

The keel protected the boat in case it ran

aground and also allowed the boat to remain stable when

headed upstream, as it displaced the current.

These

keelboats were propelled upstream by several different
methods, all of which relied on manpower.
the boats could be rowed.

In weak currents,

In somewhat stronger currents,

poles were used to propel the boat upstream; crew members

placed one end of their pole on the river bottom, and then
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walked along the deck toward the back of the
boat, pushing
the boat upstream as they walked. Another
method used in
strong currents was to attach a long rope to
the boat, and
then walk along the bank of the river, pulling
the boat
along.
Sometimes such ropes were tied to trees upstream,
and the crew would then pull themselves and the boat
up to

that point.
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in any of these cases, upstream travel was

very arduous and time-consuming.

It took one month to float

downstream from Pittsburgh to New Orleans, but it took four
months, and a crew of four to twelve, to return by

keelboat.
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Consequently, that movement of settlers into

the frontier region which was accomplished by water was,

during the eighteenth century, primarily headed downstream.
This situation changed with the introduction of

steamboats onto the Western rivers.
Orleans

a

.

In 1811, the New

steamboat built by Livingston and Fulton's

Company, set off from Pittsburgh to New Orleans.

Upon

reaching Louisville, where the flow of the Ohio was broken
by a series of falls, the New Orleans had to wait for the

water level to rise.

During this wait, the boat travelled

back upstream to Cincinnati, demonstrating its ability to
move quickly against the current of the Ohio River.
(Steamboats had already been operating on the rivers of the
East,

such as the Hudson, but their ability to handle the

larger, more treacherous rivers of the West had been in

doubt.

142
)

In 1815, another boat which was owned by the
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Livingston and Fulton company, the Enterprise

,

steamed its

way from New Orleans to Louisville in twenty-five
days, but
under unusually favorable conditions. 143 The same
trip by
keelboat would have taken around three months. 144

m

1817,

Henry Shreve's Washington completed a round-trip
from
Louisville to New Orleans in forty-one days, under normal
conditions, demonstrating the feasibility of regular

steamboat travel up the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers into the

Northwest Territory. 145

After this point, steam navigation on these two rivers
greatly expanded.

In 1817, there were seventeen steamboats

on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. By 1820, there were

sixty-nine, and by 1855, seven hundred twenty-seven

steamboats were plying the waters of these two rivers and
all of their major tributaries.
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And the speed of these

boats increased as the number of them did.

In the round-

trip made by the Washington in 1817, twenty-five of the

forty-one days were spent going upstream from New Orleans to
Louisville.

By 1820, that upstream trip could be made in

ten or eleven days, and by 1853, it was possible to make it
in less than five days.
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The steamboat, more than the

turnpike, is a clear example of the speed and acceleration

which Virilio stresses in his interpretation of modernity.
These boats attained speeds of 10 miles per hour on the

Western rivers, and even faster speeds in the East.
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While these boats were primarily used for
transporting
commercial goods up and down the river, they were

nevertheless crucial to the movement of settlers
into the
Mississippi Valley.
By the 1850 's, the boats were
large

enough to carry 300 to 400 deck passengers, many
of whom
were immigrants moving into the public lands of the

Mississippi region. 149

But while the development of the

steamboat provides a good example of the acceleration of the

movement of settlers, there was a certain weakness to the
steamboat,

in regard to its ability to regulate that

movement
Unlike the turnpikes, which could thoroughly regulate

movement along their route, through the use of toll-gates,
steamboats were unable to completely control the movement
along the rivers.

Along the turnpikes, even those

travellers who provided their own means of conveyance, and
avoided using the stage-coach and freight companies to move

themselves and their belongings, still could not avoid
paying the tolls. 150

But on the rivers, settlers could build

or purchase a flatboat or keelboat and move themselves

independently from, although more slowly than, the steamboat
companies.

In fact, the number of flatboats on the

Mississippi and Ohio Rivers reached its peak during the late
1840' s, when steamboats were spreading out into all the

tributaries of the mid-West. 151

For despite the development

of steamboats, the rivers remained uncontrollable, natural

186

routes for transportation.

Their banks offered many points

from which flatboats and keelboats could
be launched and
landed, and it was impossible to charge
these vessels for
their movement along the river. However,
the other major
development in nineteenth-century water
transportation - the

construction of canals

-

overcame this and other problems

posed by unruly rivers.
Between 1817 and 1845 in the United States, the

construction of canals was carried on at

a

frantic pace.

In

1816 there were barely 100 miles of canals in the country,

but by 1840 there were over 3300 miles. 152

Many of the

canals which were built in this period, as well as the pre1917 period, were designed to overcome a particular obstacle
in a river, usually a falls.
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in fact,

in 1828 one such

canal was built around the falls in the Ohio River at

Louisville, making it possible for steamboats to travel from
the Mississippi to the upper reaches of the Ohio River.

15A

In these instances, the canals overcame the hazards posed by
a

particularly steep pitch in the course of the river by

establishing an alternative waterway, one which contained
series of locks.

a

These locks would gradually float boats up

or down the dangerous incline, eliminating one of the chief

impediments to river travel.
But other canals were built not to overcome obstacles
in rivers, but to create waterways where none had been

before. Such canals were often built to connect two water
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routes, such as an inland and a tidewater river.

These

canals were actually artificial rivers, constructed
where a
river would have been beneficial to commerce. Canals
of this
sort were constructed around eastern commercial
centers
in

the first four decades of the nineteenth century,
but they

were not widely used to transport travellers. 155

in 1817,

however, the state of New York began construction on the

Erie Canal, which upon completion in 1824, connected Lake
Erie with the Hudson River.

Although the Erie Canal was an

important commercial link between the Great Lakes and the

Atlantic Ocean, via the Hudson River, it was also the first
canal which was widely used for the transportation of
people.
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The canal carried settlers not only to the

largely settled territory along its three hundred sixty-four

mile course across the state of New York, 157 but it also
served as a major transportation route for settlers heading
for the Ohio River Valley.
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The success of the Erie Canal caused Pennsylvania to

undertake construction of a competing canal route from the
East to the public domain of the West.

This canal was even

longer than the Erie, at three hundred ninety-five miles,
and it also faced an additional obstacle.
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The route of the

canal from the Susquehanna to the Ohio River ran directly

across the Allegheny Mountains.

In order to cross these

mountains, a series of inclined planes were constructed on

each side of the mountain range, and tracks were laid on
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these planes.

Stationary engines pulled passenger and

freight cars up one side and lowered them down
the other,
and eventually these engines moved sections
of specially
built canal boats over the mountains. 160 The
Pennsylvania
Canal was begun in 1826 and completed in 1834, and
cost over
10 million dollars.

the Erie Canal.

However,

it was never as successful as

This was partly due to the portage

railroad, which was a bottleneck in the canal route, and

partly the result of railroad competition. 161

Nevertheless,

the Pennsylvania, or Main Line, Canal, as it was often
called, stands as testimony to the faith which Pennsylvania

had in the benefits which would be provided by a canal route
into the public domain.

Although travel through the canal was not as fast as
travel by river steamboat (canal boats averaged speeds of

three to four miles per hour 162

)

,

the canals did, like the

steamboat, eliminate much of the toil and trouble associated

with upstream travel.

With their system of locks, the

canals practically eliminated the current that one would

normally face when travelling from a lower to a higher point
by water.

And in the canals, there was no need to exert

human power against even the minimized current; the boats
were pulled along by horses or mules which walked along the

towpaths that lined each side of the canal.

Another feature of the canals, one which may have
helped convince New York and Pennsylvania to expend so much
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on their construction, was that they
were,

turnpikes of water.

in a sense,

like

The banks of the canals, unlike those

of the rivers, did not provide easy,
unregulated access to
the water.
And the many locks on the canals (84 on
the
Erie; 174 on the Pennsylvania) were, like
the toll-gates on
turnpikes, stations at which payment could
be exacted from

those travellers who were moving themselves in
their own
boats, independently from the private freight and
passenger

businesses which developed on the canals.

For those who

booked passage with one of the canal businesses the tolls
were included in the fares which were charged.
As

I

have already mentioned, the Erie and Pennsylvania

Canals were financed by the states through which they ran.
It will be recalled that it was during this period - the

1820 's - that the federal government began to curtail its

direct involvement in the settlement of the public domain.
(In 1820,

the federal credit system for land purchases was

abolished, see p. 150, and in 1829, the federal government

began to relinquish control of the National Road to the

various states through which it passed, see

p.

180.)

But in

the construction of canals the federal government developed
a

new method for promoting the settlement of American space,

a

method which was to become crucial in the construction of

railroads.
In order to encourage the construction of canals in the

territory which the federal government had put up for sale,
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land grants were given to the young states
which had been
established there. Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana,
the states
of the Northwest Territory, all received
from the federal
government not only the right of ways upon which
to

construct certain canals, but also half of the
land for five
miles on each side of these canals. The other
half of the
land was retained by the federal government, the
land being
divided into odd- and even-numbered sections (640 acre
lots)

and distributed on an even/odd basis between the state
and
federal governments.

Odd-numbered sections belonged to the

states, and even-numbered ones belonged to the federal

government.

The states could then sell their sections and

use the revenue to finance the construction of the canals,
or they could grant this land to private companies, who

could then sell the land for the same purpose, and for a

profit as well.

And to ensure that the federal government

would not lose money on this arrangement, the minimum price
of its land in these grant areas was doubled to 2.50 dollars

per acre, making up for the revenue lost on the land given
to the states,
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while raising the value of the land which

was granted.

The period of canal construction was rather shortlived, however, because developments in rail transportation

around the middle of the nineteenth century overshadowed all
other forms of transportation.

Railroad vehicles, when

driven by steam engines (not horses, as they originally
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were "), offered the possibility of very rapid
transportation.
The passenger trains of 1850 were able
1

to travel

at around 25 miles per hour.
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Furthermore, railroads, like

canals and turnpikes, were not restricted to any
natural
course, such as a river.
But unlike the canals and
turnpikes, which allowed independently owned boats and

wagons to travel their routes (for a price, of course), the
railroad, with its steam locomotives, precluded such

independent movement. 166

To travel by rail meant to travel

on the terms, over the route, and at the rate of speed

established by the railroad companies.

More than any of the

other forms of transportation which have thus far been
examined, the railroad exemplifies the acceleration and

speed which characterize modernity, as well as the

regulatory dimension of this rapid movement.
It is also with the railroad that the close relation

among developments in transportation technology, the land

policies of the United States, and the reification of

American capitalism becomes undeniably apparent.

As was the

case with the federal land grants for canals, the first land

grants for railroad construction were given to states, not
entrepreneurs.
was,
1850,

But the scope of the railroad land grants

from the start, beyond that of the canal grants.

In

Congress granted to the states of Illinois,

Mississippi, and Alabama, for the construction of the

Illinois Central Railroad, the odd-numbered sections of the
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land six miles on each side of the route.
a

grant of more than 2.5 million acres. 167

This amounted to

Throughout the

1850 «s, similar grants were given to
various states,

totaling around 18 million acres. 168

But these land grants,

many of which were given for the construction of
local
railroads, were only a precursor to the much larger
and more

significant grants given for the construction of

transcontinental lines.
The transcontinental land grants

-

the first of which

occurred in 1861, the year before the passage of the

Homestead Act

-

were not only longer than the grants of the

1850' s, but they were wider as well.

The initial grant of

this sort was given for the construction of the Union

Pacific Railroad, and was comprised of the odd-numbered

sections of a twenty-mile wide tract of land along the
route.

acres.

This single grant amounted to around 12 million
169

The grant made to the Northern Pacific, the last

of the transcontinental grants, was more than double that of

the Union Pacific.

For the part of its route that traversed

existing states, the Northern Pacific was granted half of
the sections of a forty-mile tract, and in the territories,
the tract was doubled to eighty miles.
to over 47 million acres.

This grant amounted
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Aside from size, there was another important difference

between the grants of the 1850' s and the transcontinental
land grants; the latter were given directly to the railroad
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companies, not to the states through
which the tracks would
pass.
All told, about 90 million acres of
land were granted
to such private corporations by
the federal government. 171
The railroad companies, therefore
were not just in the
transportation business; they were also the
largest land
companies in the nation. The railroads
controlled to a

great extent both the movement across and the
settlement of
American space. The railroad companies not only
carried

settlers into the frontier regions of the United
States;
they also sold homesteads to those settlers.
In fact, the transcontinental railroad companies

actively sought colonists for the settlement of the
western
territory, and had large forces of agents in Europe.

These

agents would induce members of the peasant and lower-middle

classes of Europe to immigrate, but not for the purpose of

swelling the labor force of the eastern United States (as
one would expect according to Wakefield's plan for

systematic colonization), but to become western farmers. 172
Not only did these agents spread the word about the

opportunities available in the mid-western United States;
they often offered reduced train fares to settlers, or
allowed them to deduct the price of their fare from the
price of any land they purchased from the railroad

company

173

And once the settler reached the western territory, the

railroad companies made it relatively easy to acquire land
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within the grant area.

Forty acre lots were often sold
to

settlers, and at prices which were not
extremely higher than
the 2.50 dollar per acre price at
which government land in
the grant area could be pre-empted. 174
The railroad
companies also extended lenient credit terms
to the
settlers, and some companies required only
interest (usually
around 6 percent) to be paid for the first
years after

settlement.
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The lenient land sale policies of the railroad

companies can be explained in part by the passage of
the
Homestead Act. Free land was available outside the
grant
area as well as within, and this limited the price
that

the

railroad companies could demand for their land.

But it must

be recalled that much of the best agricultural land had

already been claimed by 1862 (see

p.

157).

Furthermore,

agriculture had been mechanized and commercialized by this
time, and farmers could not afford to settle on land twenty

or forty miles from the railroads.

So the effect of the

Homestead Act on land prices should not be overemphasized.
There were other factors which help to explain the eagerness

with which the railroads disposed of their land.
One of these factors has to do with the hermetic nature
of rail travel itself.

As

I

mentioned above, railroads not

only moved people and things more quickly than any other

existing form of transportation, but they moved them in
highly regulated manner.

a

Unlike the other forms of travel
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which have been examined,
railroads allowed no independent
movement,
so once the settlers were
established, any
commercial activity which they
undertook was completely
dependent on the railroads.
In order to sell their

produce,

farmers not only had to save time
in the fields through the
use of farm machinery, but they
had to get their goods to

market as quickly as possible,
through the use of trains.
The lenient land terms offered by
the railroad companies can
be interpreted, therefore, as a
railroad company decision t o
sell its land quickly and cheaply,
rather than hold out for
a hiqher price, so as to quickly
begin reaping the long-te rm
profits which it could extract through its
transportation
monopoly
Of course, the railroad monopolies were
challenged in
the last decades of the nineteenth century
by the concerted

efforts of farmers (e.g. the Patrons of Husbandry,
or the
Grange, and the Populist Movement)
But even when
the

.

farmers were successful in resisting these monopolies
(e.g.
in getting states to regulate the railroad's
management of

grain elevators 176

)

,

such achievements, just like the

Homestead Act, can be viewed not so much as victories of the
farmers over capital, as the death throes of the

agricultural challenge to capital.

These late nineteenth

century agricultural movements would not be as successful as
their predecessors, the claim clubs, were in their

resistance to land speculators.

In the time that had lapsed
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certain amount of order had been imposed upon
American
space, and an important dimension of that
order, I

a

am

arguing, was the regulation of movement which
was

accomplished through technological developments
in
transportation.

Through the consumption of this

transportation technology, homesteaders took their
place in
this order.
Although it may appear that I have overplayed
the regulatory dimension of acceleration or speed, a
brief

summary which juxtaposes developments in land policy and

transportation technology will lend some indirect support
for my claims.

When the government of the United States first acquired
its vast land holdings, squatters were moving into these

territories by means of pack trains and flatboats, and were
clearing and cultivating small homesteads in the most

desirable areas.

The government's response to this

unregulated westward movement and settlement was the
adoption of restrictive land policies.

Military force was

used to evict squatters from government land, and the

homesteads were destroyed.

Settlement could only occur,

according to the land policy of the government, after the
land had been officially surveyed into square townships and
sections, and the settler purchased at least a full section
at auction.

The restrictive nature of this policy becomes

obvious when one considers that in 1785, when this policy
was first adopted, none of the farm machinery discussed
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above was available to the settler.

The 640 acre mini mum

was eight times the minimum
purchase of the 1820 's, when
durable plows with replaceable iron
parts were speeding up
the process of clearing the land.
The original minimum of
640 acres, along with the minimum price
requirement,

prevented widespread legal settlement by
small homesteaders.
But throughout the first two decades
or the nineteenth
century, the federal government relaxed
the restrictions
on

settlement which were imposed by the Ordinance
of 1785.
The
minimum purchase size was gradually reduced
throughout this
period, until it reached the low of 80 acres
in 1820,

and

the government offered easy credit terms to
settlers during

these years.

it was also during this period that the

Wilderness Road and the National Road had made it possible
for wagons and stage coaches to pass through the
Appalachian

Mountains, and steamboats were well-established on the

Mississippi and Ohio Rivers by 1820.
The decade of the 1820

's

saw the opening of the Erie

and Pennsylvania Canals, and in 1830 the first American

passenger railroad was opened (see
land policy,

n.

164)

.

In regard to

1830 also marks several important developments,

with the Pre-emption Acts of the 1830' s, the federal

government reversed its long-standing position on squatters'
rights, and allowed many squatters to buy the land on which

they had settled.
point,

The government also reversed, at this

its practice of establishing minimum lot sizes.
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While these minimums had been decreasing
throughout the
first decades of the nineteenth
century, with the Preemption Acts the government began
establishing maximum size
limits.
A settler no longer had to buy
at least a specified
number of acres; he could now buy
no more than 160 acres
(see p.

read this shift as another indication
that
the threat of American space had largely
been overcome.
155).

I

Farmers were by this time so caught up in
the existing
order, that it was safe to promote their
settlement on
public land in large numbers. The maximum size
limit would
enable even more people to settle within the
order that was
being established in America.
1861-2 is the other important date at which changes

occurred in land policy and transportation development.
I

As

just mentioned, it was in 1861 that the first

transcontinental land grant was given to the Union Pacific

Railroad company by the federal government, marking the
clear convergence of transportation development and land
policy.

And 1862 is the date when the government finally

began to give land to homesteaders.

Of course,

I

read these

events as a phase of the confrontation between capital and

American space.

Between 1785 and 1862, a shift occurred in

the manner in which the problem of space was handled by

American capitalism.

In 1785, when movement across the

public domain was uncontrollable, land policies were used to
restrict settlement on the public domain.

Once movement was
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thoroughly regulated, by the railroad
monopolies and their
extensive land holdings, land policy
no longer

had to serve

its original restrictive function.

since settlers had been

transformed from independent, hence
dangerous, producers, to
consumers of technological conveniences,
the threat of
American space was overcome, and land
could safely be given
to those who labored upon it.
This reading is further supported,

I

believe, by the

manner in which the Homestead Act was applied
in the
railroad grant areas.
In these areas, where the railroads
held virtually complete sway, the government
tried
to

increase the number of settlers even more than
it did in
other areas of the public domain. The Homestead
Act was

applied to the government-owned sections in these
grant
areas, so settlers could get their land for free, but
the

maximum size limit was reduced to 80 acres,
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more people to settle in these "safe" zones.

allowing even
And to ensure

that these areas were indeed rendered safe by the railroad

companies, the government usually suspended settlement in
any area that was under consideration as a route for the
tracks, as earlier it had prohibited settlement in

unsurveyed areas.

Vast areas were withheld from

homesteading until the railroads had set things in order. 178
After the railroad companies had decided on the location of
the tracks, not to mention the townsites, junctions, etc.,
it was safe to bring in settlers.

In those cases where
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squatters interfered with the establishment
of railroads in
the grant areas, the government quickly
reverted to
its

original, direct approach to the squatter
problem

-

it used

military force to eliminate this threat to
order. 179
What I have tried to indicate in this
rather long
chapter, is one dimension of a genealogy of
modern
consumption, or rather, a genealogy of convenience,
the
value which underlies that consumption. Although
this

dimension is concerned with material conditions, it
is one
that is over-looked by Marxists, even those Marxists
who
have begun to look at consumption patterns.

It is a

dimension which is clearly related to the re-enforcement of
capitalist relations of production, but it does not reduce
to those relations of production.

Rather, the consumption

of farm and transportation technology, which blossomed in

nineteenth-century America, resulted, in part, from
capitalism's coming to grips with the danger or threat or

American space.
One outcome of this confrontation between capitalism
and open space was that space was transformed from a threat
to capitalism,

into a limit for consumers.

The vast amount

of unsettled land in America posed a threat to capitalism,
in that independent producers could have settled that land

and escaped from the capitalist economy, or at least inter-

acted with that economy with some degree of autonomy.

through the land policies

I

But

examined in this chapter, in
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conjunction with developments in
agricultural machinery,
farming was transformed from a largely
self-sufficient

activity into a primarily commercial
endeavor.
The
production of food came to require the
consumption of everincreasing amounts of time- and labor-saving
technology, or
convenience.
Recalling the distinction I made in the
preceding chapter, the time spent producing
food changed
from a demand of the body, to a limit of
the body.
And all
this had largely occurred by I860, long
before the period of
over-capitalization which Mandel identifies as the
condition
which permitted/demanded the industrialization of

agriculture (see pp. 25-6)
On another front, the movement across American space

was also brought under control in the nineteenth century.
Old,

slow travel routes and methods, such as pack trails and

flatboats, were supplanted by faster, and more tightly

controlled, means of movement.

American space was

transformed from a possibility for freedom, for escape, into
distance, another limit of the body to be overcome through
the consumption of technology.

And as

I

mentioned earlier,

when the need to overcome distance is combined with the need
to save time from bodily necessity, an endless series of

limits develops.

New technologies are required to move men

and things not only across all distances, but to do so at an

ever-faster pace.

Thus as the railroad replaced turnpikes

and canals, it was in turn replaced by the airplane, which
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was then replaced bv
-ipf
th<=> 3et
Y rne

'

-r^*-„
Jets
are now being developed

which promise to lessen even
further the time spent
travelling from continent to
continent. And soon, no doubt,
there will be shuttles to Mars.
However, the automobile, which is
rightly emphasized by
Aglietta as a hallmark of modern
consumption, does not seem
at first glance to fit within the
perspective that

developing here.

I

am

It is a means of conveyance
which allows

travellers to overcome distance quickly,
especially in local
travel, but it does not seem to be
amenable to close
regulation, like the train or the airplane.

The automobile,

in some sense, allows one to move freely;
it can be used for

much more than simply travelling to and from
the workplace.
But whatever freedom is provided by the
privately owned
automobile, it is compensated for by the financial
obligations one incurs through the consumption of
the
automobile.

Cars are one of the most expensive consumer

items purchased by households, and they are usually
bought
on credit.

In this sense, then, the automobile marks the

convergence of the two regulatory trends which have been

highlighted in this chapter.
forms of transportation

I

The automobile, like the other

have examined, accelerates the

movement of people; and like farm machinery, the automobile
binds the consumer with a debt that must be paid over time.
At this point, the techno-f etishist should have had

enough of this heretical babbling

-

the car as a restriction
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or burden!

and should be ready to put a
halt to this li ne
of thought.
The perfect roadblock would seem
to be
available, or rather, a rotary,
which can turn this argument
back on itself.
this questionable interpretation
-

m

of

agricultural and transportation technology,
have I not ended
up treating the consumer in just
the manner which Marxists
have,

in a manner of which

this chapter?

Indeed,

I

complained at the very start of

is not my treatment of consumers
even

closer to the rigid Marxism of structuralists
than the
treatment of consumers offered by the several
Marxists I
discussed in the first part of this chapter?
I make it
sound as though the settlers on the American
frontier were
simply herded like cattle onto the various forms
of
transportation, and fed farm equipment as if it were
fodder.
I

appear to be oblivious to the possibility that the

settlers may have actually wanted or needed this technology.
My discussion of the consumption of technology has pushed
the Marxist perspective back into nineteenth-century

America, and broadened it to include the material condition
of space, or land.

But after all that, it is still capital

which ultimately prevails, and appears to thoroughly
determine consumption and the values which underlie it.
My response to all of this, however, would be to point
out the limitations which

I

have imposed upon my argument

against Marxism's treatment of consumption.

This last

chapter has presented one dimension of a genealogy of
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convenience; it helps to explain, in
part, the technofetishism of modernity. Contrary to
this possible critique
of my perspective, I do acknowledge
that there was indeed a
need for the various technological
developments which I hav e
so far examined, or to put this
differently, that consume rs
did find this technology to be valuable.
This need,
of

course,

is the need for convenience.

My claim is not that

American capitalism created this need in
the nineteenth
century, or created consumers who valued
convenience. My
point is that American capitalism played upon

this need for,

or value of, convenience, and was thereby
able to undermine
the threat posed by unsettled land.

Of course,

I

am not claiming that this value of

convenience is a uniquely American one; it is
characterizes modernity.

a

value which

But the spatial situation of the

United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
provided the conditions in which this value was able to
flourish.

The spatial situation of the United States helps

to explain why modern consumption standards have developed

principally in the United States.

But this chapter has not

shed any light on the proliferation of the value of

convenience after the threat of American space was overcome,
or beyond the borders of the United States.

chapter,

I

In the next

will try to indicate the broader foundation of

the value of convenience.
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CHAPTER

5

WEBER, NIETZSCHE, AND MODERN
ASCETICISM

The material considerations
of the last chapter were
offered not simply as an argument
against certain recent
Marxist thought on consumption.
They were also offered
because of the influence which
those particular material
conditions had on the development,
or rather, deployment, of
the value of convenience.
The material conditions of
the
United States in the nineteenth century
had an exacerbating
or accelerating influence on another
development which had
been taking place in other Western
countries, as well as the
United States. What I have in mind here
is not the
development of capitalist relations of
production, which
Marxists have done so much to illuminate,
but the devolution
of Christianity.
And if Marxists have tended to overlook
the significance of American space in the
development of

late capitalism's "social norm of consumption,

»

they have

remained totally oblivious to the possibility that
religious
ideas, and the problems or situations to which those
ideas

are a response, can have any significant impact on
the

development of capitalism in modernity.
several Marxists

I

discussed in Chapter

Although the
3

have moved to

varying degrees beyond the simple economic determinism of

a

more structuralist Marxism, they do not seem to have gotten
much farther than Marx himself in recognizing any effective
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role of (not for) religion in
the development of Western
capitalism.
At this point,

raised before

I

am going to pick up a
theme which was

considered Marxist thought on
consumption,
theme which emerged in my criticism
of Hannah Arendt.
But
to recall this theme, which
concerns Christianity and the
body, it is best not to return
to my argument with Arendt
interpretation of Christianity as a
form of reverence
I

a

for

life.

For Arendt sees such reverence
not only in
Christianity, but in Marxism as well.
And while I disagree
with both of these claims, criticizing
them will not get me
very far in linking the materialism of
Marxism with

developments in, or transformations of,
religious ideas.
Ultimately I will come back to Arendt and
challenge
her

interpretation of Marxism, but to begin again
on this line
of thought concerning Christianity, it is
best to do so with
Max Weber's thoughts on Protestantism and
capitalism.
For

Weber's thoughts on Christianity and modernity are
much
closer than Arendt 's to the argument

want to make.

I

Weber s The Prote stant Ethic and the Spirit of
'

Capitalism has generated an exorbitant amount of controversy
since its initial publication as a two-part article in 19045.

1

And although

I

have not been shying away from

controversy up to this point, perhaps

I

should offer some

explanation or apology for my choice of such a battered
text.

My reading of Weber's text is one which emphasizes
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the limitations he imposes on
his argument.

I

pay clos

attention when he claims that he
has "no intention whatever
of maintaining such a foolish
and doctrinaire thesis as that
the spirit of capitalism
could only have arisen as the
result of certain effects of the
Reformation, or even that
capitalism as an economic system is a
creation of the
Reformation." 2 And I count myself as
part of the group when
he claims that "we are merely attempting
to clarify the part
which religious forces have played in
forming the developing
web of our specifically worldly modern
culture, in the
.

.

.

complex interaction of innumerable different
historical
factors." 3 I have to withdraw, however, when
Weber,

in a

footnote toward the end of the text, abandons his
earlier
restraint and says of religious ideas, "[t]hat they

are in

themselves, that is beyond doubt, the most powerful
plastic

elements of national character, and contain a law of

development and a compelling force entirely their own." 4

I

have no qualms with excessive argumentation (see Chapter

1,

pp.

19-21, and all of Chapter 4), but when it becomes

dogmatic instead of rhetorical, as it does in this last
quote from Weber,

I

have to balk.

So in the use to which

I

put Weber's argument in this

chapter,

I

claims.

Weber offers a perspective on modernity which

will be treating it as an argument of limited

emphasizes the role of religious ideas, and my aim in this
chapter is to examine and expand that perspective.

My
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position on Weber's argument,
therefore, is much less
polemical than was my treatment of
either Arendt or Aglietta
et al., on the issue of
consumption.
(I guess this
indicates where my dogmatic tendencies
lie.)
Weber's task in The Protestant
EthjLg,

as

read it, is
not just to identify the influence
of the Reformation on the
development of the modern, that is,
rational, spirit of
5
capitalism.
There is little doubt that the main
claim of
his argument is that Protestantism,
especially Calvinist
Puritanism, spawned a new breed of entrepreneurs
who threw
I

themselves into business life without the
slightest
religious compunction.

What the Reformation bequested to

its secular successor, claims Weber, was
"above all an

amazingly good, we may even say a pharisaically good,

conscience in the acquisition of money, as long as it took
place legally." 6 But Weber also recognized the legacy
of
the Reformation among those who labored for the new breed
of

entrepreneur, and were concerned less with the accumulation
of wealth than with satisfying the needs of their

households.

The Protestant idea of "labour as a calling

became as characteristic of the modern worker as the

corresponding attitude toward acquisition of the business
man.

7

So what Weber was trying to get at in his controversial

text was not just the rise of the modern entrepreneurial
spirit.

More broadly, he was concerned with the emergence
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of individuals of a sort which
was amenable to the

rationally organized capitalism of
modernity, which Weber
famously characterized as an "iron
cage." 8 As Weber
describes his task, "in order that a
manner of

life so well

adapted to the peculiarities of capitalism
could be selected
at all, i.e. should come to dominate
others, it had
to

originate somewhere, and not in isolated
individuals alone,
but as a way of life common to whole groups
of men. This
origin is what really needs explaining." 9
Of course, part of such an explanation would
have to be

concerned with the literal whipping of the labor
force into
shape, but Weber leaves this aspect of the explanation
to
others.

The approach Weber takes is to focus on

developments in religious ideas.

At the outset, it should

be emphasized that Weber's claim is not that certain

religious ideas clandestinely maintain their hold over

modern entrepreneurs, managers, and workers, keeping them

within the bounds of the established order.

On the

contrary, Weber acknowledges that there is no longer any

need for "transcendental sanctions," 10

because the modern

economic order "is now bound to the technical and economic

conditions of machine production which to-day determine the
lives of all the individuals who are born into this

mechanism." 11

And it determines those lives, Weber adds,

"with irresistible force."

(This compulsion of individuals
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by the economic order is only
one facet of the iron cage.
Later I will discuss another feature
of the cage.)
So Weber's claim concerning
religious ideas is not that
they still play a role in modernity,
but that religious
ideas did play a role, early on, in
the creation of

individuals who eagerly take their positions
in the modern
economic processes of production and consumption.
According
to Weber, it was the Protestant Reformation
which exerted
this influence on the development of modern
individuals.

What Protestantism accomplished was the reversal
of the
Catholic attitude toward worldly activity, which
Weber

describes as indifference.

In my criticism of Arendt's

interpretation of Christianity,

I

touched on the attitude

toward earthly life which was expressed in the gospels of
the Apostles, and in the writings of Augustine.

I

described

this attitude as an ambivalence towards mortal, earthly
life, not as an indifference.
77.)

(See Chapter 2, pp.

45-52,

The point of that description was to indicate another

pole in the range of Christian attitudes toward earthly
life, beside the reverence for such life which Arendt

identified as the defining feature of Christianity.

My

point was that even though the coming of Christ had made
mortal life and death essential to salvation, there was also
a

certain contempt for earthly life among some Christian

writers.

Mortal earthly life was both a punishment and

a
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promise, a scourge and a blessing.

Augustine in Chapter

2,

p.

(See the quote from

51.)

Weber's treatment of the Catholic
attitude toward
earthly life, however, is not as
polemical as the treatment
I offered in Chapter
2.
His concern is not to challenge
a
conflicting interpretation of Christianity,
but to
link the

Reformation with earlier Christian thinking,
in the form of
a reversal.
For Weber's purposes, the Catholic
attitude
toward earthly life is best characterized
as indifference,

not ambivalence.

I

have no quarrel with this character-

ization, since Weber contrasts this
indifference with any

positive evaluation, or reverence, of life,
and therefore
seems to support my argument against Arendt.
The indifference which Weber emphasizes is
found in the
gospels (e.g. Matthew 6:25, Luke 12:22-3), but the
clearest

source for it is one of the epistles of St. Paul.

For Paul,

earthly, mortal life was not something to be hated (see

quote from John, in Chapter

2,

p.

50)

or lost (see quote

from Mark on the same page in Chapter 2).

In his first

epistle to the Corinthians, Paul advises the faithful not to
hate this life, but to continue in their earthly activity

while waiting for the second coming of Christ.

Noting that

the time for man on earth had been shortened,

and that

the form of this world was passing away,

13

12

Paul advised

that "each man remain with God in that condition in which he
was called." 14

The end of time on earth was almost at hand,
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so men should not be unduly concerned
with their situation
in this world.
It is this "Pauline indifference"
which figures

prominently in Weber's treatment of Catholicism
in The
Protestant Ethic
According to Weber, Protestantism
eventually reversed this Catholic indifference
.

to life on

earth, and came to positively value earthly
activity.

And

Protestantism accomplished this feat, in part, by

reinterpreting the idea of a "calling" which is
found in the
above quote from Paul. Although Weber acknowledges
that

there were "certain suggestions" of such a positive

evaluation in the Middle Ages and in classical Greece (see
my discussion of Xenophon's Oeconomicus in Chapter
2,

25-6)

,

pp.

he claims that the Reformation brought something

"unquestionably new" to the positive estimation of worldly
activity:
the valuation of the fulfillment of duty in
worldly affairs as the highest form which the
moral activity of the individual could assume.
This it was which inevitably gave every-day
worldly activity a religious significance, and
which first created the conception of a calling in
this sense.

This Protestant revaluation, of course, did not occur
all in a moment, and the Puritanism upon which Weber's

argument chiefly rests, is distinct in important ways from
the writings of the sixteenth-century reformers.

In setting

up Weber's argument concerning Protestantism and capitalism,
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would like to spend

a

little more time examining the

changes within this revaluation
than Weber himself does.
This shift in attitude toward
worldly activity began,
as Weber indicates, with Martin
Luther's own transformation
in regard to worldly activity.
At first, Luther's position
was very much the same as that expressed
in the above quote
from Paul's first letter to the
Corinthians.
his

m

commentary on the seventh chapter of that
epistle, which he
wrote in 1523, Luther emphasizes Paul's
message "that all
outward things are optional or free before
God and that a
Christian may make use of them as he will; he
may accept
16
them or let them go."
A little later in that commentary,
Luther gets more specific about the proper Christian
relation to things of this world, and offers some
advice on
how a Christian can maintain an indifferent attitude
toward
mortal life.

which

I

In reference to verses 29-31 of that letter,

quoted above, Luther writes:

This is a general teaching of all Christians, that
they should treasure that eternal blessing which
is theirs in the faith, despising this life so
that they do not sink too deeply into it either
with love and desire or suffering and boredom, but
should rather behave like guests on earth, using
everything for a short time because of need and
not for pleasure.
... A Christian should hold
to this principle also in all other things.
He
should only serve necessity and not be a slave to
his lust and nurture his old Adam. 17

Along with this indifference to worldly activity,
Luther also shared with Paul, at least early in his career,
that interpretation of the calling which was expressed above
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in the quote from Corinthians.

Paul advised the Corinthians

to remain as they were when they were
called, because that
condition in which one was called made no
difference to
one's salvation. Whether one was married
or
not,

circumcised or not,

a

slave or not, made no difference.

In his commentary on Corinthians,

18

Luther reiterates this

indifferent attitude toward the calling, as the
condition in
which one was called, and expands the scope of Paul's

examples
And what Paul here says concerning a slave [that
he should not mind, or care about, his bondage],
the same is to be said of all paid servants,
maids, day laborers, workmen, and domestics in
their relations to their masters and mistresses.
It should also be said of all vows, associations,
corporations, or any tie by which one person is
related or obligated to another: in all these
matters service, loyalty, and duty are to be
maintained, regardless of whether the one party is
Christian or non-Christian, good or bad, so long
as they do not hinder faith and justice and allow
you to live your Christian life.
For all such
estates are free and no impediment to the
Christian faith. 19

Luther's interpretation of the calling, however,

gradually moved away from the indifference of St. Paul, and
worldly activity came to be a matter of great concern to
him. The performance of one's calling in this world became a

positive duty, and was no longer "optional and free before
God." (Support for this claim will be offered below.) Weber

notes this shift in Luther's thought, and describes it as an

increasing "traditionalism," by which Weber means the

maintenance of traditional economic relations. 20
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But in any case, this increasing
traditionalism of
Luther's thought is not of great
concern to Weber.

m

he claims that the chapter of

The_Protest^_E^

fact,

which

concerns Luther's conception of the
calling was only meant
to determine that the "idea of the
calling in the Lutheran
sense is at best of questionable
importance for the problems
in which [he is] interested." 21
From Weber's perspective,
what is significant about the idea of
the calling is the way
in which it eventually came to challenge
traditionalism, the
way in which it helped to usher in the
modern economic
order.

And in this regard, it is the interpretation
of the
calling which was developed by various Calvinist
sects, not
Luther, which is important.
As a result, Weber does not
offer much of a description of the traditionalism
of the
later Luther, or an explanation for this shift.

He does

indicate that this change in Luther's position on worldly

activity was due, in part, to Luther's increasing
involvement in worldly affairs, and partly to his experience

with peasant rebelliousness. 22

But Weber mentions these

sources of Luther's traditionalism only in passing; he

places more emphasis on Luther's "more and more intense
belief in divine providence, which identified absolute

obedience to God's will, with absolute acceptance of things
as they were.

" 23

For my purposes, it is worthwhile to examine Luther's

later notion of the calling in some detail.

The way Weber
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leaves it, one does not get any
significant impression of
the disciplinary dimension of
Luther's conception of the
calling.
Weber simply mentions Luther's
experience with
rebellious peasants as something
which effected his vi<.ew on
worldly activity, and cites in a
footnote a letter of
Luther's in support of his claim. 2*
a quick glance at s<;ome
of Luther's, as well as Calvin's,
writings on worldly
activity and the calling, however, will
help to uncover the
disciplinary impulse behind that Puritan conception
of the
calling which Weber emphasizes, and help to
bring out the
aspect of Weber's argument which most interests
me - the
creation of modern producers/consumers, not
entrepreneurs.
In 152 5, the peasants who were revolting in
the German

territory of Swabia issued a list of their demands in
the
form of a pamphlet called "The Twelve Articles." in
the

same

year,

Luther responded to these demands in his "Admonition

to Peace." 25

After identifying the princes and lords of

Germany as the source of the rebellious temper of the German
peasantry, and chastising them for this, Luther addresses
the peasants themselves.

He criticizes those peasants for

revolting against the oppressive situation in which they
found themselves, and is especially perturbed at the

peasants' use of the gospel to justify their rebellion.

Luther finds that everything in the articles of the peasants
"is concerned with worldly and temporal matters." He

replies:
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You want power and wealth so
that you will not
suffer injustice. The gospel,
become involved in the affairs however does not
of this world but
*
1±f in the world in Serins of
°™
sufrerinf injustice, the cross,
suffering,
patience and
contempt for this life and temporal
Therefore, you must take a different wealth
attitude 'if
6 C ristians «nd use the
Chri^ian^h 6n St ° P hat y U are doin name
9 a nd decide
to sutler
no
6
u
't
r
these injustices.
.

J

'

"

\

*

2°6

With the outbreak of the Peasants'
War of 1525,
however, Luther abandoned the patient
chastisement of the
peasants which he had expressed in the
Admonition, and
called for the swift and violent
suppression of the
rebellion.
In a pamphlet entitled "Against
the Robbing and
Murdering Hoardes of Peasants," Luther advised
leaders, both
Christian and heathen, to take up the sword
against the
peasants, who were "robbing and raging like mad
dogs." 27

it

was the duty of princes and rulers, and all other
Christians
as well, to destroy the peasants precisely for
their

rebelliousness.

Luther says of the revolting peasant:

anyone who can be proved to be a seditious person
is an outlaw before God and the emperor; and
whoever is the first to put him to death does
right and well.
For if a man is in open
rebellion, everyone is both his judge and
executioner; just as when a fire starts, the first
man who can put it out is the best man to do the
job.
For rebellion is not just simple murder; it
is like a great fire, which attacks and devastates
a whole land.
Thus rebellion brings with it a
land filled with murder and bloodshed; it makes
widows and orphans, and turns everything upside
down, like the worst disaster.
Therefore let
everyone who can, smite, slay, and stab, secretly
and openly, remembering that nothing can be more
poisonous, hurtful, or devilish than a rebel. 28
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So for Luther in 1525, the
calling was hardly a thing
of indifference.
it was the duty of the
peasants to endure
their oppressive situation. When
the peasants rejected thei
calling, and rebelled against their
worldly condition, they

"abundantly merited death in body and
soul," 29 and it then
became the duty of all Christians to
execute this sentence.
During this rebellious period, Luther's
conception of the
calling was directed primarily at
maintaining order in the
affairs of this world.
it was the duty of everyone
to

maintain the

existing order; one's salvation depended
on

it.

Later in his career, Luther continued to use
the idea
of the calling as an instrument of order.
in his lectures
on Genesis, which were written in the mid-1530
30
Luther
s,
still maintained that there was a duty to perform
one's
•

calling, but he offered a different argument in support
of

this claim than the one he offered to the peasants.

No

longer was it a matter of the duty to bear one's burdens on
earth; rather, it was a question of maintaining the order

that God had created on, or as, earth.
In one of these lectures, Luther discusses the

scholastic distinction between the "absolute" and the
"ordered" power of God.

As an example of God's absolute

power, Luther mentions the heavenly provision of manna to

Moses and his followers, and as an example of God's ordered
power, he cites the ordinary situation in which men must
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labor in order to receive food.

exerts his power by using men.

m

the latter case, God

"This they call God's

•ordered' power, namely, when he makes
use of the service
either of angels or of human beings." 31
The point Luther
makes by way of this distinction is that
men can not know
anything about the absolute power of God,
but must "keep the

ordered power in mind and form our opinion
on the basis of
it." 32 God "does not command us to act
in accordance with
absolute power, for He wants us to act in
accordance
with the ordered power." 33 The way in which the
Christian
acts in accordance with God's ordered power, of
.

.

course,

is

by following his or her calling.
In another lecture on Genesis, Luther claims that to

abandon one's calling, or even to change one's calling,

without direction from God or one's "superiors," is a sin.
In his interpretation of Genesis 16:9, where an angel tells

Hagar, the runaway maidservant of Sarah, to return to her

mistress, Luther concludes:

Therefore no one should change his position in
life because of his own judgment or desire. God
will change it either through death or because of
the desire and judgment of those who are your
superiors.
If this does not happen, those who
give up their vocations commit a sin. 34
Relations of superiority and inferiority, of course, are
part of God's ordered power.

According to Luther, therefore, if one is to avoid sin,
one must remain in and fulfill the position in which God has
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called one, no matter how unpleasant
or servile that calling
might be, for God regards all
callings alike.
Luther

emphasizes that this last point about
the equality of all
callings before God "must often be
impressed upon men, for
it makes hearts confident and
prevents the dangerous
abandoning of a calling, the abandoning
that is never
35
attempted without sin."
The conception of the calling which
Luther held later
in his career was not so much
traditionalistic, in the sense
that it was directed toward maintaining
traditional economic
relations, as it was disciplinary or regulatory.
it was not
particular relations which were paramount to Luther,
but

order itself.

Luther left open the possibility that God

might use "superiors" to change things, but such changes
would be orderly, that is, according to God's ordered power.
This disciplinary conception of the calling was also present
in the writings of Jean Calvin, the other great reformer of

the sixteenth-century.

And it was Calvin, more than Luther,

who influenced those Puritan sects which are so important
for Weber.

Nevertheless, Weber spends even less time on

Calvin's conception of the calling than he does on
Luther's. 36

This is because Calvin's influence on the

Puritans was centered not on his notion of the calling, but
on another concept, which

I

will get to shortly.

But the

disciplinary dimension of Calvin's idea of the calling must
be briefly indicated here, because it is quite different
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than the idea of the calling which
Weber finds among the
Puritans.
in the third book of his Institutes
of the Christian

Religion, which he wrote in 1835 or
36, Calvin sounds very
much like Luther did in that same
period, in regard to the
calling.
Calvin says of the calling: "he only
who directs
his life to this end will have it
properly framed; because,
free from the impulse of rashness, he
will not attempt more
than his calling justifies, knowing that
it is unlawful to
overleap the prescribed bounds." 37 For both
these

reformers, therefore, the calling served as a
call to order,
and a guarantee that order would be maintained.
For Luther,

the idea of the calling required that "no one
change his

position in life because of his own judgment or desire,"
and
for Calvin,

bounds

it required that no one "overleap the prescribed

.

And while Luther emphasized, as

a

sort of ministerial

pointer, the value of the idea that all callings were equal

before God, Calvin makes a similar point, although he does
not claim all callings are equal.

Calvin writes:

Again, in all our cares, toils, annoyances, and
other burdens, it will be no small alleviation to
know that all these are under the superintendence
of God.
Every one in his particular mode of
life will, without repining, suffer its
inconveniences, cares, uneasiness, and anxiety,
persuaded that God has laid on the burden. This,
too, will afford admirable consolation, that in
following your proper calling, no work will be so
mean and sordid as not to have a splendour and
value in the eye of God. 38
.

.

.
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Even if all callings are not equal
in the eye of God,
according to Calvin, they are all
of value; this should
console those who find themselves
in unpleasant
or

oppressive circumstances, and help
them to avoid the sin of
rebellion, or unauthorized assertion.
The Protestant reversal of the
Pauline indifference
toward earthly life was not limited to
the disciplinary

development of Luther's and Calvin's conceptions
of the
calling, however.
There is another facet of this reversal
which I would like to emphasize before
moving on to Weber's
discussion of Puritanism. Like the disciplinary
character
of their conceptions of the calling, the
feature
of Luther'

and Calvin's thought that

I

now want to stress is one which

Weber passes over in The Protestant Ethir.
important for the claims

I

r

but it too is

will eventually make concerning

Protestantism and the value of convenience.
In regard to worldly activity in general, beyond the

requirements of one's calling, Calvin, and eventually
Luther, took positions which cannot be described as

indifferent.

Early in Luther's career, when he wrote his

commentary on

I

Corinthians

7,

he advised Christians to

"behave like guests on earth, using everything for a short
time, because of need and not for pleasure."

(See p.

237)

By following this lesson from Paul's epistle, one could

avoid sinking "too deeply" into earthly life.

But as

Luther's conception of the calling moved away from Paul's
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indifferent attitude toward the particular situation in

which Christians were called, so too did his estimation of

worldly activity in general.

By the mid-1530 's, when he was

writing his lectures on Genesis, Luther had come to
revaluate life on earth, and saw more to earthly activity
than the mere satisfaction of necessity; it was something
joyful, to be enjoyed.

And for his part, Calvin also

rejected advice such as that of the early Luther, and found

earthly activity to be enjoyable, within moderation of
course
The point

I

want to stress, however,

is not just that

Luther and Calvin came to see earthly life as something to
be enjoyed.

Alongside this evaluation, there also occurred

in the thought of these reformers an intensification of that

contempt for earthly life which

challenging Arendt

1

s

I

identified earlier,

interpretation of Christianity.

in

What

I

want to stress, therefore, is neither the less severe side
of Luther's and Calvin's evaluation of earthly life, nor

their contempt for such life.

I

want to emphasize the

intensified ambivalence of their thought.

The ambivalence

of these reformers was not an indifferent, either this way

or that, attitude, as one might expect from the current

usage of this word; their ambivalence was an emphatic this
39
way and that.

In Luther's thought, this ambivalence is found quite

distinctly in his lectures on that section of Genesis which
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stressed in my argument with Arendt
(i.e. Gen esis 3:16-9)
in which God punishes Adam
and Eve for eating

I

from the t ree

of knowledge.

On the one hand, Luther expounds
upon th e
punishments, and fills in the broad
parameters which were
established in the verses themselves.
For instance, in
regard to woman's punishment (verse
16) Luther claims that
"Eve's sorrows, which she would not
have had if she had not
fallen into sin, are to be great, numerous,
and of various
40
kinds."
Woman's punishment is not just the
increased pain
in childbirth, which is mentioned in
the verse, but also th
"severe and sundry ailments" listed by Luther,
which women

may suffer throughout pregnancy, 41 as well
as the "various
dangers" a woman encounters "during all the rest
of her
life, while she devotes herself to her children." 42

And besides the procreative dimension of the
punishment, Eve, who prior to her sin "was very free and
.

was in no respect inferior to her husband," 43 became

subject to his rule.

Compared to the husband, who "rules

the home and the state, wages wars, defends his possessions

tills the soil, builds, plants, etc.", "[t]he woman
is like a nail driven into the wall." 44

.

.

.

Ultimately, of

course, after a life full of such punishments, Eve, like
Adam, had to die, at least in the flesh. 45

Now on the other hand, despite this grim portrayal of
the earthly life of woman, Luther also claims that Eve's

punishment was "truly happy and joyful." 46

And this is not
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just because God made it possible
for her to attain eternal
life through this punishment,
although this undoubtedly is
the most joyful aspect of earthly
life for Luther.
But even
on earth, the life of woman is
joyful.
in her punishment,
Eve sees that
she is not being deprived of the
blessing of
procreation, which was promised and granted
sin.
She sees that she is keeping her sex before
and
that she remains a woman.
She sees that she is
not being separated from Adam to remain
alone and
apart from her husband. She sees that she
may
keep the glory of motherhood. 47

Furthermore, motherhood is joyful not just for
women,
but for men as well.
Part of the glory of motherhood,

claims Luther, "is that we are all nourished, kept
warm, and
carried in the womb of our mothers; that we nurse at
their

breasts and are protected by their effort and care." 48

Expressing his personal enjoyment of motherhood, Luther
writes: "To me it is often a source of great pleasure and

wonderment to see that the entire female body was created
for the purpose of nurturing children.

How prettily even

little girls carry babies on their bosom." 49
For Luther, therefore, motherhood was both a punishment
and a blessing, a sign of God's wrath and of his mercy,

source of guilt and hope.

a

Luther displayed a similar

ambivalence in regard to Adam's punishment (verses 17-9).
But here, Luther not only expands the list of punishments,
as he did with Eve's, but claims that they have gotten more

severe since the time of Adam.

Luther points out that
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according to Genesis, Adam had only
to contend with the misfortunes of "thorns, thistles, and
hard work"" i„ providing
food for the household.
W We 1 arn from e *Perience
that countless
o^L"°
others have ?
been added.
How many kinds of damaae
and how many diseases affect
the crops? ?he plants
and the trees, and finally
everything that th*
earth produces!
Furthermore, f
bolts injurious dews, storms, rosts?Ughtning
overflowing rivers
settling of the ground, earthquakes all do
damage
v,

That the list of calamities which could
befall a farmer
had increased since Adam's time, Luther
interpreted as a
consequence of man's increasing corruption and
seduction by
Satan.
Luther claimed to be "fully of the opinion
that
because of the increase of sins the punishments
were also
increased and that these troubles were added to
the curse of
52
the earth."
But it was not just the increase in the

variety of disasters which convinced Luther that the
world
was becoming more depraved.

Luther also believed that

farmers in his day experienced "more frequent disasters to

crops than in former times," and that this was another

indication that "[t]he world [was] deteriorating from day to
day.

" 53

One might imagine that the subjection of Eve, while

being a punishment for women, was a blessing for men, but
Luther interprets this subjection as a punishment for both
sexes.

The husband's rule over his wife and the household

"cannot be carried on without the utmost difficulties." 54
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And as was the case with the agricultural
burdens which were
placed upon man, Luther claims that the
tasks of
"supporting, defending, and ruling over
his own
are
far more difficult in our age than
they were in the
beginning." 55 This was due, of course,
to the increasing
"perversity of people."
.

On the one hand, therefore, Luther saw
the life of the
common householder as being a sign of man's
condemnation by
God.

All his activity bears witness to man's
fall.

As

Luther puts it:

whenever we see thorns and thistles, weeds and
other plants of that kind in a field and in the
garden, we are reminded of sin and the wrath of
God as though by special signs. Not only in the
churches, therefore, do we hear ourselves charged
with sin. All the fields, yes, almost the entire
creation is full of such sermons, reminding us of
our sin and of God's wrath, which has been aroused
by our sin.
But on the other hand, just a few pages later in his

lecture, Luther claims that although farmers "are plagued

with hard labor, that labor is seasoned with matchless
pleasure, as daily the new and wonderful sight of the

creatures impresses itself upon their eyes." 57

The life of

the husband, therefore, like the life of the wife, is at

once both a reminder of man's fall from grace and a source
of pleasure.

Luther's ambivalence in regard to the punishment of
man, however,

is not as clearly drawn as his ambivalence

toward motherhood.

At that point in his lecture where
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Luther remarks about the "matchless
pleasure" of farm life,
he was attempting to justify the
lives of princes and
pastors, which seem to be free from
the "sweat of the brow"
of the husband.
Luther points out the enjoyable
side of

farm life in order to make his case
for the difficulty of
the life of the ruler or pastor.
These latter occupations
do not have such pleasures as the farmer
does, and their
labor is even more difficult.
Luther goes so far as to

claim that "[i]n one single day these people
work and sweat
more than a farmer does in an entire month, if
you consider
the vastness of their work and its dangers." 58
Then Luther

distinguishes princes and pastors, and claims that his own
calling is the most difficult of all.
"The hard work in
connection with a household is great; greater is that
connected with the state; and greatest is that in connection
with the church." 59
Given this particular context, one would not expect

Luther to dwell upon the pleasurable aspects of the lives of
rulers and pastors.

This would weaken his argument that

such persons should be supported by taxes and tithes, and

should not have to perform physical labor for their
livelihood. 60

Overall, however, Luther's interpretation of

Adam's and Eve's punishment is one which stresses that

earthly life is both a reminder of man's depravity and
sinfulness, and is also something God gave men "to enjoy." 61

Luther expounds upon the punishments which God inflicted
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upon men and women in their earthly
lives, but he also takes
pains to point out the pleasurable,
enjoyable aspects of
earthly life. At the beginning of his
lecture on Genesis
3:16-9, Luther emphasizes that the "godly"
must not despair
at the severity of mortal life but must
turn
"'to the

outside what is beautiful.'"

This "means not merely looking

at what is evil but delighting in God's
gifts and blessings
and also burying the punishments, annoyances,
pains, griefs,
and other things." 62

Although Luther's polemics may have hindered him
somewhat in turning to the outside the delightful

features

of earthly life, this was not the case with Calvin.

Calvin's ambivalence towards earthly life took a different
form than Luther's.

Whereas Luther developed and expanded

the punitive dimension of mortal life, Calvin spent time

discussing the various enjoyments of that life.

But,

of

course, Calvin did not neglect the darker side of life on
earth.

Calvin recognized that human life, since Adam's and
Eve's fall from grace, was plagued by various scourges and
calamities, but he did not interpret these vexations as

sign that mankind was becoming increasingly depraved.

a

There

are none of Luther's eschatological premonitions in Calvin's

interpretation of man's punishments.

For Calvin, these

punishments were not a sign that another disaster, on the
order of the biblical Deluge, was in store for man, as they
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were for Luther.

63

Instead, Calvin saw in the many

vexations and annoyances of life God's
reminder to men that
the things of this life on earth
were uncertain and
fleeting.
Describing God's response to
the folly of men,

Calvin writes:
t e Wh ° le SOUl
Pr
ensnare d by allurements
?
of the Si
flesh,
seeks its happiness on the earth.
To meet this disease, the Lord makes his
people
sensible of the vanity of the present life,
b
constant proof of its miseries. Thus, that v a
may not promise themselves deep and lasting they
in it, he often allows them to be assailed peace
by
tumult, or rapine, or to be disturbed by other war
injuries ... by diseases and dangers he sets
palpably before them how unstable and evanescent
are all the advantages competent to mortals. 64

SS

'

In order for Christians to keep their attention
on the

eternal, truly happy life which awaits them in heaven,
they

must refrain from becoming too deeply involved with the
affairs of earth.

Calvin's advice to Christians in this

regard is not to become indifferent to earthly life, to be
able to either accept the things of this world or let them
go,

as the early Luther,

following Paul, had advised;

instead, he takes a much stronger position.

Calvin claims

"that our mind never rises seriously to desire and aspire

after the future, until it has learned to despise the

present life." 65

For Calvin, "there is no medium between

the two things: the earth must either be worthless in our

estimation, or keep us enslaved by an intemperate love of
it." 66
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Given these rather extreme statements,
one might expect
that Calvin would have adopted the
early Luther's

distinction between pleasure and necessity,
or the
Augustinian distinction between use and
enjoyment (see
footnote 17), and recommended that
Christians limit their
involvement in earthly life to necessity
only.
But Calvin
rejects such a recommendation as being
"unnecessarily
67
austere,"
and in his rejection, appears to
contradict his
earlier claim that "there is no medium between"
the

worthlessness of life and the enslavement to it.
in the
chapter immediately following the one in which the
claim
against a medium was made, Calvin writes:
For if we are to live, we must use the necessary
supports of life; nor can we even shun those
things which seem more subservient to delight than
to necessity.
We must therefore observe a mean,
that we may use them with a pure conscience,
whether for necessity or for pleasure. 68
So on one hand, Calvin says that in order to avoid

becoming enthralled by earthly pleasures, there can be no
mean; life on earth must be worthless to Christians.

On the

other hand, he says that earthly delights can not be
avoided, so Christians must strike a mean between necessity

and pleasure.

If Calvin had left things as they stand here,

one could explain the apparent contradiction of these claims

about earthly life by pointing out that the former claim

establishes an ideal, while the latter claim is made in
spirit of concession to reality.

a

Ideally, Christians should
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be contemptuous of life on earth,
but since such a life does
have its fleeting pleasures and delights,
Christians should
strive to maintain a balance in their
enjoyment of things of
this life.

But Calvin does not leave things as
they stand here.
He does more than simply concede that
earthly life is

pleasurable; he points out how all creation
is intended to
be pleasurable to man.
"'There is not one little blade of
grass, there is no color in this world that is
not intended
to make men rejoice, '» 69 claims Calvin.
Consequently,

Christians are "'are not only to be spectators in
this
beautiful theater but to enjoy the vast bounty and variety
of good things which are displayed to us in it.'" 70

As a guiding principle for such enjoyment of earthly
things, Calvin suggests that Christians "refer them to the

end for which their author made and destined them, since he

created them for our good, and not for our destruction.

1,71

He then gives some examples to elucidate this point:

Now then, if we consider for what end he created
food, we shall find that he consulted not only for
our necessity, but also for our enjoyment and
delight.
Thus in clothing, the end was, in
addition to necessity, comeliness and honour; and
in herbs, fruits, and trees, besides their various
uses, gracefulness of appearance and sweetness of
smell.

Given this attitude toward pleasure, Calvin can hardly
be considered an extreme ascetic, and in fact, he described
as "inhuman" that philosophy which would restrict man's
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earthly activity to the satisfaction of
necessity alone. 73
Therefore, the severe "worldly asceticism"
of the

Puritans,

which Weber emphasizes in The

Protean*

and which

T

will discuss later in this chapter, can
not be derived from
Calvin's teachings on earthly pleasures.
Weber acknowledges
this in a footnote. 74
But Calvin, of course, was no hedonist,
either.

Christians should enjoy food and drink, fine
clothes and
flowers, and all other things which please the
senses, 75 but

such enjoyment should never be carried to the
point where it

distracts them from

a

pious concern for the true, eternal

happiness which is promised to Christians, or from the
fulfillment of one's calling. 76

Here, too, Calvin offers

some advice for "curbing licentious abuse" of earthly

pleasures: "There is no surer or quicker way of

accomplishing this than by despising the present life and
aspiring to celestial immortality." 77
While this advice may appear to be another

contradiction within Calvin's thought

- in

that his advice

amounts to telling Christians to enjoy life's pleasures, but
to curb excesses by despising this life

describe this antinomy as such.

-

I

prefer not to

At least since Hegel, the

idea of a contradiction seems to imply the immanent

resolution of the tension involved therein, but for Calvin,
as for Luther, the tension between the enjoyment of, and the

contempt for, life on earth was to be maintained.

Both
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these reformers rejected the asceticism
of monastic orders,
which can be interpreted as one route
for eliminating such
tension.
Instead, they heightened the tension
between these
two attitudes toward earthly life,
Luther by drawing
out the

dark, punitive dimension of that life,
while nonetheless

insisting on "turning to the outside what
is beautiful," and
Calvin by indicating how pleasing all of
creation was meant
to be, while insisting that Christians
despise earthly
life.

78

As

I

have already indicated,

I

prefer to describe

this tension by the term ambivalence.

Having pointed out both the ambivalence of Luther's
and
Calvin's attitudes toward earthly life, as well as
the

disciplinary nature of their conceptions of the calling,

I

can now pick up Weber's argument relating Protestantism,

specifically Puritanism, and capitalism.
course,

I

Eventually, of

will return to these points, and situate them in

regard to Weber's argument. But first,

another of Calvin's doctrines

-

I

must discuss

predestination

-

the one

which Weber claims was the "most characteristic dogma" of
Calvinism. 79

The doctrine of predestination is crucial to

the relation between Protestantism and capitalism which

Weber tries to establish in The Protestant Ethic
Institutes

.

.

In the

Calvin describes this doctrine as follows:

By predestination we mean the eternal decree of
God, by which he determined with himself whatever
he wished to happen with regard to every man. All
are not created on equal terms, but some are
preordained to eternal life, others to eternal
damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been

250
° r ° ther of these en <*s,
1°*
we say
JEJJ^Sf
that
he has been predestinated to
life or death. 80
This doctrine did not originate
with Calvin.
his
letter to the Ephesians, Paul had
expressed the idea that
God, "before the foundation of the
world," chose those who
would be saved, 81 and to the Romans,
Paul wrote, "For whom
He foreknew, He also predestined to
become conformed to the
image of His Son." 82
Although the letter to the Ephesians,
as well as the above quote from Romans,
refer only to the
predestination of those who were saved, Paul does
give some
indication in his letter to the Romans that
others were

m

predestined to damnation.

At least he leaves open this

possibility: "What if God, although willing to demonstrate
His wrath and to make His power known, endured with
much

patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction?

And he

did so in order that he might make known the riches of His

glory upon vessels of mercy, which He prepared before hand
for glory

.

.

.

"

83

Paul almost seems to suggest that the

predestination of those who are saved required the

predestination of those who are damned, so that there would
be a contrast.

In any case, Calvin interprets Paul's

statements on predestination as including both those who are
saved and those who are damned.

I

will return to this

feature of predestination shortly.

Another important feature of this doctrine, one which

Weber emphasizes, is that it effectively places the
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salvation of an individual beyond the
influence of that
individual or the church. God determined
whether one would
be saved or damned before he ever
created man, and there was
nothing that one could do to alter this
situation.
Calvin
insisted that one was predestined by God
"according to
the

good pleasure of his will.

..."

And "[w]herever this

good pleasure of God reigns, no good works are
taken into
84
account."
Paul expressed this gratuitous dimension

of the

doctrine of predestination in his letter to the Romans, 85
and Augustine, writing in the fifth century, also
insisted

that the salvation of the elect was gratuitous. 86

But in

the course of those years in which the Roman Catholic Church

established itself as the dominant religion of the Western
world, the idea that there was nothing that one could do to

attain salvation became buried under the proliferation of
sacraments, some of which served as steps one could take to

ensure one's salvation (e.g. penance and extreme unction).
Protestantism, of course, rejected most of these

sacramental developments, and Calvin's conception of

gratuitous predestination was, in some sense, a weapon to be
used in this struggle with the Catholic Church.

For

example, Calvin was sharply critical of the sacrament of

penitence as it was established by the "schoolmen."

Calvin

did believe that repentance for one's sins was an important

part of a Christian life, and claimed that "it is certain
that no man can embrace the grace of the Gospel without

betaking himself from the errors of his former life into the
right path, and making it his whole study to practise

repentance." 87

But according to the Catholic sacrament of

penitence, repentance had to follow a particular, tripartite
formula, and had to be performed on a regular basis.
First, the sinner had to be deeply sorrowful for his
sins; that is, he had to be contrite.

88

Secondly, the

sinner had to orally confess all of his sins to a priest, at
89
least once a year.

And finally, the sinner had to perform

90
some "satisfaction of works" for those sins.

Although

Calvin rails at length against each of these elements of the
sacrament of penitence (especially the priestly arrogation
of the exclusive role of confessor)

,

I

need only focus on

indicate
his criticism of the practice of satisfaction to

doctrine of
the conflict between this sacrament and the

predestination.
their sins in
The repentant performed satisfaction for
the church or
various manners: prayers, fastings, gifts to
works could be required.
to the poor, or other charitable
the practice of
Besides these forms of satisfaction arose

purchasing indulgences.

According to this practice, one

for the satisfaction that
could buy from the church a pardon
Calvin, of course was thoroughly
one had to perform.
which "the salvation of
revolted by this crass practice, in
of a lucrative traffic,
the soul [was] made the subject
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salvation taxed at

a

few pieces of money, nothing given

gratuitously.
However, the selling of indulgences was, for Calvin,

only the most obvious form of the blasphemy which the church
had committed by requiring satisfaction to be performed for
The very idea of satisfaction being required for

sins.

forgiveness amounted to the purchase of salvation.

Calvin

summarizes the papal attitude toward this element of

penitence as follows:
They say that it is not sufficient for the
penitent to abstain from past sins, and change his
conduct for the better, unless he satisfy God for
what he has done; and that there are many helps by
which we may redeem sins, such as tears, fastings,
oblations, and offices of charity; that by them
the Lord is to be propitiated; by them the debts
due to divine justice are to be paid; by them our
faults are to be compensated; by them pardon is to
be deserved. 92

According to the doctrine of predestination, however, the
forgiveness of sins is free, gratis.

It is not just that

one does not have to pay for one's sins to be forgiven; one
can not pay.

"Assuredly," insists Calvin, "divine grace

would not deserve all the praise of election, were not
election gratuitous; and it would not be gratuitous, did God
in electing any individual pay regard to his future

works.

" 93

Besides flying in the face of the doctrine of

predestination, as interpreted by Calvin, the Catholic

practice of performing satisfaction was also an insult to
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the honor of Christ, the son of God.

Those whom God

predestined to eternal life were saved by
Christ, "the Lamb
of God, who takes away the sins of the
world.- 94 Calvin
emphasizes the import of this greeting which
John the
Baptist offered to Christ: "He [Christ] takes
them [sins]
away, and no other; that is, since he alone
is the Lamb of
God, he alone is the offering for our sins;
he alone is

expiation; he alone is satisfaction." 95

To assume that the

works or satisfactions performed by men, or the
indulgences

which were purchased from the church, have anything to
do

with the forgiveness of sins, upon which salvation depends,
is both an effrontery to the honor of Christ, 96 as well
as a

challenge to God's gratuitous predestination of man.
Of course it was not just the sacrament of penance

which suffered at the hands of Calvin.

The doctrine of

predestination, when carried to its logical conclusion,
seemed to undermine the importance which the Catholic Church

attributed to the sacraments in general.

The position which

the mature Church took in regard to the sacraments is

exemplified in the writing of Thomas Aquinas, who wrote in
the thirteenth century.

In his Summa Theologica

.

Aquinas

recognized seven sacraments, and argued that these
sacraments were necessary for salvation.

Aquinas'

syllogistic reasoning on this matter runs as follows:

Augustine says: 'It is impossible to keep men
together in one religious denomination, whether
true or false, except they be united by means of
visible signs or sacraments. But it is necessary
'
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for salvation that men be united
together in the
name of the one true religion.
Therefore
sacraments are necessary for man's
salvation. 97

Aquinas also taught that the sacraments
were "instituted by
God to be employed for the purpose of
conferring grace." 98
Although Calvin does not address Aquinas
explicitly

in

regard to the issue of the sacraments, he
does challenge
those teachings mentioned above. To begin
with, Calvin
recognizes only two of the Church's seven
sacraments -

baptism and eucharist

-

and spends one of the last chapters

of the Institutes denying the legitimacy "of
the Five

Sacraments, falsely so called." 99
But even the two sacraments which Calvin recognized

were not necessary for salvation.

"[A]ssurance of

salvation," writes Calvin, "does not depend on participation
in the sacraments, as if justification consisted in it.

This, which is treasured up in Christ alone, we know to be

communicated, not less by the preaching of the Gospel than

by the seal of a sacraments, and may be completely enjoyed

without this seal." 100

And as for the teaching that grace is

conferred by the sacraments, Calvin replies, "[t]hey confer
nothing." 101

Even though Luther, along with Calvin, professed the

doctrine of predestination, Weber indicates that the
doctrine waned in importance for Luther "the more his

position as responsible head of his Church forced him into
practical politics." 102
•

•

•

For Calvin, however, the doctrine
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assumed a central role as his teaching
developed.
This
difference helps to explain why Calvin
broke more cleanly
with the Catholic Church and its
sacraments than did
103
Luther.
According to Weber, Luther maintained
that God's
saving grace could be lost through
sin, and "won again by
penitent humility and faithful trust in
the Word of God and
in the sacraments." 10 * on the other
hand, Calvin, who clung
firmly to the doctrine of predestination,
rejected
the

possibility of either losing or recovering grace.
Consequently, claims Weber, the practice of
private
confession disappeared "from all the regions of fully
developed Calvinism." 105
For Weber, the disappearance of this sacrament was
"an

occurrence of the greatest importance.

...

The means to

a

periodical discharge of the emotional sense of sin was done
away with." 106

Weber's point, as

I

read him, is that this

emotional energy which had been discharged in, or generated
and regulated by, the sacrament of confession, could now be

focused in a different direction by Calvinists.

But there

is more to the doctrine of predestination than the

gratuitousness of salvation, and the corresponding challenge
to the Catholic sacraments.

There is another important

element of Calvin's doctrine of predestination which must be

mentioned here, what might be called the gratuitousness of
damnation.

This other dimension of predestination posed its

own particular threat to Catholic doctrine, and generated
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from the guilt for sin.
its own emotional energy distinct
of predestination, not
It was this element of the doctrine

seems to have most
the gratuitousness of salvation, which

troubled the Catholic Church.
between the idea of
For despite the implicit antagonism
attitude toward the
gratuitous salvation and the Catholic
accepted the doctrine of
sacraments, the Church nevertheless
of gratuitous
predestination, particularly the idea
paragraphs ago was cited to
salvation. Aquinas, who a few
Catholic theology placed on
indicate the importance which
used to present the Church's
the sacraments, can also be
predestination. The following
view of the doctrine of
from
concerning the sacraments, is
quote, like those above

Aquinas' Summa Thp-oloaica:

Spl^^e^ P&XZX Skeins

of

and in respect of
lit mercy, in sparing them; by mean of His
s
others! who, ^reprobates,
^oraf/rlpr^tes-otbers has no reason

iofeTor

except the divine will.

Doctor" of
Aquinas, the "angelic
in the above passage,
Both
like Calvin, the heretic.
somewhat
sounds
Catholicism,
that it
predestined for some, and
is
salvation
agree that
for
mercy of God. of course,
and
goodness
the
depends on
and also
of predestination
element
this
profess
Aquinas to
he
necessary for salvation,
were
sacraments
claim that the
the
maneuvers to get around
rhetorical
some
to
h ad to resort
maneuvers
For Calvin, such
ideas.
these
conflict between
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were nothing more than sophistical
subterfuges, and h e
attacked them as such.™ Wha t
I want to

stress, however,

is

not the way the Catholic Church
accommodated these
problematic ideas, or the way Calvin
sought to upset that
accommodation; instead I want to
point out that element of
the doctrine of predestination
that the Catholic Church
could not accept.

The above quote from Aquinas gives
some indication of
the exclusion that I want to emphasize.
in that
quote,

Aquinas uses the term predestination in
reference only to
the saved; the term reprobation is used
in regard
to the

damned.

For Aquinas, predestination does not
include those
who are not saved; reprobation, as something
distinct from

predestination, is the source of their damnation.

This

distinction is made more clearly in the following
quote, and
its implications are more fully drawn out by
Aquinas (and
myself)
Thus, as predestination is a part of providence,
in regard to those divinely ordained to eternal
salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence
in regard to those who turn aside from that end.
Therefore, as predestination includes the
will to confer grace and glory, so also
reprobation includes the will to permit a person
to fall into sin to impose the punishment of
damnation on account of that sin .™9 (emphasis
added)
'

.

.

.

r

As

I

have tried to indicate through my underlining,

predestination, without merit, belongs only to the saved;

upon them grace and glory are conferred; they are ordained
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to eternal salvation.

The damned, on the other hand,
turn
aside from eternal salvation; God
permits them to fall into
sin, but does not ordain that
they do so. And they are
punished on account, or because, of
their sin.

Aquinas, in other words, lets God
off the hook for the
damnation of the non-elect, and shifts
responsibility to the
damned themselves. Ultimately, of course,
it is God's will
which permits them to sin, but the damned
earn their
damnation through their sins. The responsibility
which is
established by this distinction between
predestination and
reprobation can be interpreted as the general,
broad form of
that specific responsibility which was
institutionalized by
the Church in the sacrament of confession.
(in order to be

forgiven by the priest, you had to be responsible
for your
sins.) Although yearly confessions to a priest
were not

required by the Church until the thirteenth century, 110 the
Catholic rejection of the gratuitousness of damnation did
not begin with Aquinas.
As

I

indicated earlier, Paul, in his letter to the

Romans, can be read as including both the saved and the

damned under the notion of predestination.

(See p.

250)

Calvin read him in this manner, as will be shown, but so did
Augustine, one of the earliest defenders of the Catholic
Church.

Augustine believed that the majority of men were

predestined to damnation,

111

and borrowed Paul's imagery of

the "vessels of wrath" to explain this point.

260

alS n0t
v™ are of the ° f this numbe r [of the
elect], who
same mass
have been made vessels of wrath, as these but
their advantage. God creates nineare born' for
of them rlshlv
r
He also knows what

S»
'

b°

e

And, according to Augustine,
those predestined to

damnation were so not on account of
their particular sins,
or because of their personal turning
away from salvation.
God does not damn them because he knows
in advance that they
will sin after they have been born. 113
The
damned, like the

saved, were chosen in the same manner
in which God chose

between the twins Jacob and Esau (see footnote
85); that
before they were born, without regard to their

is,

future

deeds.

114

This is not to say that damnation, like salvation,

was completely gratuitous, however.

Whenever Augustine

discusses the predestination of the damned, he does
indeed
raise the issue of merit or responsibility, but not in
regard to individual sinners.

sinner (actually, the second)

Rather, it is Adam, the first
,

who ultimately bears the

responsibility for damnation.
For example, Augustine says that if one were to

understand God's judgments, one would see "that the whole
human race was condemned in its rebellious head by so just

divine judgment, that if no one were to be freed from
one could rightly blame the justice of God." 115

which Augustine is referring to here is Adam.

it,

a

no

The head

And again, in

reference to the lesson of Jacob and Esau, Augustine points
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out that both, initially, were
damned by God "through n o
deeds of their own to be sure,
but as bound by the chain
of
condemnation originating in Adam." 116
All men are bound by
this chain before they are born,
and some are destined

to be

pardoned through God's merciful
grace.
those who are not saved, they have

But in regard t o

not earned their

damnation; they are predestined to
damnation through the sin
117
of Adam.
Even though Augustine defended the
justice of God in
his doctrine of predestination, by placing
responsibility
for man's punishment on Adam, and explicitly
rejected one of
the doctrine's logical, yet troubling,
conclusions
(i.e.

that sinners should not be admonished or
punished, since
they may have been predestined to be among the
damned 118
)

Augustine's doctrine nevertheless became

,

a source of

conflict within the Church during the century following
his
death.

119

The semi-Pelagians, who tried to strike a

compromise between the conflicting teachings of Pelagius and
Augustine, rejected the doctrine of double predestination,

that is, that both the saved and the damned were predestined.

120

During the second half of the fifth century,

the semi-Pelagians were successful in having the doctrine of

double predestination condemned by regional synods,

particularly in Gaul, or France. 121

But it was at the second

Council of Orange, in 529, that the idea of predestined
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damnation was effectively banished
from accepted Church
dogma
Overall, Augustinianism fared
much better than semiPelagianism did at this official
proclamation of church
teachings; the twenty-five propositions
or canons to which
the members of the Council subscribed
were drawn largely
from the writings of Augustine himself. 122
But in the fivepoint creed which the signatories added
to the document, the

Augustinian doctrine of predestination, or
at least the
disturbing half of it, was excluded from the
Church's
official theology. Actually, only two of the
five points
were involved in this mutation. After indicating
how Adam's
sin weakened the will of men, so that none
thereafter
could

love God in a suitable manner, the creed continues:
All, however, are able, after they have
received grace through baptism, with the cooperation of God, to accomplish what is necessary
for the salvation of their soul.
c) It is in no way our belief that some are
predestinated by God to evil (predestination
heresy)
rather, if there are any who believe a
thing so evil, we, with horror, say anathema. 123
(parenthesis in Clark's translation)
b)

;

According to this creed, none are predestined by God to
evil, that is, God does not predestine some to commit sins.

For the opponents of Augustine's doctrine of predestination

had claimed that it rendered God the author of evil.

12A

This

misrepresentation of Augustine's teachings was explicitly
rejected by the Council of Orange, but the Council also
implicitly rejected the Augustinian claim that some are
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predestined to damnation in general (as
distinguished from
the predestination to commit particular
sins)
According t
the Council's creed, salvation was
available
.

to all men.

Salvation still depended on God's grace,
as it did for
Augustine, but that grace appears to be
available to all
men.

No one need suffer eternal damnation.

While the Council's creed rejects one half
of the
doctrine of double predestination, it does not
mention
single predestination, that is, predestination
to salvation
at all.

in fact, the idea that all are able to accomplish

what is necessary for salvation would appear to leave
littl
room for even such a restricted doctrine of predestination:
if all can attain salvation, and salvation is
predestined,

does this mean all are predestined to salvation?
not.

Of course

Someone has to suffer; there have to be some vessels

of wrath (predestined or not) which allow God's mercy to be

merciful.

(See p.

250)

However, the creed does mention

that God's co-operation is necessary for salvation, so it

i

conceivable that such co-operation is predestined, although
the Council never made this claim.
this,

But even if it had,

in turn, would have raised the question as to whether

all were indeed able to attain salvation.

But despite this apparent incongruity of the ideas of

universally available salvation and single predestination,
the Catholic Church did retain both of these ideas, as is

exemplified in the teachings of Aquinas.

125

And while such
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combination appears to be logically
unharmonious the creed
of the Council of Orange and
Aquinas' limited concept of
predestination actually fit together quite
,

nicely.

The

Council's rejection of predestined
damnation, in a sense,
paved the way for Aquinas' later
predestination/reprobation
distinction.
For the obverse of the rejection
of

predestined damnation, is that those who are
not saved are
responsible for their damnation.
If all can be

saved, and

none are predestined to damnation, then who
but the sinner
can be responsible for damnation? This
responsibility,
it

will be recalled, was at the heart of Aquinas'
distinction,

according to which the reprobated were not predestined,
but
were punished for their own sins.
In this light, Aquinas' predestination/reprobation

distinction can be interpreted as

a late form of

Catholicism's moderation of Augustine's doctrine.

Those

with Nietzschean sensibilities, perhaps, can appreciate the
way the Council of Orange's mitigation of the severity of

Augustine's predestination came around in the thirteenth
century as the burden of responsibility, in the forms of
Aquinas' distinction and mandatory confessions.

The teachings of the Council of Orange, with their

predominantly Augustinian bent, were quite influential in
the development of medieval theology,

126

but they also mark

the point where the Church abandoned Augustine's idea of

predestined damnation.

It was against this long-standing
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position of the Catholic Church that
Calvin threw himself
with all his weight. To those who
urged that the doctrine
of predestination, as developed
in Paul's letters and
Augustine's literary artillery, was too
troubling and
dangerous a doctrine to merit widespread
discussion, Calvin
replied:
There is nothing in the allegation that
the whole
subject is fraught with danger to pious
minds, as
tending to destroy exhortation, shake faith
disturb and dispirit the heart. Augustine
disguises not that on these grounds he was
often
charged with preaching the doctrine of
predestination too freely
Those, however
who are so cautious and timid that they would
bury
all mention of predestination in order that
it may
not trouble weak minds, with what colour, pray,
will they cloak their arrogance, when they
indirectly charge God with a want of due
consideration, in not having foreseen a danger for
which they imagine that they prudently provide. 127
'

.

.

.

Calvin insisted not only that the doctrine of

predestination be taught, but that it be taught in its
entirety; he rejected the truncated version of the Catholic
Church, which limited predestination to election only, and

denied that some are predestined for reprobation. 128

For

Calvin, the damned do not earn their damnation through their
sins, as the Council of Orange implied and Aquinas

maintained.

Rather, they are predestined to damnation just

as the elect are predestined to salvation.

In contradiction

of the Catholic Church's teaching that all can be saved and

none are irrevocably damned, Calvin claims: "All are not

created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal

266
life, others to eternal damnation;
and, accordingly, as each

has been created for one or other of
these ends, we say that
he has been predestinated to life or
to death." 129
In pushing this point about the
predestination of the

damned, Calvin is even more severe than
Augustine.

Augustine, at least, interposed the responsibility
of Adam
to mitigate the gratuitousness of damnation.
Calvin,
however, does not offer this consolation.
»[l]f we look for
the source of their ruin," writes Calvin,
concerning the
damned, "we must ultimately come to this, that
being cursed
by God, all they do, say, or intend, only furthers
and

increases their curse.

Yet, the cause of eternal rejection

is so hidden that there is nothing left for us to do but
to

be amazed at the incomprehensible mind of God." 130 Calvin

also calls this ultimate question-mark the "secret" or

"hidden counsel of God." 131 And on the occasion when Calvin

actually offers some sort of answer to the question of man's
damnation, he is hardly more comforting: "Those

.

.

.

whom

God passes by he reprobates, and that for no other cause but

because he is pleased to exclude them from the inheritance

which he predestines to his children." 132
The severity of this teaching should be evident.

Not

only are some damned, through no fault of their own, but

there is no explanation for why they are damned, other than
that their damnation pleases God.

And not only is there no

comforting explanation available for those who are damned,
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but there is nothing that can be done
about it. Man's deeds
have no bearing on his election to
salvation, or his
predestination to damnation. This is the
''decretum

horribile" which Calvin taught. 133
As was the case with Augustine,
Calvin's teachings on

predestination became a source of controversy
after his
death, and were the subject of several
synods. 134

But in

Calvin's case, the doctrine was not shorn of
its sharp
edges, but was retained as a double decree
which included
damnation.
The statement of the doctrine which Weber
cites
in The Protestant Ethic comes from the
Westminster

Confession of 1647, the product of one of these synods.
This Confession not only states explicitly that some
are

"foreordained to everlasting death," but at one point
claims, in direct opposition to the teachings of the

Catholic Church, "All those whom God hath predestined unto
life, and those only, He is pleased in His appointed and

accepted time effectually to call by His word and spirit
(out of that state of sin and death,

nature)." 135
I

in which they are by

(emphasis added)

mentioned earlier that the Calvinist elimination of

private confession was interpreted by Weber as a source of
emotional energy.

The sense of guilt for sin was no longer

discharged in confession, and could be focused in

different direction.

(See p. 26)

a

But the idea that some

were hopelessly, helplessly, and gratuitously damned
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question of man's salvation or
damnation, and promised
immortality to those who followed
its teachings and participated in its sacraments.
My point is that Calvin's
doctrine of predestination
radically challenged this Catholic
confidence in salvation,
and not just because the doctrine
undermined the sacraments.
For Calvin, as for Augustine, most
people were from the
start irrevocably denied the possibility
of heavenly
immortality.
And it was because of this dreadful
dimension
of the doctrine, which threw salvation
into doubt, that
predestination's "psychological effect was
extraordinarily
138
powerful."
As Weber puts it, "The question, Am I
one of
the elect? must sooner or later have arisen
for every
believer and have forced all other interests into
the

background.

" 139

Calvin, apparently, had no doubt about his own

salvation, and suspected that true believers would have
the

same confidence.

He found it strange that "many who boast

of being Christians,

instead of thus longing for death, are

so afraid of it that they tremble at the very mention of it
as a thing ominous and dreadful." 140

For Calvin, death was

not something to be avoided, either intellectually or

physically; instead, he taught that Christians should

"ardently long for death, and constantly meditate upon
it."

Calvin's doctrine of predestination,

I

want to

suggest, was effective in getting people to focus upon their
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eventual death, even if it did
not make them long for
it.
The doctrine raised, in a very
poignant way, the specter of
man's mortality.
But according to Weber,
most of Calvin's
followers were unable to attain,
or maintain, his confidence
in heavenly immortality.
" [F]or the broad
mass of ordinary
men
" wr ites Weber, "the certitudo
salutis in the
sense of the recognizability of
the state of grace
necessarily became of absolutely
dominant importance." 142
That is, they needed a sign of
their salvation, and one was
provided in the form of the calling.
.

.

.

Earlier,

discussed the shift in attitude toward
the
calling, from the indifference of
Paul's first letter to the
Corinthians, to the disciplinary concern
of the mature
Luther and Calvin.
(See pp. 7-12)
For both Luther and
Calvin, the idea of a calling came to be
used as
I

a tool

maintaining order in the face of rebellious masses.

for

But in

regard to the serious questions raised by the
doctrine of
predestination, the idea of a calling became an instrument
of change.
In their responses to the anxiety the faithful had

concerning salvation, Calvinist ministers came to encourage
"intense worldly activity" as the most suitable means of

dispersing doubts about, and inspiring confidence
salvation.

in,

one's

Weber describes this Puritanical attitude

toward earthly activity and its relation to the questions
raised by predestination, as follows:
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It was through the
consciousness that his rthe

willed of God but rather done by
attained the highest good toward God that he
religion strove, the certainty of which this 144
salvation
n
(parenthesis in original)
"

By the rigorous and conscientious
performance of one's
earthly calling, one not only
maintained the order which God
willed, as Luther and Calvin had
taught, but one could

"increase" or "augment" the glory of God.

145

The greater the

success one had in performing one's
calling, the greater the
glory of God which one accomplished through
one's earthly
activity, and the surer one could be that
one was of the
elect.
For only one of the elect could have an
"effectual
calling," one which was capable of augmenting
"the glory of
God by real, not apparent, good works." 146
But it was not really success itself which was

important in regard to salvation.

Rather, it was the fact

that one had organized one's life to serve the glory of
God

which was truly important, that one's life "was thoroughly
rationalized in this world and dominated entirely by the aim
to add to the glory of God on earth." 147

Success happened to

follow upon such a dedicated, disciplined form of life, and
so was valuable as a sign, or proof, of one's election.

this point

I

At

should note, as Weber does, that this attitude

toward success in one's calling, as providing proof of one's

predestination to salvation, was quite foreign to Calvin
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himself.

calvin never wavered in his
teaching that works
have nothing to do with salvation
and damnation, and he
denied that works give any
indication of God's "secret
counsel." fact, Calvin warned against
attempts to
understand this realm of mystery,
and taught that « [i]t is
not right that man should with
impunity pry into things
which the Lord has been pleased to
conceal within
1

himself.

m

» 149

Nevertheless, this deviant use to which
the Puritans
put the idea of the calling was, in
Weber's eyes, of the
greatest economic significance.
it was by ascribing to the
calling the important role of signifier of
salvation, that
Calvinism was able to reclaim and redirect into
economic
activity that emotional energy which Catholicism
had

regulated through the sacraments.

As individual believers

successfully performed their particular callings, not
only
was their certainty of salvation confirmed and the
glory of
God enhanced, but the productivity of the community was
also
increased.

This effect of the Puritanical use of the

calling is described in utilitarian terms by Weber:

"The

specialization of occupations leads, since it makes the

development of skill possible, to

a

quantitative and

qualitative improvement in production, and thus serves the
common good.

,,15 °

It was this promotion of the common good that provided

the basis for the distinction between real and apparent good
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works, and even for distinctions
among effectual callings.
Those callings which were useful
to the community were
pleasing to God, and those which
were more useful than
others were more pleasing to, and
more greatly glorified,
151
God.
According to Weber, the Puritan
ministers were not
opposed to changes in callings, as
long as the changes were
made in order to augment God's glory,
that is, to increase
the productivity of the community. 152
Weber's claim is that
this dynamic conception of the calling,
with its

specializing effect, helped to usher in the
rationally
organized capitalism of modernity. This
dynamism stands in
sharp contrast to what I termed the disciplinary,
or as

Weber put it, "traditionalistic,

••

conception of the calling

which Luther and Calvin employed to defend the old
economic
order.

This is not to say that there was no disciplinary

dimension to the Puritanical conception of the calling,
however.

As Luther's and Calvin's conceptions of the

calling were aimed, in part, to restrain the rebellious

activity of an expropriated peasantry, the Puritans'

conception of the calling was used to fit that same stratum
into the new economic order.

For instance, Puritans

supported the brutal British poor laws which were mentioned
in the previous chapter (see endnote 107 of Chapter 4).

153

Even though the Puritans believed that not everyone was

predestined to salvation, they still believed, according to
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Weber, that "for everyone
without exception God's
Providence
has prepared a calling, which
he should profess and in
which
he should labor.
God created everyone for his
glory.
For those, such as vagabonds
and beggars, who pursued no
calling, and were therefore a
blight on the glory of God,
the Puritans favored the creation
of workhouses, which could
instill the discipline which was
required by the glory of
God and the capitalist economy. 155

Although the Puritanical notion of the
calling as proof
of salvation may have been a great
boon to the development
of modern capitalism, operating as it
did to establish
this

order on both the level of the Puritan
entrepreneur and the
level of the undisciplined peasantry, the
idea was

nonetheless an inherently dangerous one from the
religious
perspective of Calvinism. For one thing, the idea
that

proof of one's election could be provided by the
successful

pursuit of one's calling came perilously close to the

Catholic Church's position that one could attain salvation
by good works on earth.

156

Although the Puritan ministers

insisted that such works were nothing more than an

indication of salvation, and that salvation in no way

depended on worldly success, there was always the danger
that among those anxious believers who accepted Calvin's

doctrine of predestination, such works would come to
outweigh faith in providing certainty of salvation.
of bolstering the Calvinist's faith in his salvation,

Instead
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worldly success might come to
replace that faith as
of certainty.

a

source

This notion of the calling as
proof also posed another
threat to Calvinism, in that the
success that attended the
disciplined, purposeful activity of
the believer could
undermine that very discipline. The
more successful, that
is, wealthy, the Puritan became
in his calling, the greater
was the temptation and feasibility of
living a leisurely,
comfortable life. Weber points out how
Richard Baxter, the

Puritan minister upon whose writings he
principally relies,
frequently warned against the accumulation
of wealth.
Weber
writes that for Baxter, "Wealth as such is a
great
danger;

its temptations never end, and its pursuit
is not only

senseless as compared with the dominating importance
of the
Kingdom of God, but it is morally suspect." 157
The primary objection which Puritan ministers such as

Baxter raised against wealth, was that it could lead to

"distraction from the pursuit of a righteous life," 158 that
is,

a life devoted solely to the glorification of God.

According to Weber, the Puritan ministers were more
suspicious of wealth than was Calvin himself.

159

Given the

greater weight which those ministers placed upon worldly
activity, in comparison to Calvin, it is understandable that

they would be more concerned than he was with the dangers of

earthly success.

And in response to this threat, which

followed upon their novel idea that salvation could be
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proven, Calvinist ministers
were compelled to move even
farther away from Calvin's teachings.
They developed what
Weber calls "worldly asceticism,"
something quite distinct
from the ambivalence to earthly
life which Calvin
(and

Luther) maintained.

Weber identifies two principal
features of this
Puritanical asceticism. The first of
these is the
prohibition against wasting time. For

the Puritans, claims

Weber,

»[w]aste of time is

the deadliest of sins." 160

.

.

.

the first and in principle

Any time not spent performing

one's calling was wasted time, since that
time could have
been spent in furthering the glory of God.
For these
Puritans, time was "infinitely valuable because
every hour
lost is lost to labour for the glory of God." 161
This

concern with time did not originate with the Puritans,
but
arose instead among those other-worldly ascetics, the
Catholic monks.

162

And it was not even the Puritans who

first brought this monastic regulation of time out into the

worldly activity of men. 163

But it was the Puritans who

brought this concern with saving time to bear on worldly

activity in an ascetic manner.
Closely bound to the Puritans' concern with time was
the harsh attitude that the Puritans held toward earthly

pleasure.

Weber writes that the worldly asceticism of the

Puritans "turned with all its force against one thing: the

spontaneous enjoyment of life and all it had to offer.",164

277

The Puritans were suspicious of
pleasurable activity in
general, claims Weber, and the
"[impulsive enjoyment of
life, which leads away both
from work in a calling and from
religion, was as such the enemy
of rational asceticism." 165
This tendency of Puritanism is
exemplified in the following
quote from Baxter, as is the close
relation between this
suspicion of pleasure and the concern
with saving
time:

^

'Keep up a high esteem of time, and
be every day
y ° U l0Se n ° ne ° f
Ur
you are that you nlose none of your gold tim ^' than
and
silver.
And if vain recreation, dressings,
f eastings, idle talk, unprofitable
company,
sleep be any of them temptations to rob you or
of any
of your time, accordingly heighten your

vou\rT^

watchfulness.'

^

166

This distrustful attitude toward earthly activities
such as eating, dressing, and conversing is missing
that

counterbalancing element which created a tension in Calvin's
teachings on the pleasures of this world.

Calvin, who at

some points insisted on the utter worthlessness of earthly
life, at other points was able to claim that "[t]here is not

one little blade of grass, there is no color in the world

that is not intended to make men rejoice." (See

p.

247)

It

will be recalled that Calvin also argued that food was not

simply a necessity, but was also a source of "enjoyment and
delight," and that clothing was properly directed not toward

necessity alone, but to "comeliness and honour" as well.
I

will return to this difference between the

Puritans and Calvin shortly, but first

I

must follow the
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last lines of Weber's argument.

While this worldly

asceticism of the Puritans can be
interpreted as a safeguard
against the dangers posed to righteousness
by earthly
success, this asceticism nonetheless
complemented
the

beneficial effect which the Puritans' unique
conception of
the calling had on capitalist development.
While the
Puritan entrepreneur restlessly devoted himself
to his
calling, in order to prove his election to
salvation, he was
restrained from squandering his increasing wealth
by

Puritanical asceticism.

This asceticism, claims Weber,

"acted powerfully against the spontaneous enjoyment of

possessions; it restricted consumption, especially of
luxuries.

" 167

At an early stage of capitalist development, such

limitations of consumption helped to further that
development.

For "the inevitable practical result" of the

combination of asceticism and the idea of the calling as
proof, was the "accumulation of capital through ascetic

compulsion to save.

The restraints which were imposed upon

consumption of wealth naturally served to increase it by

making possible the productive investment of capital." 168
But as was indicated earlier, in the discussion of

contemporary Marxist perspectives on consumption (Chapter
3)

,

capitalism would eventually require an augmentation of

consumption in order to absorb excess productive capacity.
(See discussion of Aglietta's perspective on pp.

102-13 of
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Chapter 3.)

Although Weber, who wrote

Th^rotestan^thlc

years before Henry Ford's
production/consumption process
began to roll, does not deal
explicitly with capitalism's
need to promote the consumption
of commodities, he does

acknowledge that a shift from
limitation
of consumption had occurred in
capitalism.

to

augmentation

m

fact, the

requirement to consume is a principal
element of Weber's
notion of the iron cage, which he
introduced in the last few
pages of his text. The following long
quote, in which

the
idea of the cage is first mentioned,
highlights precisely
this shift from the Puritanical restriction,
to the modern
promotion, of consumption.
In Baxter's view the care for external
goods
should only lie on the shoulders of the 'saint
like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside
at
any moment'.
But fate decreed that the cloak
should become an iron cage.
Since asceticism undertook to remodel the
world and to work out its ideals in the world,
material goods have gained an increasing and
finally an inexorable power over the lives of men
as at no previous period in history. 169

There is no doubt that, for Weber, the rationally

organized capitalism of modernity is a cage in part because
it offers no options but for people to take up their roles

in this economic order.

As Weber puts it,

"The Puritan

wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so." 170
that is not all there is to the cage.

But

The concern with

"external" or "material" goods, the commodities which are

produced by this economic order, is the feature which Weber
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explicitly mentions in his discussion of the cage.

The

Puritans' light cloak of material goods has become a cage
for modern men.

Although Weber acknowledges that the religious

asceticism of the Puritans, which limited consumption, "has
escaped from the cage," 171 he does not offer any explanation
He brings up this issue of modern man's

for this escape.

enslavement to commodities, perhaps, just to point up the

difference between those conditions at the inception of the

modern period, upon which his text has focused, and the
situation in which he was writing, early in the twentieth
century.

But

I

think that there is more to this difference

than mere contrast, and that Weber brought up the issue of

modern consumption and the cage at the end of his text in
And although he

order to leave the reader with a question.

wrote that "fate decreed that the cloak should become an
iron cage,"

I

do not think Weber raised the question of how

the cloak became a cage, only to leave off his questioning

with a reference to fate.

That is,

I

do not think Weber

raises this question in the pious, humble sense in which

Augustine and Calvin raised the question of God's

predestination of men, as a sort of sacred question-mark
beyond which men should not venture.
the question, as

I

Instead, Weber raises

read him, to provoke one to think about,

and attempt to answer, it.

remainder of this chapter.

This is what

I

plan to do in the
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To begin with, one must concede
that any explanation of
the shift from the ascetic limitation
of consumption to
modern fetishistic consumption must
take into account the
needs of capitalism itself, as indicated
by those Marxists I
examined in Chapter 3. Weber would most
likely have been
willing to make such a concession.
in the final paragraph
of The Protestant Ethir, Weber states
that "it would also
further be necessary to investigate how
Protestant

asceticism was in turn influenced in its development
and its
character [and, I might add, its dissolution] by
the

totality of social conditions, especially economic." 172

it

is not as clear, however, whether Weber would
have been

willing to go so far as to concede that material conditions
outside the capitalistic production process must also be

taken into account, as

I

argued in Chapter

event, the line of inquiry

I

4.

But in any

want to follow here, in regard

to the shift from limited to frenzied consumption, is the

one which Weber "traced" in his text, the one having to do

with religious ideas.

I

think one can tease an answer to

this question about consumption out of Weber's argument
itself, when Weber's argument about Protestantism is viewed

from a different, and somewhat broader, perspective.
The broader perspective

I

have in mind here is that of

Nietzsche, who was concerned not so much with the rise of

capitalism, but with the devolution of Christianity, or as
he would put it, the history of nihilism.

Although this is
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just one among several important
differences between
Nietzsche's and Weber's perspectives,
to dwell on these
differences here would only further
complicate and confuse
the argument I am trying to make.
All I want to
do is

indicate how the implicit question with
which Weber closes
his argument in The Protestant Ethic,
can be more clearly
seen, and therefore approached, when
glimpsed from

Nietzsche's unique perspective.

I

must stress, however,

that this introduction of Nietzsche to Weber is
without
doubt an extrapolation, and that I am, in a sense,
forcing

Nietzsche to look more closely at Protestantism than he
himself was prone to do.

Unlike Weber, Nietzsche was

disgusted, not fascinated, by Protestantism.
The first point

I

want to make about Nietzsche's

perspective on Protestantism, is that he recognized it as
distinct stage in the decline of Christianity.

a

In a note

written in 1887, Nietzsche describes Protestantism as
follows

Protestantism, that spiritually unclean and boring
form of decadence in which Christianity has been
able so far to preserve itself in the mediocre
north; valuable for knowledge as something complex
and a halfway house, in so far as it brought
together in the same heads experiences of
different orders and origins.

This idea of Protestantism as a halfway house on the decline
of Christianity is quite compatible with Weber's

interpretation of Protestantism, especially in regard to
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Weber's insistence on the
importance of the doctrine of
predestination.
As

tried to emphasize in my
elaboration of Weber'
remarks on predestination, Calvin's
resurrection
I

s

of thi..s

doctrine in the troubling, disturbing
duality in which
Augustine had framed it, was a challenge
to the confident:e
and complacency which were spawned
by the sacramental
Church.

Salvation was not only thrown into
doubt, but was
explicitly denied to the majority, according
to the doctrine
as elaborated by Calvin and reiterated
by those synods which
confirmed Calvin's teaching.
(See p. 267)
From Nietzsche's
perspective, Calvin's challenge to the Catholic
Church's
long-standing rejection of the double decree can
be

interpreted as an attempt to halt the decline of
Christianity, to revive that religious intensity which

accompanies the anxious concern with salvation.
doctrine of predestination,

I

Calvin's

am suggesting, brought the

issue of the afterlife into sharp focus and held it before
men, and in this way could aid in rekindling religious

fervor.
I

174

would also like to suggest that Luther's and Calvin's

ambivalence toward earthly life, which

I

earlier discussed

at some length (but which Weber himself does not develop)

can also be interpreted in terms of the halfway house.

urging believers to both enjoy life and despise

it,

in earthly life both God's creative majesty and his

By

to see
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righteous chastisement, both of these
reformers can be seen
as trying to heighten that tension
within the Christian,
which had been weakened by Catholicism's
increasing

tolerance of worldly activity.

By attempting to retighten

the Christian ambivalence concerning
life on earth, Luther
and Calvin were trying to make the
Christian a more responsive religious instrument, one which was
closely tuned to
its involvement with the things of this
world.
I see this

heightened ambivalence of Luther and Calvin as
another way
in which they tried to revive Christianity.
But what about the worldly asceticism of the
Puritans,

which on Weber's account played an important role in
the

development of modern capitalism?

Does Nietzsche's

perspective on Protestantism have much to offer on this
feature of Protestantism?

The initial answer to these

questions would have to be "Not explicitly." But

a

more

elaborate, interesting answer to these questions can be

provided.

To do this, it will be necessary to draw out

Nietzsche even further, and to expound at some length what
appears to be nothing more than an incidental remark of
Nietzsche's. In one particular note, in which Nietzsche

criticizes German (i.e. Lutheran) Protestantism as being
stale, lazy, and comfortably relaxed, he says of

Protestantism, "A homoeopathy of Christianity is what
it." 175

Homoeopathy was a nineteenth-century medical

practice in which small doses of a poisonous drug were

I

call
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administered as a remedy for the
sick.
If administered to
the healthy, these drugs would
produce the same symptoms as
those found in the sick. 176
Now while the note in which
this remark about
homoeopathy occurs would appear to
be quite incompatible
with any discussion of Protestant
asceticism, since it
emphasizes the laziness and comfortableness
of

Protestantism, and plays on the fact that
homoeopathy uses
weak doses of drugs, I am going to argue
that this idea of
Protestantism as homoeopathy is nevertheless
helpful in
understanding worldly asceticism. One can get
around the
initial obstacle which the context of Nietzsche's
remark
poses to any discussion of asceticism by pointing
out that
Nietzsche was referring in that note to German
Lutheranism,
not the Calvinist Puritanism which Weber stressed.

The

legitimacy of expanding Nietzsche's comment on homoeopathy
to this more austere form of Protestantism will become

apparent below.
This practice of religious homoeopathy was not

something peculiar to Protestantism.

Although he does not

use this particular term to describe it, Nietzsche's account
of the activity of the "ascetic priest" in The Genealogy of

Morals provides a clear example of homoeopathy.
third essay of the Genealogy

.

In the

Nietzsche emphasizes the

importance of asceticism for the priest; it is "the main
instrument of priestcraft, the supreme guarantee of their
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power." 177

Asceticism serves as

a

guarantee of priestly

Power,

in that priests are the
best examples of those who
live according to the ascetic
ideals they espouse.
"The

ascetic priest," claims Nietzsche,
"is an incarnation of the
wish to be different," - and it
is the difference which
such
priests attain through their asceticism
that gives them
their power.
But asceticism is also the "main
instrument of
priestcraft," and by this Nietzsche means
that ascetic
ideals are employed by the priest in
his ministerial
1

activity.

it is here that the connection
between asceticism

and homoeopathy becomes clear.

For Nietzsche, the priest serves a definite

medicinal function.

"We must look upon the ascetic priest

as the predestined advocate and savior of a
sick flock," 179

writes Nietzsche.

And although he often refers to the

priest as a physician, ultimately Nietzsche rejects
this
description.

"It is scarcely correct to call him a

physician," Nietzsche says of the priest, "much as he likes
to see himself venerated as a savior.

What he combats is

only the discomfort of the sufferer, not the cause of his
suffering, not even the condition of illness itself." 180

A

more accurate description of the ascetic priest would seem
to be that of a pharmacist, or druggist.

"To be sure, he

carries with him balms and ointments." 181

And from

Nietzsche's perspective, it was Christian priests who
brought this pharmacological practice to its most highly
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developed form.

of Christianity, Nietzsche
writes,

"Never
have so many restoratives,
palliatives, narcotics been
gathered together in one place." 182

But these drugs can never result
in a cure, because
they are poisons.
» [E ]ven as he [the priest]
alleviates the
pain of his patients," claims Nietzsche,
"he pours poison
183
into their wounds."
Furthermore, in order to practice his
special skill, the priest "must first
create patients," 184

and he does so by prescribing his poisonous
drugs to the
otherwise healthy. So the homoeopathic activity
of the

priest is not focused solely on the sick; he
also strives to
gain the healthy as clients. For these reasons,
Nietzsche
writes that "wherever the ascetic priest has been
able to

enforce his treatment, the sickness has increased
alarmingly, both in breadth and depth." 185
In the Genealogy Nietzsche lists several of the

"medications" which are used by the homoeopathic priests to

create and treat their patients.

Among the wide variety

which Nietzsche finds in the priestly "cabinet of hypnotic
drugs," 186

I

would like to emphasize here just that the

ascetic ideals of the priest are part of this pharmacy.
Poverty, humility, and chastity, which Nietzsche identifies
in the Genealogy as the "three mighty slogans of the ascetic
•

ideal,"

1

87

are described in an earlier note, as "dangerous

and slanderous ideals," and as "poisons." 188

But Nietzsche

recognizes the homoeopathic benefits of these ideals, and

2

88

that "in the case of certain
illnesses" these poisonous
ideals can be "indispensable
as temporary cures." 189
So

Nietzsche was not opposed to the
homoeopathic use of
asceticism in general,™ it was
just the way in which the
priests used it which really
bothered him.

According to Nietzsche, asceticism
is one of the many
things which was "ruined by the
church's misuse of it." 191
For the Christian priests, asceticism
was not a "temporary
cure;" it was a way of life. And
this way of life was based
on a contempt for the body, the life
processes, the
sensuous.
in contrast to Arendt (but perhaps
as onesidedly)

Nietzsche found that Christians "despised
the
body; they left it out of account: more,
they treated
,

it as

an enemy."

192

Christians were characterized by a "contempt

and a deliberate desire to disregard the demands
of the
193
body."
For them, "[suffering, struggle, work, death
are
for,

considered as objections and question marks against life,
as
something that ought not to last; for which one requires
a

cure." 194

That cure, of course, is Christian asceticism; the

homoeopath's practice is thereby securely established.

The

upshot of this use of asceticism is that "at last a pale,
sickly,

idiotically fanatical creature was thought to be

perfection;" 195 and sickness triumphed over health.
To turn now to that specifically Protestant asceticism,

which so interested Weber, it should be obvious that

Nietzsche could not have held it in very high esteem.

And
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since Nietzsche did not have much
to say about Protestanti sm
generally, much less about Calvinist
Protestantism, it is
tempting to simply treat worldly
asceticism as just anothe r
weak, dilute feature of that
"spiritually unclean
and

boring" form of Christianity,
Protestantism.

But since the

purpose of this examination of Nietzsche's
perspective is to
see whether he can help to answer the
question of whether
there is any relation between the limited
consumption of
ascetic Protestantism and modern consumption,
I must spend
little more time here.
For things are more complex than
they might at first appear.

a

To begin with, it is not clear that Nietzsche
would

have had nothing besides contempt for Protestant
asceticism,
at least the asceticism of Luther and Calvin.

in fact,

I

think Nietzsche may have appreciated precisely that

ambivalence which
Calvin's writings.

I

tried to identify in Luther's and
in the Genealogy

the ascetic ideal of chastity (which

mentioned, have not discussed
chapter).

-

.

Nietzsche discusses
I,

for reasons already

see footnote 75 of this

In this discussion, he cites Luther's attitude

toward chastity with approval, because it was not
sided adoration of chastity.

a

one-

"[P]erhaps Luther's greatest

merit," wrote Nietzsche, "was to have the courage of his

sensuality." 196 For Nietzsche, "[t]here is no inherent

contradiction between chastity and sensual pleasure: every
good marriage, every real love affair transcends these
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opposite*.

197
•-

According to the context in
which the;se

remarks were made, Nietzsche seemed
to believe that Luther
had such a marriage.

Now when Nietzsche says that
these opposites are
transcended, he is not referring to
the dialectician's sense
of transcendence as aufheben,
where one of the opposed
entities is advanced or elevated, in
a new, superior form,
and the other is left behind. As I
read him, when Nietzsche
mentions the transcendence of the opposites
of chastity and
sensuality, he means the transcendence of
these things as
mutually exclusive opposites. Nietzsche
continues
his

discussion of chastity as follows:
But even in cases where a real conflict exists
between the sexual urge and chastity, the issue
fortunately, need not be tragic. At least this'
holds for all those happy, soundly constituted
mortals who are far from regarding their
precarious balance between beast and angel as an
argument against existence. The finest and most
luminous among them
have even seen in this
conflict one more enticement to life. 198
.

.

.

While Nietzsche most certainly would not have included
Luther or Calvin among the brightest lights of the soundly

constituted set (their ambivalence about earthly life was

maintained with an eye constantly toward the afterlife,
after all)

,

I

would like to assert that he nevertheless

would have appreciated their ambivalence.

The invigorating,

if ultimately misguided, effects of their taut, tense

ambivalence would not have been lost on Nietzsche.

But the

worldly asceticism of the Puritans, which smothered the
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celebratory, joyous dimension of
Calvin's and Luther's
ambivalence, is another matter.

After pointing out how the happy,
well-constituted
types could turn the conflict
between chastity
and

sensuality into an enhancement of,
or an enticement to,
life, Nietzsche describes how the
less-appealing

sorts would

approach this virtue.

"On the other hand,

it is obvious

that, once those pigs who have failed
as pigs

.

.

.

come

round to the worship of chastity, they
will view it simply
as their own opposite and will worship
it with the most
tragic grunting zeal." " i think Nietzsche
would have had
similar judgment of the severe asceticism of
1

a

the Puritans.

Their suspicion of all pleasurable activities which
might
draw from the time spent glorifying God, would surely

have

rankled Nietzsche, and in their time-saving slogans

Nietzsche would likely have heard the sgueal of swine.

For

these ascetics were so caught up in their worldly activity,
in their callings, that they had to idolize that attitude

which found life on earth to be worthless and despicable.
In this way they could go about their earthly activity with
a good conscience.

Recall that even in Weber's scheme,

worldly asceticism emerged as a ministerial tool, or drug,
which was supposed to minimize the dangers posed by the idea
of the calling as proof.

Now the fact that the asceticism of the Puritans

profited worldly activity must not be imagined to be to its
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credit when viewed from Nietzsche's
perspective.
Although
Nietzsche complained bitterly of the
other-worldliness of
traditional priestly asceticism, the
dogged, dreary pursuit
of one's calling was not an
alternative to other-worldlin

ess

which Nietzsche would have applauded.

in fact,

in the list

of drugs which he found in the
priests' medicine cabinet,

Nietzsche mentions -'mechanical activity,"
which is quite
similar to the Puritan's calling.
"Mechanical activity,
with its numerous implications (regular
performance,
punctual and automatic obedience, unvarying
routine,

a

sanctioning, even an enjoining of impersonality,
selfoblivion)

-

how thoroughly and subtly has the ascetic priest

made use of it in his battle against pain!" 200

(it will be

recalled that Luther and Calvin were pioneers in this

disciplinary use of mechanical activity, or the calling.
See pp. 231-7)

So,

from Nietzsche's position, there is not

that much which is new with worldly asceticism.

The old

ascetic slogan of poverty may have been abandoned by this
new form of asceticism, and it may have, following Luther
and Calvin, reversed the Pauline indifference to worldly
activity, but the increased dosage of mechanical activity,
in the form of the calling, made up for any decreases in

those other medications.

In the end, the patient was as

sick as ever.
Finally, and most importantly, the question must be

posed from a Nietzschean perspective, of whether there is
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any connection between the
worldly asceticism of the
Puritans and the techno-f etishism
of modernity.
Or,

alternately,

is there some sort of
unbridgeable chasm

between these two very different
attitudes toward
consumption? To answer these questions,
it must first be
pointed out that for Nietzsche, asceticism
did not end with
Christianity.
On the contrary, Nietzsche recognized
in the
most unlikely of places a new, particularly
modern form of
asceticism.
He found this asceticism in scientific
objective scholarship, which he found to be
frequently
offered as the very opposite of religious
asceticism.
"People say to me that such a counterideal [to

asceticism] exists," writes Nietzsche, "that not
only has it
waged a long, successful battle against asceticism
but to
all intents and purposes triumphed over it.

The whole body

of modern scholarship is cited in support of this." 201
for Nietzsche,

"[t]he case is exactly opposite of what is

claimed here: scholarship

.

of the ascetic ideal but,

in fact,

form." 202

But

.

.

represents not the opposite
its noblest and latest

It is the commitment of these scholars to the

ideal of truth which gives them away as ascetics.

For in

their pursuit of scientific truth, modern scholars adopt

their own unique ascetic regime: "[i]t is necessary that the
emotions be cooled, the tempo slowed down, that dialectic be
put in place of instinct, that seriousness set its face on

stamp and gesture." 203

"As for the absolute will to truth
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which begets such abstinence, it
is nothing other than a
belief in the ascetic ideal in its
most radical form," 20 *
charges Nietzsche.
As

stated at the very beginning of
this examination
of technology, however, my concern
is not with science and
the values which underlie it.
I am concerned, instead,
with
the value which underlies the
consumption of technology, a
value I have identified as convenience.
What I would now
like to suggest is that this value of
convenience, like the
value or ideal of scientific truth, can be
shown
I

to be the

value of another late form of asceticism.

In other words,

my claim is that techno-f etishism is asceticism.

Now

I

am

sure that this claim must appear even more
implausible than
Nietzsche's unusual interpretation of science as
asceticism
-

at least scientists reject the testimony of their
senses

in their search for truth.

The modern consumer of

technology, however, would appear to be a slave to his

senses and pleasurable sensations.

Fast food, constant

audio and visual entertainment, comfortable travel, and all
of these comforts in a wide variety to choose from, would

hardly seem to indicate an ascetic lifestyle.

On the

contrary, modernity would appear to be characterized by the

constant titillation of the senses, the maximization of
pleasure, the refusal to deny anything to the self.

How can

anyone possibly interpret this age of bliss as one which

contains any trace of asceticism?
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My response to this question
would be to ask some
different ones: How can one
imagine that asceticism, which
had been practiced and perfected
for millennia by various
priests, was overcome completely
and permanently with the
eclipse of religious belief, or
the death of God, to use
Nietzsche's notorious phrase? Can
one really accept that
the tremendous self-loathing which
produced Christianity,
according to Nietzsche, has been
extinguished by that God's
demise? Anyone who is at all receptive
to Nietzsche's
sensitive, perhaps hyper-sensitive,
examination of
asceticism would seem to me to have trouble
imagining that
modernity had gotten over this particularly
human sickness.
But even so, there is still quite a big step
to be taken to
get from the suspicion that asceticism must still
be lurking
in modernity,

to the conclusion that the consumption of

modern technology is one of the forms which it has assumed.

Weber's argument about worldly asceticism, when read through

Nietzschean lenses, seems to me to help bridge this gap.
As

I

have already mentioned, Calvin's insistence on

predestination as

a

double decree, and his and Luther's

ambivalence toward earthly life, can be interpreted as
efforts to preserve Christianity; in this sense,

Protestantism can be seen as a "halfway house." But these
efforts of the reformers were bound to fail; their medicine
was too strong and their patients too sick to ever achieve
cure.

a

In fact, new medications were required to counter the
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deleterious effects of those harsher
drugs.
The calling as
proof of salvation, and the severe
attitude toward earthly
Pleasures, were antidotes used by
Puritan ministers to
counter the prescriptions of Calvin,
and to a lesser degree,
Luther. Worldly asceticism, like
the asceticism of earlier
priests, was homoeopathic medicine,
the application
of

poisons to sick people

-

but it was, despite appearances to

the contrary, a weaker form of medication
than its
predecessors.
it allowed Christians to throw
themselves
without compunction into worldly activity.
Charitable works
were no longer the hallmark of Christian
activity;

successful business enterprises became the sign
of God's
presence in the world. Even though the Puritans
limited the
enjoyment of earthly activities and things, their
asceticism

provided proof of immortality, of the eventual relief from
the toils and troubles of mortal existence.
But even this weaker form of asceticism could not stop

the progress of the nihilistic disease.

Faith in God, or in

the possibility of immortality, which was both the premise
and promise of the Christian God, eventually became

untenable.

This is not to say that people are no longer

willing to profess their faith, either by celebrating
rituals with other believers in some church congregation, or
by sending checks to the saints of the television

satellites.

What

I

am saying is that in the most developed

of those cultures in which Christianity flourished, man's
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earthly activity, by and large, is
no longer undertaken with
a view to heavenly immortality.
The idea of immortality has
receded from the forefront of the
modern horizon; it is no
longer a guiding principle of
human actions
on,

earth.

For now,

I

and beyond,

am going to simply assert this
claim

about the demise of Christianity,
which is sure to be
rejected by some, although evidence,
if not proof, of this
claim could be offered. My argument
presupposes that this
claim will not present a stumbling block
to most
readers.

To continue this line of assertions,

I

want to further

claim that even though God may have receded
or retreated
from the modern world, the need for a God
remains.
Men have
not become well, in the Nietzschean sense that
they celebrate their mortality, their embodiment, their senses,
both

pleasurable and painful.

All of these human conditions

still remain a source of anxiety to men, but the projection
of this anxiety into a supersensuous realm of immortality,

access to which is determined by God, will no longer suffice
to comfort men.

A new drug is needed; a new ascetic

practice is required.

My claim is that convenience is that

drug, and the consumption of technology is that practice.

As

I

argued earlier, when

I

challenged Arendt's

interpretation of modernity, the tremendous productive

capacity of modernity, and the heightened concern for

maintaining and increasing that capacity, are not
indications of any modern "reverence for the body."

On the
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contrary, if one takes into account
what it is that is
consumed by modern producers, it becomes
apparent, at least
to me, that modernity is characterized
by a certain
revulsion against the body, mortality,
and necessity.
The
demands of the body, which were ignored
or strictly

regulated by Christian asceticism, in both
its monastic and
Puritanical forms, are no longer something
to be neglected
or restricted.
Instead, they have become, to recall the
distinction I introduced earlier, limits imposed
by the

body.

And the overcoming of these limits is the value
of
convenience, in the particularly modern sense of this

word.

The asceticism which

I

am trying to identify may

appear, at first glance, to be the opposite of its

Puritanical predecessor.

The latter restricted consumption,

while modern asceticism, as

I

have stretched the term, is

based on continually increasing consumption.

But there are

certain similarities between the halfway house of worldly

asceticism and modern techno-f etishism, aside from their
relation to human mortality.

The Puritans' concern for

saving time, for not wasting a moment, is also present,

although in an altered form, in modern asceticism.

For the

Puritan, any time spent outside of the performance of one's

calling was, strictly speaking, wasted time.

For moderns,

it is not time spent away from the calling which must be

minimized, but time spent in the satisfaction of the demands
of the body.

I

have already discussed as examples of this
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attitude toward time, certain
developments in the production
and preparation of food, and the
means of transportation
(although I earlier emphasized
the material conditions of
the United States as a factor
in that modern
attitude)

Here,

let me just mention that the
body's demands for

clothing (e.g. shopping by phone or
mail on credit) and
shelter (e.g. pre-f abricated homes,
maintenance-free
condominiums) have also become satisfied
much more quickly
in modernity than ever before.
Along with the material

and

economic conditions which played a role in
this "saving" of
time, there is also this element of modern
asceticism.
Just as there is no proof which is available
to

convince modern Christians that God has retreated
from the
world, there is no way to prove to the techno-f
etishist that

modern consumption practices have anything to do with the
death of God.
But here, too, evidence is available.
Such
evidence will be presented in the following, final chapter
of this text.

But

I

want to close this chapter with

a

brief

examination of one particularly ironic example of such
evidence.

Early in The Protestant Ethic

,

Weber offers the

writings of Benjamin Franklin as "a document of that
[capitalist] spirit which contains what we are looking for
in almost classical purity." 205

In Franklin's books of

ethical maxims, Weber finds examples of the worldly

asceticism of Puritanism, without that religious context.
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For Weber, Franklin is on the
ousp; he represents the
transition from the age in which
a oaliing was pursued
for
religious reasons, to the age of
the cage, in whioh a
calling is pursued for utilitarian
reasons, if indeed, there
is any choice involved at all.

For Franklin, the successful
pursuit of a calling was
not undertaken to prove one's
predestination to salvation,
206
nor was wealth accumulated in order
to provide for a
life of leisure and comfort. According
to Weber, Franklin
valued the accumulation of wealth in itself,
and not for
what it could prove or provide. Weber
describes the

transitional character of Franklin's ethic as
follows:
the earning of more and more money, combined
with
the strict avoidance of all spontaneous
enjoyment
of life, is above all completely devoid of any
eudaemonistic, not to say hedonistic, admixture.
It is thought of so purely as an end in itself,
that from the point of view of the happiness of,
or utility to, the single individual, it appears
entirely transcendental and absolutely irrational.
Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. 207

Now even though Franklin may have abandoned the

Calvinism of his parents, his advice on how to accumulate

wealth sounded somewhat like those Calvinist ministers, such
as Baxter, whom Weber cited to elucidate Puritan asceticism.

In Franklin's Necessary Hints to Those That Would be Rich
(1736)

and Advice to a Young Tradesman (1748), which Weber

quotes at length in his text, there is that concern with
time which characterized Puritan asceticism, but for
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Franklin time was valuable not
because it could be spent
glorifying God through one's calling.
Instead, Franklin
claimed "that time is money. He
that can earn ten shillings
a day by his labour, and goes
abroad, or sits idle,
one half

of that day,

.

five shillings.

.

has really spent< or rather thrown

.

.

.

«*»

In a later> widely rea(J essa

^

entitled "The Way to Wealth," Franklin
is even more emphatic
about the value of time.
* ut doest thou love Life then do
n ot swuander
,
Time, for that's the stuff Life jj wa H»
Poor Richard says.
... if Time be of all
the most precious, wasting Time must be, as Things
Poor
Richard says, the greatest p ro digality.*09

^

In this same essay, Franklin also discusses
that other

dimension of Protestant asceticism, restricted consumption.

Although Weber does not cite this essay, and does not
really
discuss Franklin's attitude toward consumption, there is
a
particular passage from it which supports Weber's
interpretation of Franklin as a sort of non-religious
ascetic, and also serves my argument about modern

asceticism.

Here you are all got together at this Vendue of
Fineries and Knicknacks
You call them Goods but
if you do not take Care, they will prove Evils to
some of you.
You expect they will be sold cheap
and perhaps they may for less than they cost; but
if you have no Occasion for them, they must be
dear to you. Remember what Poor Richard says, Buy
what thou hast no Need of. and ere long thou shalt
sell thv Necessaries / "
.

,

,

1

In this warning against excessive consumption, Franklin

employs the necessary/artificial distinction which has
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surfaced in various places and forms
throughout my essay.
Of those goods mentioned in the
above guote, Franklin
continues, "These are not the Necessaries
of Life; they can
scarcely be called the Conveniences,
and yet only because
they look pretty, how many want to have
them.
The
artificial Wants of Mankind thus become more
numerous than
211
the natural."
Franklin recognized in this increase of
wants a certain danger, as did the Calvinist
ministers, and
he warns against this trend.

He is especially suspicious of

the purchase of such goods or commodities on
terms of
credit.

"But what Madness must it be to run in Debt for

these Superfluities!" 212

warns Franklin.

So in both his concern with wasted time and his

restrictive attitude toward consumption, Franklin does
appear to be advocating a form of asceticism which closely
resembles the worldly asceticism of Puritanism.

But

I

want

to suggest that Franklin was not simply a Puritan stripped
of his religious foundation, as Weber seems to suggest.

Franklin was indeed ascetic,

I

want to argue, but he

displays elements of the modern asceticism
bring to light.

I

am trying to

(Franklin's disdain for consumption on

credit is not one of these modern elements.)
A first glimpse of this asceticism can be found in the

above quote concerning necessity and artificiality, where

Franklin seems to be saying that if such goods were

definitely among the "Conveniencies,

"

then they would be
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less artificial, or more necessary,
and would therefore be
less troubling or dangerous.
Franklin's notion of necessity
seems to be expanding to include
the need for convenience.
This impression from the quote
is further supported by
the
fact that about midway through
his life, at the age of
forty-two, Franklin appears to have
undergone a shift in his
attitude toward time. At this point,
Franklin retired from
his printing business, although he
still received a share of
that business' profits for many years
afterwards. 213

Franklin no longer spent his time in the
pursuit of wealth,
as he had advised others.
In a letter to a friend, written
in the year in which he retired,
Franklin describes his

new

life as follows:

Thus you see I am in a fair way of having no
other
tasks, than such as I shall like to give myself,
and of enjoying what I look upon as a great
happiness, leisure to read, study, make experiments, and converse at large with such ingenious
and worthy men, as are pleased to honour me with
their friendship or acquaintance, on such points
as may produce something for the common benefit of
mankind.

Franklin even urged friends to follow his example.

In

another letter to another friend, he asked,
By the way, when do you intend to live - i.e. to
enjoy life.
will you retire to your villa,
give yourself repose, delight in viewing the
operations of nature in the vegetable creation,
assist her in her works, get your ingenious
friends at times about you, make them happy with
your conversation, and enjoy theirs: or, if
alone, amuse yourself with your books and elegant
collections. 2
.

.
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This advice concerning the economy
of time is certainly
quite different than that offered by
either Richard Baxter,
Weber's prototypical Calvinist, or
Poor Richard, Weber's
model of the ascetic entrepreneur.
Both of these ascetics
would have looked upon the advice
of the retired, leisurely
Franklin as an invitation to waste time.
Retire to your
villa? Give yourself repose? Amuse
yourself with books and
collections? Such activity, or lack of
activity, would not
have augmented the glory of God, according
to Baxter, nor
would it have augmented one's wealth, as Poor
Richard says.
But for the mature Franklin, such leisurely
pursuits were

not a waste of time, because they were all directed
toward
the "common benefit of mankind."
For Franklin, mankind could be served not just by the

successful performance of an earthly calling, such as his

business as a printer prior to retirement.

Mankind could

also benefit from the scientific investigation of the laws
of nature, and the application of those laws to man's

earthly condition.

Franklin valued that time which he spent

performing experiments and designing "improvements" for
mankind, and retired so that he would have more of such
time.

Even though his retirement was disrupted by his full

and varied career in public service, Franklin nevertheless

became a prominent figure in eighteenth-century "natural
philosophy," and designed several important devices over the
course of his life.

A brief examination of some of these
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devices will make it clearer what
Franklin had in mind when
he wrote about the common benefit
of mankind.
Borrowing from German designs,
Franklin developed a
wood-burning stove which became enormously
popular.
The
advantages of the "Pennsylvania
fireplace," or Franklin
stove, as it came to be known, were
many, according
to a

pamphlet which Franklin wrote to promote
its sale. 216 But
the principal benefit of the stove was
that it was much more
efficient than an open fire.

Franklin's design made use of

the hot gases which, in a common fireplace,
rise directly
into the chimney.
Franklin's stove, those gases were
used to heat a thick metal plate, which in turn
heated the
air above and around it.
The result was »[t]hat your whole

m

Room is equally warmed; so that People need not croud
(sic)
so close round the Fire, but may sit near the Window,
and

have the Benefit of the Light for Reading, Writing,
Needlework, &c.

They may sit with Comfort in any Part of

the Room, which is a very considerable Advantage in

a

large

Family, where there must often be two Fires kept, because
all cannot conveniently come at one." 217
In other words, the stove freed people from the hearth,

and allowed them to go about other activities in the heated
room.

Staying warm was no longer as much of a burden, and

the stove saved some of the time that had been taken up by
the body's demand for heat.

And since these stoves were

more efficient and used less wood than fireplaces, they also
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shortened the amount of time that
one had to spend moving
wood about to feed the fire.
The stoves were also easier
light and were safer than open
fires.
conclusion,
Franklin says of the stove, "With
all these Conveniences,
you do not lose the pleasing
Sight nor Use of

t

m

the Fire, as
in the Dutch Stoves, but may
boil the Tea-Kettle, warm thle

Flat-irons, heat Heaters, keep warm
a Dish of Victuals by
setting it on the Top, &c & c." 218
so besides heating
bodies, the stove could simultaneously
be used to help
perform other household tasks. it is in
this sense of
improving efficiency in the necessary
activity of the
household, of speeding things up, that the
Franklin stove
can be described as a convenience.
.

Franklin, as is well known, was also a pioneer
in the
study of electricity, and here too he put this
knowledge in
the service of convenience.

Aside from his invention of the

lightning rod, Franklin also used his knowledge of

electricity to kill animals that were to be eaten.

One

advantage of electrocution was that it resulted in
immediate, sudden death, and was therefore more humane than

other methods.

But electrocution also helped to minimize

the time that meat had to hang in order to become tender.
"The flesh of animals, fresh-killed in the usual manner, is
firm, hard and not in a very eatable state

..."

wrote

Franklin to some friends, but "in its progress towards

putrefaction

.

.

.

the flesh becomes what we call tender, or
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is in that state most proper
to be used as our food." 2 "

But

when the animal is electrocuted
in the manner which Franklin
fully described, "the putrefaction
sometimes proceeds with
surprising
verity. ,|220 p
or t?v-=~t,i
For
y celeritv
Franklin, this acceleration of
"putrefaction" was the chief
recommendation for electric
slaughtering.
•

It is also interesting to note
that Franklin was a
leader in making the production and
storage of electricity

more convenient in itself.

The first experiments with

electricity were performed with the "Leyden
jar," a glass
tube which was rubbed with a piece of silk,
which thereby
condensed the electric charge. Soon after
Franklin received
such a tube from a friend in England, he wrote
back to that
friend that
the European papers on Electricity, frequently
speak of rubbing the tube, as a fatiguing
exercise.
Our spheres are fixed on iron axes,
which pass through them. At one end of the axis
there is a small handle, with which you turn the
sphere like a common grindstone. This we find
very commodious, as the machine takes up but
little room, is portable, and may be enclosed in
tight box, when not in use. 221

a

Franklin and his American colleagues, therefore, not only

performed experiments along the lines which had been
established in Europe; they also facilitated the performance
of such experiments by creating portable generators.

Franklin even turned his invention of the lightning rod
into a device for speeding up the investigation of

electricity, and he did so in a manner which indicates the
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direction in which the development
of electricity would be
carried out. One of the lightning
rods on Franklin's house
in Philadelphia ran not to
the ground outside the house,
to
render lightning harmless, but
ran instead into the hou
itself, and then to a ground.
Franklin attached two bell s
to the wire running through his
house, and these sounded
whenever an electrical charge was
being drawn through the
lightning rod.
in a letter describing this
arrangement,
Franklin claimed to have "frequently
drawn sparks and
charged bottles" from this device. 222
Through this
technique, Franklin eliminated the necessity
of rubbing the
bottle or turning the crank; all he had
to do to acquire a
charge for his experiments was draw off
electricity which
was generated in the atmosphere. And Franklin's
device even
notified him when it was time to charge his bottles,

so that

he did not have to spend time waiting for the
proper moment.
I

would like to mention one last example of Franklin's

inventiveness, an example which comes from the realm of

transportation technology, which was discussed in the
previous chapter.

Upon his return to the United States

after many years service as the American ambassador to
France, Franklin designed a sedan chair which was used to

move him about the city of Philadelphia.

While there is

nothing truly innovative here, since such conveyances had
been developed over a century before in Europe, there is

something about Franklin's use of the sedan chair which
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illuminates the point

I

am trying to make.

Early in the

seventeenth century, John Winthrop,
the Puritan governor of
Massachusetts Bay Colony, had
refused to accept the gift of
a sedan chair, and even
toward the end of that century,
horse drawn carriages were frowned
upon in Boston as things
of this world only. 223 Roughly
a century
later, however,

Franklin had no religious compunction
about such worldly
things as sedan chairs.
indeed, Franklin wrote that he
wished "I had brought with me from
France a balloon
sufficiently large to raise me from the
ground.

in my

malady it would have been the most easy
carriage for me,
being led by a string held by a man walking
on the

ground." 224

Such a wish would most likely have been
worthy
of punishment in seventeenth-century New
England, but it was
appropriate and prescient in eighteenth-century

Philadelphia.
My point in discussing Franklin is not to contradict

Weber's interpretation of him as an entrepreneurial ascetic.
My claim is not that Franklin was, contra Weber,
libertine, or a lover of luxury.

a

For those devices which

Franklin invented and developed were not, in his eyes,
"superfluities" of the sort which he warned against in his
books of ethical maxims.

If these things were not absolute

necessities, they were "conveniencies,

"

and as such they

were valid and valuable, as the quote several pages above
indicated.
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do want to point out, however,
that Franklin was not
as free from religion as Weber's
portrayal of him implies.
Although Franklin claimed to have
abandoned religious
I

disputation early in his career, 225
toward the end of his
life he did set down his religious
beliefs in a letter to
Ezra Stiles, the President of Yale
College.
in that letter,
written a month before his death, Franklin
claimed »[t]hat
the most acceptable Service we render
to him [i.e.
God]

is

doing good to his other Children," and
»[t]hat the soul of
Man is immortal, and will be treated with
Justice in another
Life respecting its Conduct in this." 226

These beliefs,

based as they are on the idea that earthly works
have some
bearing on one's salvation, fly in the face of the
doctrine
of predestination and the reformers' denigration of
good

works.

But what

want to stress is not simply the fact

I

that Franklin completely abandoned the Calvinism of his
parents.

Rather,

I

want to emphasize that Franklin's

inventiveness, his skill at applying scientific knowledge to

make man's life on earth more convenient and comfortable,
had a religious sanction.

In providing,

for the "common

benefit of mankind," devices such as efficient stoves and

lightning rods, Franklin was not concerned with making
money, as one might expect given Weber's argument.

In fact,

Franklin refused to accept patents on his inventions. 227
Instead, Franklin's motives were other worldly; his concern

was with the salvation of his soul, not earthly treasures.
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From Weber's perspective, as

I

mentioned above,

Benjamin Franklin was a transitional
figure.
to Weber the worldly asceticism
of the

He represents

Puritans, without

that religious foundation.

And for Weber, the worldly

asceticism of Franklin was eventually
eclipsed in the modern
[c]age.
From my perspective, as well, Franklin
is on the

cusp, but for me he represents a new
form of asceticism, as
well as a certain utilitarian religion.
And as I interpret

modernity, even though the religious concern
with an
afterlife may have waned, the new form of
asceticism has
flourished as more and more time has been saved
from bodily
necessity.
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Calvin, Institutes
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vol.

2,

111.
Augustine,
Charity.), trans.

vol.

pp.

19 of The Great Books,

193-4.

Enchiridion (also known as Faith. Honp
Bernard M. Peebles, in vol. 2
Fathers of the Church Series (Washington: The of The
Catholic
University of America Press, 1947), p. 449.

and

112.
Augustine, Against Jul ian trans. Matthew A.
Schumacker, vol. 3 5 of The Fathers of the Church Series
(New
York: Fathers of the Church, Inc. 1957), p. 258.
f

113.
Calvin points out that Augustine held, for a while
the mistaken position that God's foreknowledge of men's
deeds was the basis of predestination, but upon making
"greater progress in the knowledge of Scripture, he not only
retracted it as evidently false, but powerfully confuted
it." Calvin, Institutes, vol. 2, p. 552.
Schaff points out
that the pre-Augustinian Fathers of the Church (i.e.
Tertullian, Ambrose, and Jerome), along with Pelagius, held
a view of predestination which made it dependent on God's
foreknowledge of men's deeds. Schaff, vol. 3, p. 852.

114.
For Augustine's comments on the significance of the
choice between Jacob and Esau, see Augustine, Enchiridion
In this section, Augustine expounds upon Paul's
p. 4 50-2.
use of this incident from Genesis in his instructions to the
Romans.
,

115.

Ibid., p. 453.
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116.

Ibid., p. 451.

And again on p. 452

Auaustin^

This reading of Augustine's doctrine
117
of
predestination, as including the saved
and
the
damned icertainly questionable. After all,
this doctrine was 'the
source of controversy within the Church
for a century after
Augustine's death.
(More on this will follow in the
text
But I think it is a defensible reading.
Philip Schaff in
CU
n
Augus
conce P t?
of prostration
(Schaff vol.
(Schaff,
vor Ill,
i?i pp. 851-6)? offers a seemingly
opposite
interpretation of the doctrine. Schaff claiml
that
Augustine, "strictly speaking, knows nothing
of a double
Q eC 10n and ^probation, but
recognizes
simply a
}
fitnlll
l
decree of* election
to salvation." p. 853.
And a little
Writ
Hnie
has reference only
! f
M'« p. predestination
to good, not
to evil."
854.
Schaff acknowledges,
however, that Augustine does indeed mention
the
"predestination to perdition" in several places.
pp
F * 8 54-5
note 1 on p. 869.
I agree with Schaff 's point that God
did not,
to Augustine, predestine some to commit sins. As according
will be
mentioned in the text, Augustine rejected the claim that
his
doctrine of predestination undermined men's personal
responsibility for, and the punishment of, their sins on
earth.
But one can maintain that some were predestined to
damnation, on account of Adam's sin, without making any
claims about the particular sins of particular men. After
all, according to the doctrine of predestination, even when
limited to salvation alone, men's deeds have no bearing on
predestination.
The crux of the conflict in these interpretations of
Augustine seems to run back to the question of whether man's
damnation through Adam can be interpreted as being
predestined or not.
If the fall was not predestined (the
infralapsarian position), then the damnation of Adam's
progeny would also seem not to be predestined. If one sides
with the supralapsarian perspective, however, and sees the
fall as predestined by God, then the damnation of man would
be predestined as well.
Applying these latter terms of
debate to Augustine's position, Schaff argues that Augustine
was of the infralapsarian camp, "though logical instinct
does sometimes carry him to the verge of supralapsarianism.
)

^r

-

L

'

p.

853.

What I would like to suggest is that by leaving aside
the question of whether or not Adam's fall was predestined,
the two conflicting interpretations of Augustine's
predestination can find some common ground, besides the
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point that Augustine did not
completely
men *from
responsibility for their cine "'{^eteiy absolve mon

taught that man, since Adam*s
SSl Regardless
uegaraiess ofwnSh
of whether or
not this was predestinpH^
it
"by [Augustine-sfpecSuir view
connection between Adam and the race h inseparable
,
man as it were responsible for
the ran of Adam »

^

%

T/l

punitive justice of God." pp. 853-4.
At this point, the question becomes
not whether Adam
sin was predestined, but whether the
term predestination
be used to describe the damnation of
Adah's
Augustine himself used the term, on occasion,he^rsslnSe
to refer to
the damned (see, e.g., Enchiridion,
p. 454), I think an
a
rma tive a nsW e r to this question is defensible.
And
"i U
C
ff 7° U1
° bjeCt t0 this USa ^ e
1 think he would
^ are so not
agree ?hJ
that the damned
because of their sinstheir damnation was determined in advance. And
this is the
X
ant t0 stress in m y discussion of predestination,
P
°i
u
^w
not whether Adam's sin was predestined.
For my part, I would have to concede to Schaff
some men are predestined to damnation, according to that if
Augustine, they are not damned gratuitously. The damnation
is a just punishment for Adam's sin.
I have already
conceded this point in the text.
'

a^

^

'

118.
The controversy at the monastery in Hadrumetum, which
elicited Augustine's Admonition and Grace (see note 86), was
based on this polemical interpretation of Augustine's
doctrine of predestination. Some monks used that doctrine
to question the practice of admonishing those monks who
seemed to be weakening in their devotion to God. Since some
were predestined to damnation, argued these recalcitrant
monks, there was no point in punishing them or admonishing
them.
Augustine rejected this conclusion, and replied:
"Whenever you fail to follow the known commands of God and
are unwilling to be admonished, you are for this very reason
to be admonished, that you are unwilling to be admonished."
Admonit ion and Grace pp. 250-1. For another example of
Augustine's rejection of this mistaken inference from his
doctrine, see Enchiridion pp. 452-3.
,

,

119.

Schaff, p. 856.

120.

Ibid., pp. 863-5.
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121.

Ibid., p. 865.
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124.

Schaff, p. 864.

S^

This troubling inference which

^edesffii^^as
ex^essed tn*l
expressed
in a much-discussed anonymous
"Proedestmatus," which was written aftertract entitled
Auaustino'*
around 460. The document is written
asthoSgS
Augustine
were the author, and presents a caricature
of
Augustine
-s
doctrine of predestination, which it then
refutes

^ 5I h

.

°f

'

Aquinas, teaching on predestination, see
pp. 257-9
rega
to the ide * that salvation was
available
avaUablf to I?i
all, Aquinas' teachings on the role
of Christ
are relevant
"Now to unite men to God in a perfecting
way
*
belongs to Christ, through Whom men are
reconciled to God
according to II Cor. 5.19: -God was in Christ
reconciling
the world to Himself.' And, consequently,
Christ alone is
at ° r f G ° d
men SlnCe b V His d ^th He
°
rPrnE^
'frl!
reconciled
the i
human race to God." Summa Theolog
i^, vol
20 of The Great Books, p. 845.
(my emphasis)
in
passage, Aquinas expresses the Catholic dictum thatthis
Christ
died for all men.

S

^

?

:

^

'

126.
Schaff, pp. 867, 879.
Schaff notes that despite the
prevalence of what he calls "Semi-Augustinianism, " there
remained over the years proponents of a more stringent,
strict Augustinianism, among whom were Wycliffe and Huss
"the precursors of the Reformation." p. 870.
127.

Calvin, Institutes

,

vol. 2, pp. 533-4.

128.
Ibid., p. 560.
The language Calvin uses to describe
this attitude toward predestination is confusing, in light
of Aquinas' distinction between predestination and
reprobation.
Calvin writes: "Many professing a desire to
defend the Diety from an invidious charge admit the doctrine
of election [i.e. predestined election to salvation], but
deny that any one is reprobated [i.e. predestined to
reprobation]." p. 560. Although in the absence of my
brackets, Aquinas would appear to be excluded from this
group, since he does acknowledge that the damned are
reprobated, the context in which Calvin makes this remark
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indicates that Aquinas is indeed nart
Calvin is criticizing
? Z

L

129.

n-F

•

Calvin, Institutes, vol.

2,

p.

that arou P which

561.

entari
ed and trans. Joseph
jalt^n CalVin ?°r
b ° rati n With L ° Uise **tibone
Smith,
vol xx?
if ?hfT^
2 Christian
Library of
Classics
^
TShn^iiv?
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
1948)
ch VII
'

-

,

'

"Election and Predestination,"

p.

298.

Calvin, Institutes

2,

p.

131.

132.

,

vol.

561.

Ibid., p. 560.

This is the term Weber uses to describe
133.
the doctrine
of predestination, in specific reference
to Calvin.
xvxn.
See
see
Weber, p. 102.
134.

Ibid.

135.

Quoted in Weber,

136.

Ibid., p.

See also note 36 of Chapter IV,
pp. 226-7.

137.
Aquinas,
pp. 880-1.

p.

104.

Summa Theolocn

138.

Weber, p. 128.

139.

Ibid., p.

140.

Calvin, Institutes

141.

Ibid.

142

Weber, P- 110.

.

100.

r

vol. 20 of The Great Books

110.

143.

Ibid.

P-

112

144.

Ibid.

P-

114.

145.

Ibid.

pp.

,

vol. 2, p. 290.

.

114-5.

146.
Ibid., p. 114.
Calvin also claimed that "[t]he
special election which otherwise would remain hidden in God,
he at lenqth manifests by his calling." Institutes vol. 2,
But in this context, Calvin is using calling in the
p. 580.
sense of God's communication to man, and not in the sense of
one's earthly occupation.
In the same chapter, Calvin
.
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writes that "the nature and
dispensation of callina

147.

Weber, p.

us.

^•no^S^-c^iv^p?^!
149.
585,

Calvin, Institutes, vol.
vwx.

2

<s

,

ChaPter

do
pp.

530-1
Dju-i.

"

°" P

-

q ee
q
=n
s
also
p.

150.
Weber, p. 161.
Weber notes the similarity between
these Calvinist ideas and the
contemporaneous
thG division of labor (p. 161), utilitarian
and insist
that the latter were derived from the
former
See note 33
of Chapter V, on pp. 265-6.

fEF'JFVE
151.

Ibid., p.

152.

Ibid.

153.

Ibid., pp.

154.

Ibid., pp. 159-60.

162.

177-8.

155.
Michael Walzer, The Revolu tion of Saints: A
Study in
the Origins of Radical Politics ^r^hriH
H-ir-nrd
University Press, 1965), pp. 217-9, 226-7. Although
arguments in general are guite distinct, Walzer does, their
at one
point, agree with the claim made by Weber, that the
Puritans
•in some fashion mediated" the transition from
traditional
to modern society.
Walzer, p. 230.
In the sixth chapter of
The Revolution of Saints entitled "The New World of
Discipline and Work," Walzer indicates that the discipline
of the Puritans was not directed solely at themselves, but
was also focused on those selves which had not yet assumed
the form of the disciplined subject of modernity.

r

.

,

156.
Weber indicates that Lutherans freguently charged
Calvinists with returning to the Catholic idea of salvation
by works.
See Weber, p. 115.

157.

Ibid., pp. 156-7.

158.

Ibid., p. 157.

159.

Ibid.

160.

Ibid.

161.

Ibid., p.

158.
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In an essa y entitled
"Labor Time in the VriSJ'."
2 the
Crisls
of
Fourteenth Centurv
?
rZr^i% points out
LeGoff
that in the regulation of time
"the
Church took initiatives. Monks
esoeciallv
masters in the use of schedules "
•

4.

jSl

^rnif'

^

LeGoff makes the case that sometime
around the
fourteenth century, Christian merchants
began
to develop a
"temporal horizon" which differed from
tha?
of
the Church
The episodic, cyclical sense of time
which was held by the
Church, and was institutionalized in the
ringing of bells
for the canonical offices, was unable
to provide ?he
10 an r gUl
itY WhiGh WSre r^ir-ed by merchants.
LeGof? pp. 35-6.
?
?f
LeGoff,
It was in the fourteenth century,
partlv
y
to th ls
p
rcantilistic need and due
part,
to t^
d^i
,
the development of accurate mechanical clocks,
that the
day was divided into twenty-four equal parts.
ibid
48-9.
LeGoff also points out that the late medieval' pp
merchant used this measurable sense of time not only
to
regulate his business activity and labor force, but
that he
also "introduced his business organization into everyday
life and regulated his conduct according to a schedule."
For LeGoff, this marks "a significant secularization of
the
monastic manner of regulating the use of time." Ibid.,
p.
163

^ ^

r

'

'

51

It would seem, therefore, that the Puritans were not
the first to regulate time outside of the monastery.
I
think Weber would have acknowledged that these merchants of
the late Middle Ages were part of that "well-beaten track"
which the Puritans followed. But the differences between
the medieval merchant and the Puritan entrepreneur, is that
for the latter, the regulation of his time was part of an
ascetic practice, while for the former, part of his schedule
included "the time of rest
., diversion, and visiting,
the leisure and social life of men and substance." Ibid.,
As will be indicated immediately below in the text,
p. 51.
Puritan asceticism viewed such leisure and diversion as a
waste of time, and urged that such activities be kept to a
minimum.
Since I will have no other opportunity in this essay
for considering LeGoff s writings, I must mention one more
of his insights - a particularly fascinating one from the
perspective I have been developing. In an essay entitled
"Merchant's Time and Church's Time in the Middle Ages,"
LeGoff relates the development of late medieval
.

.
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selling what does not belong to him."
ibid
LeGoff further argues that in
response'to
this thr^twhich was posed to the Church by the
development
of
11
11 ™'
ChUrCh n0t
Elaborated
a
"theologicoSSST
M
U

^

° depl °^ d the ""ra
orconfessiL°to ^i P assimilate the
merchant and his new
sense It ?tS2
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'
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alS

of time.
Ibid., p. 38.
Around the twelfth centurv
claims LeGoff, penance shifted from
"external sanct^n to'
internal contrition." Confession became
a way
discovering "internal dispositions to sin and of
redemption
dispositions rooted in concrete social and
professional
situations." Ibid., p. 39. The merchant had
to
conscious of his intentions and dispositions in become
that
temporal activity which threatened to develop
outside the
purview of the Church. From LeGoff «s perspective
sacrament of confession, which it will be recalled, the
became
institutionalized by the Church in the thirteenth century
(see p. 252 of this chapter), helped to close "the
merchant's loophole" and reunite "the time of salvation and
the time of business." Ibid.
164.

Weber, p. 166.

165.

Ibid., p.

166.

Quoted by Weber, in note 14 of Chapter

167.

Ibid., p.

171.

168.

Ibid., p.

172.

169.

Ibid., p.

181.

170.

Ibid.

167.
V,

p.

261.

171.
Ibid.
This is the only other reference to the cage
which Weber makes in his text, and it immediately follows
that long quote which is cited on p. 279 of this chapter.
The complete sentence reads:
"To-day the spirit of
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Ibid., p.
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183.

173
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Win
Kaufmann trans. Kaufmann and R. J. to Power, ed Walter
Vintage Books, 1968), note 88, p. 54.Hollingdale New York1

I am aware that Nietzsche
174.
recoqnized as a »ar P
ii 0
in history" the idea that the
Reformation was caused by the
U
f
e C
r
Nietzsche The
note ?8i°V
381, p. 205
Mv
205.
My ^-claim is not directed at the
corruption of the Church, for example, its
practice of
selling indulgences, although Calvin did
rail against this
e
nt
y
S ° mUCh that th
church was
corruot "but
corrupt,
but ^°i
t ha t sacramental developments, the *
relaxation
of the prohibition of usury, and the revaluation
mercantilism (see note 163), all tended to weaken of
men's

^

<

willing

^H^

concern with the afterlife and their religion.
175.

Nietzsche, The Will to Power

176

Compact E dition of the Oxford English Dictionar y

1,

•

p.

,

note 89, pp. 54-5.

1324.

177.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals: An
Attack, trans. Francis Golffing (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday & Company, 1956), essay III, ch. i, p. 231.

178.

Ibid., Ill, xiii, 256.

179.

Ibid.,

Ill,

xv,

180.

Ibid.,

Ill,

xvii,

181.

Ibid., Ill, xv, 263.

182.

Ibid., Ill, xv, 267.

183.

Ibid., Ill, xv, 263.

184.

Ibid.

185.

Ibid., Ill, xxi, 279.

186.

Ibid., Ill, xvii, 268.

187.

Ibid.,

188.

Nietzsche, The Will to Power

262.

Ill, viii,

266.

243.
,

note 223, p. 130.

vol
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Ibid.

n thS hird essay of The
Genealo gy o f Morale ln
^
in
which lhe examines
asceticism in detail Mi!I " ° I
he 13 not a
constant foe of asceticism
in r
of
Philosophers,
f
than a bit ° f
^fch:. viiix.
He aSmits^thT
admits "that a certain asceticism
thai- i« +~TL
strict yet high-spirited continence
"the necessary
conditions of strenuous intellectual
activity
as well
IL
of its natural consequences."
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ans " - h
he
: says that "when we examine the lives
of
productive spirits closely, we are bound to the great
find all three
present in some degree."
viii, 243.
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192.

Nietzsche, The Will to Pnwpr, note 916,
pp. 483-4.
Ibid., note 226, p. 131.

193.

Ibid., note 227, p.

131.

194.

Ibid., note 224, p.

130.

195.

Ibid., note 226, p.

131.

196.

Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals

191.

197.

Ibid.

198.

Ibid.,

199.

Ibid.

200.

Ibid., Ill, xviii, 271.

201.

Ibid.,

202.

Ibid.

203.

Ibid., Ill, xxv, 290.

204.

Ibid., Ill, xxiv, 288.

205.

Weber, p. 48.

I,

ii,

Ill,

r

I,

ii,

232.

233.

xxiii, 284.

206.
Weber points out in several places that religion did
not play a significant role in Franklin's thoughts about
worldly activity. See Weber, p. 180, n. 36 on p. 227. See
also p. 48.
From Franklin's correspondence, however, it
appears that although Franklin may have abandoned writing
about religious issues early in his career (see Franklin's
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Weber, p. 53.
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Franklin, pp. 189-90. Weber does not
cite this later
itt6n aS an introduction to the
twentyfir?h' e
fifth
dir?n of Poor Richard's Almanack,
edition
and
was
"reprinted
in hundreds of editions ... and was
translated into*
French, German, Italian, and more than
a half-dozen other
languages." Franklin, p. 188.
209.

r

210.

Ibid., p.

193.

211.

Ibid., p.

194.

212.

Ibid., p.

195.

213.

Ibid., pp. 217-8.

Ibid., p. 218.
The letter was to Cadwallader Colden
long-time friend of Franklin's, who, like Franklin, was
interested in science and politics.

214.
a

215.
Ibid.
doctor.

This letter was to John Fothergill, a Scottish

216.

Ibid., pp. 239-43.

217.

Ibid., p. 241.

218.

Ibid., p. 243.

219.

Ibid., p. 237.

220.

Ibid.

221.

Ibid., p. 223.

222.
Franklin's description of this device is quoted in
Carl van Doren, Benjamin Franklin (New York: The Viking
Press, 1938), pp. 168-9.

Seymour Dunbar, A History of Travel in America
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1915), pp. 45-6.

22 3.

'

Quoted in van doren,

p.

741.

Franklin, p. 329.
Ibid., p.
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Ibid., p. 239; and van Doren,

CHAPTER

6

TRACES OF MODERN ASCETICISM

While Franklin may have provided
an ascetic
example of "almost classical
purity" to

Weber, he is not

quite as helpful in regard to
the asceticism I am trying to
identify.
Modern asceticism, which I am
claiming is bound
up with the fetishistic consumption
of technology, is not
supported by religious aspirations,
such as those voiced by
Franklin late in his life. Specifically,
modern asceticism
is not ultimately grounded in
the goal of an other-worldly
immortality, as was Christian asceticism
in its various
forms.
The celibacy and regularity of monastic
orders and
the worldly asceticism of the Puritans
were directed toward
that which was promised by Christ - life
everlasting.
And
for his part, Franklin thought that the
benefits he provided
to men in common would gain for him this prize.

Modern asceticism, on the other hand, is not grounded
in the Christian idea of an afterlife.

While this

asceticism has indeed come to embrace the promise of
immortality, it is not an otherworldly afterlife toward

which this asceticism aims.

I

will discuss this recent type

of immortality later in this chapter.

What

I

want to stress

at this point is that modern asceticism, even though it was

not able to abandon its Christian framework all at once,

distinguished from Christian asceticism partly, but

is

precisely, by its rejection,
tacit or otherwise, of
Christian immortality. This
rejection of Christian
immortality, I will argue is
clQsely
up
other distinguishing feature
of modern asceticism, the
consumption of convenience.

^

,

^^

To support these claims, and
to begin establishing in
more detail the dimensions of
modern asceticism, I will have
to move beyond the limited
example of Franklin and his
inventions, and examine other modern
thinkers whose

connection with technological development
is not so clear as
is Franklin's.
However, these other thinkers Hobbes,

Locke, Marx, and Marcuse

-

have the advantage of

highlighting the relation between technological
development
and the mortal, finite body.
it is in their non-Christian
attitudes toward mortality and necessity that these

four can

be interpreted as modern ascetics.

My choice of these

theorists is based solely on their appropriateness to
the

argument
focused.

am making, which is,

I
I

in its own way,

narrow and

do not want to give the impression that

I

have

objectively surveyed modern political thought, or even these
four thinkers, for that matter, and am offering a

distillation of that experience.

On the contrary, this

reading is biased; it slashes the surface.
I

should also offer at this point some explanation for

the direction which my argument has taken.
be asked why

I

It certainly may

have chosen to focus on political theorists
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in this final chapter.

Why not continue examining

technological apparatuses such as
those that Franklin
invented? Could I not make my
case for modern asceticism by
referring to those devices which
are consumed in order to
deny the limits of the body?
The answer to these questions
is yes, the argument could be
carried in that direction.
And

imagine that it should be obvious
by now how I would
interpret contemporary technological
developments, such as
satellite communications, space shuttles,
organ transplants,
test-tube babies, etc.
Devices such as these can all be
interpreted as means for overcoming the
temporal and spatial
limits of embodiment.
But as I stated at the outset of this
critique of techno-f etishism, my concern is not
primarily
with mapping the development and deployment of
technology in
I

modernity, but with uncovering or unearthing the value
of

convenience, roots and all.

(See Chapter 1, pp. 4-6.)

Given

this genealogical objective, the four theorists listed above
are more appropriate than a survey of recent technological

developments.

For they help to make the case that the

modern attitude toward technology is based on

a

particularly

modern attitude toward the body, mortality, and necessity.
And it is only insofar as these thinkers are concerned with
this attitude that

I

am concerned with them.

As

I

said

above, this reading is biased.
I

will pursue a chronological direction in this

examination of modern thought, beginning with Thomas Hobbes.
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And

will focus on the mature version
of Hobbes
the formation of civil society Leviathan.
I

account of

As the subtitle

of that text indicates, Hobbes,
despite his reputation as
one of the first theorists of the
modern state, was not

unconcerned with religious questions, but
was, on the
contrary, concerned with "the Matter,
Forme and Power of a
Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil." in
my treatment of
Leviathan I will emphasize to some extent the
religious
dimension of Hobbes- thought, although I will avoid
getting
involved with the dichotomous argument concerning
,

Hobbes'

atheism or Christianity.

I

tend to side with those who

recognize an ambiguity in regard to the role of Christianity
in Hobbes' thought.

1

But what is important for me is not

the question of whether or not Hobbes was an atheist, but is
the way in which Hobbes introduces a new, non-Christian

attitude toward mortality and necessity, while remaining
very much within the structure of Christian discourse.
is this attitude,

It

not Hobbes' religious convictions, which

want to stress.
The issue of human mortality runs throughout Hobbes'

argument in Leviathan

.

The state of nature which he

describes there is one in which the fact of man's mortality
is never long out of mind.

"Nature hath made men so equal,

in the faculties of the body, and mind

.

.

.

",

claims

Hobbes, that there "ariseth equality of hope in the

attaining of our ends." 2

When two men in this state of

I
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natural equality come to desire
the same thing, their parity
leads them to become competitors.
For in the state of
nature, every man has the
natural right "to use hi.s own
power, as he will himself,
for the preservation

of hi-S own
nature; that is to say, of his
own life; and consequently,
of doing any thing, which in
his own judgment, and reason,
he shall conceive to be the
aptest means thereunto.- 3 si nee
neither of these naturally equal men
has such an advantage
that one can hope to intimidate the
other into abandoning
that common desire
or forfeiting his natural right
to that
object of contention, they come to regard
each other as
enemies in a struggle to assert their natural
right.
,

This natural competition is intensified by
the passions
of men, primarily vanity.

Hobbes describes this passion as

follows
For every man looketh that his companion should
value him, at the same rate he sets upon himself:
and upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing,'
naturally endeavors, as far as he dares, (which'
amongst them that have no power to keep them in
quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each
other)
to extort a greater value from his
contemners, by damage; and from others, by the
example.
,

Leo Strauss has demonstrated at length how the competition

which occurs in Hobbes' state of nature expands into

a

life

and death struggle in the presence of the uncontrolled

appetite, or passion, of vanity. 5

I

need not set out

Strauss' argument here, but can just say that he helps to

explain Hobbes' conclusion that the state of nature is
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always in danger of turning into
a state of war, "every
man,
against every man."' And as far
as Hobbes is concerned,
as
long as the possibility of
outright mortal conflict is
imminent, there is a state of
" For war,
war.
consisteth not
in battle only, or the act
of fighting; but in a tract of
time, wherein the will to contend
by battle is sufficiently
7
known.
What

would like to emphasize about Hobbesstate of
nature, however, is not its natural
equality,
I

or the role

that vanity plays in it, but that it
raises the issue of
human mortality, and that it does so in a
temporal context.
One of the problems, or "incommodities » of
the state of
,

nature, to use Hobbes- term, is that men's lives
in that

state tend to be short, that is, of short duration.

in his

famous description of life in this state of nature, Hobbes
says it is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." 8

At

another point in the text, Hobbes says that in the state of
natural equality, "there can be no security to any man, how

strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time, which

nature ordinarily alloweth men to live." 9

In the state of

nature, in other words, men are sold short, or short-

changed, on their time; they die not only violently, as

Strauss emphasizes, but prematurely, as measured by natural

standards
There are, of course, natural forces or causes which
lead man out of this state of nature, and allow him to buy

so me time, or extend the
duration of his life. The
singular
"man" is appropriate here,
not just because life
in the
state of nature is solitary,
but also because those
forces
which Hobbes identifies as
leading out of the state of
nature, are effective at the
level of the individual.
The
possibility for man to come out
of the state of nature,
Hobbes claims, consists "partly
in the passions, partly
in
his reason."'" it is of man's
nature, therefore, to be
inclined by his passions and his
reason, to leave the state
of nature.
But like the state of nature,
these passions and
reason are also imbued with a sense
of mortality, and are
guided by considerations of death. The
role which death and

mortality play in Hobbes' thought is hardly
limited to the
state of nature.
One of the forces that leads out of the state
of nature
- reason - does so by placing a limitation
on the exercise
of the natural right to do and take whatever
one wants.

This limitation comes in the form of a law of nature.

Hobbes stresses that a law of nature, like any law, is
an

obligation to do nor not to do something, whereas

a

right of

nature, like any right, is a liberty to do or forego doing

something.

1

And even though man in the state of nature

tends to be rather nasty and brutish, he is reasonable
enough, when not in a passionate frenzy, to recognize the

laws of nature.
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laws of nature, Hobbes
defines
a law of nature, in its
generic sense, in a surprisingly

specific manner.

™
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A law of nature, therefore, is
not just an obligation or
limitation which men naturally recognize;
it is a limitation
on the natural right to do what
one thinks will best

preserve one's life.

According to the very idea of natural

law, man cannot reasonably exercise
his natural right in a

manner which would actually lead to his
demise.
Furthermore, man must do, or as Hobbes put it,
he is
forbidden to omit doing, that which he thinks
will best
preserve, or prolong, his life.

Hobbes gets even more specific about natural law
after

defining the category, and names two such laws.

The

fundamental law of nature is "to seek peace, and follow
•

it."

1

first,

The second such law, which is derived from the
is "that a man be willing, when others are so too,

as

far-forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall

think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things;
and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as
he would allow other men against himself." 14

So as Hobbes

reads the laws of nature, man is naturally inclined, by dint

of his reason, not to exercise
his natural right in a
manner
which could lead to violent
competition and his early
demise.
Rather, natural man is inclined
to sacrifice his
natural right, in common with
others, in order to attain and
preserve peace, but most importantly,
to save his mortal
life.

This natural, reasonable inclination
toward peace and
civil society, of course, is just
that, an inclination.
Given Hobbes' view of the violent
character of the state of
nature, it is apparent that the laws
of nature do not
thoroughly determine man's behavior, and
that man can ignore
those precepts which are discovered by his
natural
reason.

For instance, a man might be willing to
put himself at risk
in order to have revenge upon someone who
slighted
or

insulted him.

But there are other elements in the

constitution of Hobbes' natural man which come to the aid
of
reason, and help to promote peace.

These other elements are

passions, and foremost among them, in regard to man's

inclination toward peace, is the fear of violent death. 15
On Hobbes' account, of all the incommodities of the

natural state of war, the "worst of all" is the "continual
fear,

and danger of violent death." 16

And it is this worst

feature of the war which urges men most strongly towards
peace.

Here again, Leo Strauss' interpretation of Hobbes is

instructive.

After describing how the passion of vanity

leads man in Hobbes' state of nature to engage in

a

physical
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struggle to have revenge on
another for some real or
imagined wrong, Strauss traces
the development of his
struggle to another level.
At some point in the conflict,
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It is this face to face confrontation
with death, with

the possibility that one's time may
soon be over, which
clarifies and intensifies the reasonableness
of the laws of
nature.
The cold breath of death
one might say, compels
the natural man to seek peace in some form of
civil society,
,

where he no longer has to rely on himself for
protection.
But while death is the goad which impels men toward
civil
peace,

it is also the outer limit on the exercise of any

civil authority.

It marks the boundary beyond which civil

society cannot go, because it also marks the spot beyond

which man cannot go in his renunciation or transfer of his
rights.

For Hobbes, "there be some rights, which no man can

be understood by any words, or other signs, to have

abandoned, or transferred." 18

The first of these is "the

right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take
away his life." 19

So death is at the heart, or throat, or

344

Hobbes- relation between man
and the commonwealth.
life
and death situations, man need
not obey any authority,
and
can act out of his most
fundamental, natural right.
Now this is not to say that
the sovereign authority, to
whom men confer all of their
power and some of their natural
right, 20 cannot issue the punishment
of death.
in Hobbes'
scheme, the civil authority of the
commonwealth is the sol e
dispenser of punishments for breaches
of particular laws, or
of the covenant upon which the
commonwealth rests. 21 Among
the punishments Hobbes lists in
L^yiathan, are corporal
punishments, "such as stripes, or wounds,
or deprivation of
such pleasures of the body, as were before
lawfully

m

enjoyed," 22

and capital punishment. 23

But even though Hobbes' absolute sovereign
wields the

"power of life and death," 24 it cannot compel a man to
kill
or injure himself.
If a sovereign command a man, though justly
condemned, to kill, wound, or main himself; or not
to resist those that assault him; or to abstain
from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other
thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that
man the liberty to disobey. 25

In this statement, Hobbes not only recognizes the right to

disobey orders to kill or injure oneself, but also implies
the right to resist attempts by the sovereign and its agents
to inflict punishments.

"A covenant not to defend myself

from force, by force, is always void," claims Hobbes; "no

man can transfer, or lay down his right to save himself from
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death, wounds, and
imprisonment."*

Hobbes argues that thi s

natural inalienable right to
resist "is granted to be
t rue
by all men, in that they
lead criminals to execution,
and
Prison, with anned men,
notwithstanding that such criminals
have consented to the law, by
which they are condemned.""
So the limit of man's
renunciation of his rights to the
commonwealth, as well as his
inclination to renounce
anything in the first place, are
derived from the same
source - the mortal, finite body.
Man's recognition that he
is a finite being, that there
is a limit to his being death - is what makes the reasonableness
of the laws of
nature unmistakably clear to him. This
insight, which is
gained from the fearful moment in a life
and death
struggle,

leads men to renounce some of their natural
rights, so that
they may lengthen their mortal lives in a
commonwealth.
But

when the commonwealth comes to threaten one's
life, or even
to take hold of one's body, that force which led
to
the

formation of the commonwealth becomes a justification
for

resisting that commonwealth by any means whatever.

Hobbes

begins his chapter "Of Punishment and Rewards" by making the

surprising concession that no one has to submit to

punishment by the sovereign.

"For by that which has been

said before, no man is supposed bound by covenant, not to

resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended that
he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his

person." 28

For "a man cannot tell, when he seeth men
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proceed against him by violence,
whether they intend his
29
death or not."
One should not overplay the role
which death, or the
fear of death, plays in Hobbes
thought, however.
There are
other passions besides the fear of
death which lead men out
of the state of nature, and there
is another justification
for avoiding legal punishment besides
the fact that one
might be killed in the violence of punishment.
Those other
passions and justifications may be lumped
together under the
category of "commodious living."
Hobbes' list of the

m

passions which incline men toward peace, he adds to
the fear
of death, men's "desire of such things as are
necessary to
commodious living; and
them." 30

a

hope by their industry to obtain

And in regard to justification for avoiding

punishments, Hobbes cites not just the possibility of death,
but also the fact that "there is no benefit consequent to
such patience." 31

I

take this to mean that imprisonment and

other punishments do not promote that "commodious living"

which one sought in forming the covenant in the first place.
So the role which the body plays in Hobbes thought is

not limited to the fear of death.

In forming covenants to

promote peace, Hobbes' natural man is looking not just to
lengthen his life, but to overcome those "nasty, brutish"

aspects of life in the state of nature.

Hobbes' conception

of necessity, like Calvin's before him and Franklin's after,

was not restricted to absolute physical necessity.

Man's
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needs included those things
which made life commodious,
or
convenient, as Franklin would
say.- Hobbes- claim that
men
join covenants in the hope
that they will be able to
obtain
the commodities necessary for
commodious living indicates
that he was not under the sway
of Puritan asceticism, with
its suspicious attitude toward
worldly goods.
But even
though Hobbes was no Puritan, he
does represent an early
form of that modern asceticism
which denies the body's
limits through the consumption of
convenience.

What

want to stress about Hobbes- thought,
however,
is not the status he affords to
comfort and convenience,
even though this feature of his thought
is obviously related
to my argument about convenience.
Rather, I would
I

like to

stress the less obvious connection between
the role which
human mortality and death play in Hobbes' thought,
and

modern asceticism.

As

I

mentioned at the beginning of this

chapter, modern asceticism is distinguished from
Christian

asceticism by the stance it takes toward human mortality and
the possibility of immortality.

This difference can be

brought out by a comparison of the worldly asceticism of the
Puritans, which

asceticism

I

I

examined in the previous chapter, and the

claim to have found in Hobbes' thought.

At first glance, there appears to be a certain

similarity between these two forms of asceticism

-

they both

can be interpreted as responses to anxiety concerning man's

mortal condition.

Calvin made men anxiously aware of their
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mortality through his resurreotion
of the doctrine of
gratuitous, double predestination.
This doctrine, it will
be recalled, placed the
possibility of other-worldly
Mortality absolutely and unalterably
beyond man's control
or influence.
The Puritans- conception
of the calling and
their asceticism, I argued,
following Weber, were responses
to the dreadful character of
Calvin's doctrine
of

predestination.
Like, Calvin, Hobbes also raises
the issue of man's
mortality, but he does so through
his description of the
state of nature, where violent,
premature death always

threatens.

But when Hobbes raises the issue
of man's

mortality, at least in the first two
parts of Leviathan. it
is not in relation or regard to
immortality.
Death, in this
part of Hobbes' argument, does not hold forth
the

possibility of eternal life.
as Leo Strauss put it,

Rather, death for Hobbes was,

"the greatest and supreme evil."

on

my reading of Hobbes, death is evil because it is
the

ultimate temporal limit which is imposed on man by his
body.
The death with which man comes face to face in the life
and

death struggle, reveals man's essentially finite, temporal
being.

If he dies, his time is up, so he must do whatever

he can to avoid death, and increase that time which nature

allots to man.

Therefore, it is not just the desire for a

commodious life that fits Hobbes within the frame of my
argument about convenience.

The role which the fear of
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death plays in his thought also
oan be interpreted as an
instance of the modern concern
with overcoming the limits
of
the body, in this case, the
ultimate temporal limit, which
is death.

This interpretation of Hobbes,
however, would appear to
hold, if at all, only for the
first two parts of Leviathan.
In the third part, "Of a Christian
Commonwealth," Hobbes
does recognize the possibility of
eternal life, and even
goes so far as to claim that if the civil
sovereign issues a
command which "cannot be obeyed, without
[the subject] being
damned to eternal death; then it were madness
to obey it." 33
This appears to contradict my claim that the
life and death
of the finite, mortal body presents, in Hobbesthought, the

ultimate limit of sovereign authority, as well as a
limit to
the renunciation of man's rights.
For one could conceivably
be commanded by the sovereign to do something upon the

penalty of death, which would result in one's banishment
from the kingdom of God, and the loss of one's eternal life.

According to Hobbes, at least, in this part of Leviathan
one would be mad to abandon one's eternal life in such

,

a

situation, in order to escape death; one should instead give
up one's mortal life in order to save the immortal one.

Hobbes seems to recognize, in this advice, another temporal

dimension beyond man's earthly time, one that is infinite,
or eternal.
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But situations

l

ike the one described
above,

in which
God's authority conflicts with
that of a civil sovereign,
should not really present as
much trouble as they have
in
the past, writes Hobbes^
To avoid such conflicts,
men
"need to be taught to distinguish
well between what is,

and

what is not necessary to eternal
salvation." 35 And in the
chapter of Leviathan entitled "Of
what is Necessary for a
Man's Reception into the Kingdom
of Heaven," Hobbes offers a
lesson in making this distinction.
But if Hobbes- lesson is
followed closely, one can see that
Hobbes really does
not

contradict my earlier claims about the
mortal body, but
instead bears them out. Ultimately, Hobbes
cannot fully
endorse martyrdom for the sake of one's
eternal life.
One's
time on earth, one's mortal life, is too
valuable, for
Hobbes, to justify such a sacrifice.
Hobbes' lesson concerning what is necessary for

salvation is a fairly simple one.

He minimizes those

requirements, so as to minimize the chance for conflict

between the heavenly sovereign and those of earth.

"All

that is NECESSARY to salvation," claims Hobbes, "is

contained in two virtues, faith in Christ, and obedience to
laws." 36

In regard to the first of these virtues,

faith,

Hobbes boils things down to one necessary article of faith:
"The, unum necessarium, only article of faith, which the

Scripture maketh simply necessary to salvation, is this,
that JESUS IS CHRIST." 37
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When it comes to the laws which
men must obey to attai n
salvation, Hobbes continues his
process of simplification,
and tries to separate from
all of God's laws that pure
minimum which is necessary for
eternal salvation.
Hobbes
begins his discussion of these
laws by identifying them with
the laws of nature which he
examined in the first part of
L6Viathan
" For our s ™ior Christ hath not given
us new
laws," writes Hobbes, "but counsel
to observe those we are
subject to
Th e laws of God therefore are
none but the
38
laws of nature."
And as Hobbes reduced the articles
of
faith down to one necessary belief,
he similarly distills
one law which must be obeyed.
Of the laws of
-

.

.

.

nature, or of

God,

"the principal is, that we should not violate
our

faith, that is, a commandment to obey our civil
sovereigns,

which we constituted over us by mutual pact one with
another.

" 39

Hobbes' short, neat lesson on the question of how to

obey both God and an earthly sovereign, therefore, teaches
that only two things are necessary: faith that Christ is
king, and obedience to civil sovereigns.

But this lesson is

not so neat after all, and it really has not resolved the

fundamental problem between civil and divine authority.

Suppose the civil sovereign commands that one renounce one's
faith in Christ, a faith which is necessary for salvation,
or else be put to death.

Should one obey the civil

sovereign, as the law of God commands, and renounce one's

faith in Christ?

Or should one follow the
advioe Hcbbes
gave before starting this
lesson, in which he claimed
that
it would be madness to obey
a command which would
result in
eternal death?

Hobbes seems to realize that he
had not cleared things
up quite as much as he had
intended, and at the very end of
the chapter on the requirements
for salvation, he discusses
precisely that sort of situation
which I described above.
Hobbes struggles, once again, with
the problem of what to d o
when a civil sovereign, in effect,
commands one to renounc e
one's faith and eternal salvation.
Hobbes- advice
at this

point is no longer to disobey.

Hobbes now writes, "And for

their faith, it is internal, and invisible;
they have the
licence that Naaman had, and need not put
themselves into

danger for it." 40

One need not, therefore, become a martyr

for one's faith.

Because faith is something internal, one

can say or do whatever the sovereign commands, and still
be
saved.

One no longer has to be willing to lay down one's

earthly life, to consider that life worth nothing, in order
to glorify God and his promise of eternal life.
I

must point out that immediately after saying that one

need not put oneself in danger for one's faith, Hobbes does

explicitly recognize that martyrdom is still a possibility.
People need not risk their earthly lives for their faith,

writes Hobbes, "[b]ut if they do, they ought to expect their
reward in heaven, and not complain of their lawful
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sovereign; much less make
war upon him.
For he that is not
glad of any just occasion
of martyrdom, has not
the faith he
Professeth, but pretends it
only."- B ut Hobbes himself,
I
want to argue, is not glad
for any just occasion of
martyrdom His theory of a
Christian Commonwealth, based
as
it is upon his theory of
man's natural inclination
to live
in a commonwealth, does
not leave much room for
martyrdom,

or the traditional Christian
justification of it, which was
based on a contempt for earthly,
mortal life.
To begin with, the context in
which Hobbes offers hi s
endorsement of martyrdom is one in
which the objective s eems
to be preventing aggressive,
dangerous martyrdom, such ais
that which occurs in religious wars.
Men need not become
martyrs, according to Hobbes, but if
they do, they should
not "complain of" or "make war upon"
their sovereign.
in

other words, if you must be

a

martyr, do it quietly, so that

you do not disturb the peace of the commonwealth.

Hobbes further undermines the justification of

martyrdom by noting that the subjects whom he envisions
in
his commonwealth pose no real threat to sovereign

authority,

and that therefore there is no reason to make them martyrs.
This is evident in the following quote, in which Hobbes tips
his hand concerning the role of Christianity in the

commonwealth.
But what infidel king is so unreasonable, as
knowing he had a subject, that waiteth for the
second coming of Christ, after the present world
shall be burnt, and intendeth then to obey him,

the'christ'f
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^

that Jesus is
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coSS?4„ce to

in a commonwealth formed
of Hobbesian subjects,
there
is no need for martyrdom
or persecution, even if the

commonwealth is not

a

Christian one.

For the man which

Hobbes describes in the first part
of Ley^athan, recognizes
certain natural laws, but the general
principle underlying
all natural laws is that man cannot
do that which threatens
his life, that is, his earthly,
mortal life.
Hobbesian

man,

whether in the state of nature or

a

commonwealth, is always

justified in doing anything to save his
life, including, one
must assume, renouncing his faith. Martyrdom,
in light of

Hobbes view of nature and human nature, is not
reasonable.
Martyrdom, in fact, is

a

threat to the order which Hobbes is

trying to establish in Leviathan

,

hence,

it should be done

quietly and passively, if it is done at all.

Martyrdom

challenges is the very idea of a law of nature, as Hobbes
defines it, because it is

a

voluntary relinquishment of

man's time on earth.
It should be obvious that Hobbes' view of human

mortality runs counter to the Christian tradition, as

I

presented it in the second and fifth chapters of this essay.
The Christian idea that earthly life, while being

a

from God, should nonetheless be held to be something

gift

355

worthless and contemptible,
something one would readily
sacrifice, is not to be found
in Hobbes.
As I have tried to
show here, Hobbes- theory of a commonwealth ecclesiasticall
and civil" is based on the
preservation of man's life on
earth, not his eternal life in
the "kingdom
of God."

This

attitude toward earthly life, which
treats it as something
sacred or reverent, characterizes
modern asceticism, and
distinguishes it from Christian asceticism.

(At this point,

it should be apparent why

I

treated Arendt's interpretation

of Christianity so harshly in Chapter

The reverence for

2.

life which she found in Christianity
and modernity,

I

find

as a hallmark of modernity, which sets
it apart from the

Christian tradition.

But this modern reverence of life is

not a reverence for necessity, as Arendt

implies

•

s

interpretation

.

But the concern with saving man's time on earth
is only

one element of modern asceticism.
living, or convenience, is another.

The desire for commodious

And this second feature

of modern asceticism can also be distinguished from

Christian asceticism, and not just because it increases,
rather than restricts, consumption.

The desire for a life

of convenience, in which the limits of the body do not

consume much of man's time, runs counter to the Christian
idea that the toil and trouble of earthly life were a

punishment for Adam's sin/ 3

This distinction between
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modern and Christian asceticism,
however, is not readily
apparent in the thought of Hobbes.
Hobbes does mention in Leviathan
that '.man was created
in a condition immortal, not
subject to corruption, and
consequently to nothing that tendeth
to the dissolution of
his nature; and fell from that
happiness by the sin of
Adam."" But Hobbes makes this point
in his discussion of
salvation and eternal life in the
third part
of Le^athan.

He does not use the idea of the fall
to help explain the
state of nature in the first part of
the text, and therefore
is not forced to come to grips with
the conflict that exists
between the idea that life in civil society
can ameliorate
the nasty, brutish aspect of earthly life,
and the idea that

those inconvenient aspects are the punishment
for sin.

In

other words, Hobbes never tries to answer the
question of

how his idea of commodious living can be reconciled
with the

Christian idea of the fall.

However, John Locke, another

modern ascetic, struggles with this problem, and in his own
manner, resolves it. An examination of Locke's treatment of

the fall will help to make clear how this feature of modern

asceticism

-

the desire or need for convenience

-

differs

from the Christian tradition.
To begin with,

I

must point out that Locke's wrestling

with Christian doctrine was not by any means limited to the
idea of the fall.

Like Hobbes, Locke sought to render

Christianity a firm support for civil society, but Locke was
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more systematic than Hobbes
in this effort.
publishing the Two Trea tises of

ft^nw

Years afte r
(1690)>

Locke

offered his interpretation of
the New Testament, or at least
all that was reasonable in
it, in The
Bsaganafelgngss of
Christianity as Delivered in tho
-rrlr tjugg (1695).
And at
the end of his life, Locke was
working on paraphrases of
Paul's epistles, in which he
continued his rationalization
5
of Christianity.'
Locke's treatment of the fall,
therefore, is just one facet of his
project of constructing
a reasonable Christianity,
although it is an important
facet.

Locke begins The Reasonableness of C hristianity
by
squarely facing up to the problem that Hobbes
never

confronted in Leviathan.

In the first sentence of this

text, Locke acknowledges that there really
is no way of

avoiding the issue of the fall.

"it is obvious to anyone

who reads the New Testament," begins Locke, "that the

doctrine of redemption,

(and consequently of the gospel,)

founded upon the supposition of Adam's fall." 46

is

He

continues: "To understand therefore what we are restored to
by Jesus Christ, we must consider what the scripture shows
we lost by Adam." 47
In his consideration of what was lost by the fall,

Locke offers an interpretation which initially appears to

closely follow the traditional Christian interpretation of
the fall.

The punishment of Adam arose out of his violation
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of the command of God not
to eat from a certain tree.
is interesting to note that
Locke, in

(it

this interpretation of

the

fan which

opens

Ikjeasonabl^,^^

does not specify that the
forbidden tree was the tree
or
knowledge of good and evil.
Perhaps Locke sensed a
similarity between the hubris that
led Adam and Eve to seek
such knowledge, and his own
rational impulses.,
The
punishment of which God warned Adam
was death, but when Adam
ate of the forbidden tree, "he
did not actually die; but was
turned out of paradise from the tree
of life, and shut out
for ever from it, 'lest he should
take thereof and live for
ever.'"
So the first thing Adam lost was
immortality.

Locke's description of man's life after
the fall, that
is, man's mortal life, bears that
temporal tone which
was

noted above in Hobbes' description of life in
the state of
nature.
On that very day that Adam ate, writes
Locke,

"His

life began from thence to shorten and waste, and
to have an
end; and from thence, to his actual death, was but
like the

time of a prisoner between the sentence, and the execution

which was in view and certain." 49

Now Locke's theory of

civil society, like Hobbes', offers as a principal advantage
to man the fact that his life would be lengthened by

consenting to give up some of his natural rights to form
such a society. 50

And as was the case with Hobbes, this

idea of postponing death by consenting to form a civil

society, runs Locke up against the Christian idea that man's
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mortality is a punishment inflicted
by God.
But unlike
Hobbes, Locke resolves this
tension between his rational
theology and the fall.
Before getting to Locke's escape
from this dilemma, however,
I would like to
emphasize
another aspect of the fall, one
which runs against that
other benefit of civil society,
which

is that the longer

life it provides is also easier
and more convenient than
life outside civil society.

Along with his loss of eternal life,
Adam also lost
through his sin the bountiful life God
had given him in
paradise.
Locke points out "that paradise was
a place of
bliss, as well as immortality; without
toil, and without
sorrow.
- But when man was turned out, he was exposed
to
the toil, anxiety, and frailties of this mortal
51
life."

This is Locke's interpretation of God's cursing the
ground,
in Genesis 3:17, and it is this aspect of the fall
which

should cause some hesitation by modern ascetics like Hobbes
and Locke.

For just as Locke's civil society shares with

Hobbes' the feature that it can lengthen man's mortal life,
it also offers the promise of alleviating some of the "toil,

anxiety, and frailties of this mortal life."

In his

description of the state of nature, Hobbes calls these
problems of mortal life
"inconveniences."

"

incommodities

;

"

Locke calls them

In the Second Treatise on Government

.

Locke writes, "I easily grant that civil government is the

proper remedy for the inoonveniences
of the state of
Nature. " 52
Now it is true that when each
of these thinke:rs
discusses the problems with the
state of nature, neither of
them cite the fall, or Adam's
sin, as the source of these
problems, but both prefer instead
to cite the natural
liberty and equality of men in
that state." But since each
of these thinkers wants to use
Christianity as a support for
the commonwealth or civil society
that they are trying to
build on natural, rational principles,
there is occasion for
asking how the convenient, commodious
life which they see as
part of the promise of civil society, can
be reconciled with
the Christian idea that man's mortal life,
with
its toils,

burdens, and troubles,

men as

a

is a punishment God inflicted upon

result of Adam's sin.

In responding to this question, Locke begins
to veer

away from the traditional Christian interpretation of
the
fall.

In the previous chapter,

it will be recalled,

I

indicated in passing that Augustine, Luther, and Calvin,

despite their many differences, all recognized that the

punishment which was inflicted upon Adam and Eve was
extended to all their posterity. 54

Locke rejects this tenet

of Christianity, and this rejection provides a way around

this particular conflict between natural reason and

Christian revelation.
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On Locke's reading, Adam
was indeed "turned out
of
paradise" as a punishment for
his sin, but Adam's
posterity
was "born out of it."" It
is not as a punishment
were born out of paradise;
it is rather just a
condition in
which they find themselves,
given Adam's punishment.
From
Locke's perspective, to even
suggest that God would have
punished all men for the transgression
of Adam, "when
millions had never hear of, and no
one had authorized to act
for him - or be his representative," 56
violates not only the
idea of consent, upon which Locke
grounds his political
philosophy, but it also is an effrontery
to the honor of
God.
such an idea, claims Locke, "indeed
would be hard to
reconcile with the notion we have of justice;
and much more
with the goodness and other attributes of
the supreme being,
(which he had declared of himself, and which
reason and

^^

revelation must acknowledge to be in him.)" 57

According to Locke, in order for God to punish Adam's
posterity for his sin, God would have had to take away
something to which that posterity had a right.
nature of punishment.

But,

That is the

Locke argues,

The state of immortality in paradise [and, one
could logically add, the blissful life there] is
not due to the posterity of Adam, more than to
any other creature.
Nay, if God afforded them a
temporary, mortal life, it is his gift; they owe
it to his bounty; they could not claim it as their
right; nor does he injure them when he takes it
from them.
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Since men do not have a right
even to their mortal life,
much less can they claim to
have a right to eternal,
blissful life. Man's mortality
and his troubled life on
earth, therefore, cannot
be considered punishments,
according to Locke. Even "such
a temporary life as we
now
have, with all its frailties
and miseries," writes
Locke,

"is better than no being.""

It is just tne condition

J

which men find themselves after
Adam's fall, but its still
gift from God. 60

a

This interpretation of the fall
has significant
implications for that conflict between
reason and revelation
which I have identified in the thought
of Locke and
Hobbes,

but these implications are most readily
apparent not in The
Reasonableness of Christianity but in an
earlier work.
,

When he attacked Filmer's De Patriarch*

Treatise on Government

,

in

the First

Locke seems to already have

understood the implications of his reading of the
fall.

Although Locke does not mention the punishment which
God
inflicted upon Eve in The Reasonableness of Christ an
i

i

Y

,

he

does focus on that aspect of the fall in the First Treatise

,

in order to refute one of Filmer's arguments for
patriarchal

hierarchy.

And the interpretation of Eve's punishment which

Locke offers in the First Treatise foretells of the reading
of the fall which Locke would offer later, and reveals the

implications of this reading.

-

qp

- '

as ln The ReasnnablenP^

^

L ° Cke denies that God's
punishment of Adam is
intended for all men, but his
argument here is not based on
the definition of punishment,
as it was in The

Reasonabl enes ^_oJ_ChrisUanlt^

grammar.

>

but on the rules of
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But Locke is not quite so
restrictive when it
comes to Eve's punishment.
Locke writes about the words of
Genesis 3:16, in which Eve's
punishment of multiplied pain
and subjection to her husband is
inflicted, as follows:
"and if we will take them as they
were directed in

particular to her, or in her, as

a

representative, to all

other women, they will at most concern
the female sex only,
and import no more but that subjection
that they should

ordinarily be in to their husbands.-' 62

Locke's liberalism,

apparently, was not as developed as that of J.s.
Mill, since
Locke suggests that all women are subject to their
husbands
on account of Eve.

But Locke rejects the idea that even

this subjection is a punishment which all women must
suffer.
For immediately following the preceding quote, Locke

continues
but there is here no more law to oblige a woman to
such a subjection, if the circumstances either of
her condition or contract with her husband should
exempt her from it, than there is that she should
bring forth her children in sorrow and pain if
there could be found a remedy for it. 63
This, then,

is Locke's way of getting around the

constraints which the traditional Christian interpretation
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of the fall posed to the
modern civil society.

punishments of Adam and Eve are

The

not extended to all men
and

women as punishments, but just
as the condition in which
they were born. Again referring
to the words by which Eve
was punished, Locke writes,
"neither will any
one,

I

suppose, by these words think
the weaker sex, as by a 1.aw
so
subjected to the curse contained in
them, that it is their
duty not to endeavor to avoid it.""
On the contrary, if a
remedy could be found for the pain
of childbirth, or for the
subjection of women to their husbands,
Locke argues, women
may certainly take steps to ameliorate
these conditions or
avoid them altogether. To extend Locke's
argument to the

condition in which men find themselves after
the fall, death
and toil can also be avoided. Men, no less
than women, can
avoid the brutishness and inconvenience of life
in the state
of fallen nature, and, in fact, they form civil
society

precisely to avoid those conditions.
The rational or reasonable Christianity which Locke

developed over the course of his career, would appear to be

better-suited to the modern asceticism
than to Christian asceticism itself.

I

have identified

Locke's interpretation

of the fall renders it compatible with that facet of modern

asceticism which

I

stressed in my discussion of Hobbes,

which is the idea that mortal, earthly life is something
valuable, and should be lengthened as much as possible.

Locke's reading of the fall men may be expected to avoid

On
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death, just as they may be
expected to avoid the other
inconveniences of the state of
nature.
Such mortal
conditions are not punishments
which must be suffered, as
they are according to one
pole of the traditionally

ambivalent, Christian attitude
toward earthly life.
The traditional Christian
idea that life is in some
sense contemptible, even though
it is a gift from God, was
in large part based on the
account of the fall in Genesis,
in the preceding chapter, I
indicated that both Luther and
Calvin used these verses from Genesis
to intensify the
ambivalence of Christianity in regard
to earthly life.
(See
Chapter 5, pp. 238-49)
But on Locke's reasonable reading
of
Christianity, especially the fall, there
no longer appears
to be any tension involved in the evaluation
of earthly
life.

There also no longer appears to be any
justification

for Christian asceticism, which was based on
the idea that
mortal life was inferior to, and should be willingly

sacrificed for, immortal life.

The Christian ascetic,

if

I

may be allowed to generalize so boldly, denied or
regulated
the needs and desires of the body so as to gain time for
the

contemplation of, and preparation for, an otherworldly
immortality.

With the revaluation of earthly, mortal life

which was undertaken by Hobbes and Locke, the objective of

Christian asceticism recedes into the background, and
mortal, temporally finite life comes into prominence.
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Despite their differences, both
Christian and modern
asceticism can be interpreted as
ways of saving time.
Christian asceticism saved time
in order to gain
immortality, while modern asceticism
saves time in two
different senses. On the one hand,
modern asceticism saves
time in the sense of prolonging
life, and on the other, it
saves time from necessity, by making
life more convenient.
The modern ascetic's consumption
of convenience saves time
in the sense that it minimizes
the amount of time which is
spent on bodily necessity.
the terms I used in Chapter 2
to define my conception of convenience,
the ascetic
consumption of convenience saves time by
overcoming the

m

temporal and spatial limits which are imposed
by the body.
But,

of course,

it is not just the time-saving features

of Hobbes' and Locke's civil societies which
makes me

describe convenient living as a form of asceticism.

The

more important similarity between Christian and modern
asceticism, the one which provides the real justification
for my describing modern consumption practices as

asceticism, is that both, in their different ways, deny the
body.

This feature of modern asceticism tends to get shaded

when one emphasizes how modern asceticism differs from
Christianity.

In distinction to the negative pole of the

Christian ambivalence to earthly life

-

recall Luther's

claim that "[a] 11 the fields, yes, almost the entire

creation is full of such sermons, reminding us of our sin
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and of God's wrath" 65

the Christianity espoused
by Hobbes
and Locke in their attempts
to turn Christianity into
a
footing for the modern political
order, appears to be a
celebration of mortal life and
earthly comfort.
But when
one looks more closely at
the direction in which modern
consumption or necessity has developed,
it becomes apparent
that those practices continually
assault the limits which
are imposed by man's embodiment.
it is in this sense that
the modern consumption of technology
can be seen as a new
way of denying the body, mortality,
and necessity, as a new
form of asceticism.
Or to put this in Nietzsche's terms,
the modern consumption of convenience
is the latest form of
-

homoeopathic medicine, one which is administered
by new
priests -the scientists and technicians.
So while the modern asceticism of Hobbes and
Locke may

have eliminated the ambivalence in which Christianity

traditionally held earthly life, modern asceticism is not
without its own tension.

This tension, obviously, is

derived not from the idea of the fall and man's punishment,
but is based instead on that fundamental contempt for the

body which Nietzsche identified as the source of

Christianity.

(See Chapter 5, p. 288)

For the body is the

foundation of all those limits which have been overcome, or
at least assaulted, by the consumptive practices of modern

asceticism.

It is not Adam's original sin upon which modern

contempt for the mortal body is based; rather, it is the
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fact that the body is mortal
which is the source of
modernity's uneasiness with
the body.
And on Nietzsche- s
reading, the traditional
Christian interpretation of
thle
fall is similarly based on
a fundamental contempt
for thle
body.
The fall is an interpretation
of that revulsion.
To get a better glimpse of
modern asceticism's contempt
for the body, it is necessary
to move beyond Hobbes and
Locke, who, at least as I read
them, stand too close to
Christianity to provide a clear image
of modern asceticism.
I will now turn to a very
different line of thought, one
which was developed in conscious
contrast not only with
liberal political thought, such as that
of Hobbes and Locke,
but also with Christianity.
in the thought of Marx, and
many of those who have been influenced
by that thought,
there exists a more mature form of modern
asceticism than
that which I found in liberalism. This ascetic
dimension of

Marx's thought is centered on his attitude toward
necessity,

which

I

will now examine.

Later

I

will argue that this

ascetic dimension of Marx's thought has been maintained
and

developed by some contemporary Marxist, or Marx-influenced,
thinkers. By following this line of thought, one may catch

clear glimpse of the ascetic trajectory of modernity, in

which the fetishistic consumption of technology appears as
the project of denying, and eventually eliminating, the

mortal body.

a
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Before taking up this
examination of Marx's concept
of
necessity, I should point
out that not only will
this help
in identifying techno-f
etishism as a form of asceticism,
but
such an examination will
also provide a third dimension
to
the critical judgments of
Marxism that I have offered
throughout this essay.
Z have trouble with
Marxism not just
because of the way in which
dialectical thinking tends to
undermine ruthless criticism (see
Chapter
.
1,

pp.

18

21)

,

or

because of the way in which Marx's
notion of historical
materialism has become restricted to
consideration of the
capitalist production process alone
(see Chapter 3).
what
bothers me most of all about Marxism, is
the way in which
Marx's thoughts on necessity, especially
his

idea of a "rich

human need," has become
asceticism.

a

very subtle vehicle for modern

The contrast between this interpretation
of

Marxism and Arendt's, which treats Marxism as

a smuggler of

Christian reverence for the body and necessity, should
soon
become obvious.
Marx's attitude toward necessity was most clearly
stated very early in his career, in what eventually came to
be published as The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
of 1844, and has since become known as the "Paris

Manuscripts."

In these manuscripts, as in his later work,

Capital, Marx challenges the liberal idea that through his
labor, man comes to appropriate as his own, some of that

which was given to men in common.

(In Chapter 3,

this
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Lockean conception of property
was introduced, and the
critique of this concept which
Marx offered in Capital was
discussed.
see Chapter 4, p. 134, and
note 12.)
his
earlier criticism of 1844, Marx
introduces as a counterconcept to the liberal notion
of property, the

m

idea of

estranged, or alienated, labor, 66
and it is in hi:.s
elaboration of this concept that Marx
sets out hi,_s
perspective on necessity. Although
the concept of alienated
labor is crucial for understanding
the distance which Marx
sought to establish between himself
and liberal political
economy, I want to focus just on Marx's
conception
of

necessity, and to show how this element of
Marx's thought
actually links Marx to that asceticism which
I identified in
the liberal thinkers Hobbes and Locke.
One of the ways in which men in a capitalist
economy

become alienated from their labor, argues Marx, is
that in
such an economic setting, men no longer undertake their

productive activity in a distinctively human manner.

As

Marx puts it, "estranged labour estranges the species from
man." 67

Each species, according to Marx, has its own

particular species character, which "is contained in the
character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity
is man's species character." 68

Under capitalism, however,

men do not produce in a free and conscious manner, so they

become alienated from the character of the human species.
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But Marx goes farther than
simply noting this
alienation of man from his
speoies character; under
capitalism, men actually come
to resemble animals more
than
men, because their productive
activity takes on the species
character of non-human animals.
In distinguishing the
species man from animal species,
Marx claims that

U

a
r ° dUCeS What
y
^diately needs
for itself°or tS ° ung
Y
Produces one-sidedly
il n
i UCeS
P
unive rsally.
It produces only
under the dominion
d
of immediate physical
need
whilst man produces even when he P
is free from'
° n y tIUlY P r °^=« i» f
"edom
l
tneref rem"- (my
tnerefrom.
,T* emphasis)

^

-

"

Under the exploitative environment of
capitalism, however,
man's productive activity comes to be
nothing more than "a
means to his physical existence." 70 Men
work, in other
words, in order to satisfy the demands of
their bodies, and
in this they are more like animals than
men.

Men only

"truly" produce, as men, when they produce in the
absence of

physical needs.
In contrast to the life-activity of animals, man,
as a

species, has a more developed, richer life-activity, which

satisfies needs which are higher, more refined, than crude

bodily needs.

Marx believed that this higher nature of man

would eventually blossom, once capitalism's exploitative,

dehumanizing relations of production were demolished.

"It

will be seen," Marx wrote in the Paris Manuscripts, "how in

place of the wealth and poverty of political economy come
the rich human being and rich human need.

The rich human
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being is simultaneously the
human being in need of a
totality of human life activities
activi
- the man in whom
his own
realization exists as an inner
necessity, as need.- 71
This attitude of Marx's
toward necessity, in which the
demands of the body are denigrated
to mere animal
1-

-i

status,

and are distinguished from
richer human needs, was not just
a conviction which he held
early in his career, before he
undertook his painstaking analysis
of the structure of
capitalism.
On the contrary, Marx expressed
this same
attitude in different contexts throughout
his career.
The German Ideology (1845-6), which
Marx wrote with Engels
shortly after compiling the Paris Manuscripts,
he again
denigrates physical necessity, but this time
not in

m

distinguishing man's species from that of other
animals, but
in describing the activity of man after
the proletarian
appropriation of capitalism's
production.

highly developed forces of

In the terms of the Paris Manuscripts, one

might say that Marx and Engels are here describing the
situation in which the species character of man may be
fulfilled:

"Only at this stage does self-activity coincide

with material life, which corresponds to the development of
individuals into complete individuals and the casting-off of
all natural limitations." 72
By natural limitations,

I

read Marx and Engels to

mean those conditions in which physical necessity, or the

demands of the body, dominate man's productive and
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consumptive activity.

For just a page or so before
maki ng

the above claim about natural
limitations, Marx and Engels
note that
[t]he only connection which
still links rthe
jaunty of individuals] with the productive
forces and with their own existence labour - has
lost all semblance of self-activity
and only
by StUnting
finally
Material ITf?
material
life appears as the end, and
what
1 Ufe
labiur
is -w
onlv oossibfT? 93 WS ee
native
form
of
S
se?f-acti£?^ as the means. 73
self-activity)

^

'

'

'

'

-

,

In other words, men have become like
animals; their life-

activity is nothing more than the means
of existence.
Marx eventually came to recognize that
capitalism did
not simply reduce the needs of men to the
level

of animals.

Even though capitalism undoubtedly had this
dehumanizing
effect, by 1857-8, when he wrote those notebooks
which

eventually were published as Grundrisse, Marx recognized
that capitalism also had a tendency to develop and enrich

human needs.

In Grundrisse

,

Marx claimed that "Capital's

ceaseless striving toward the general form of wealth drives
labour beyond the limits of its natural paltriness

.

.

.

thus creates the material elements for the development of
the rich individuality which is as all-sided in its

production as in its consumption." 74
But still, Marx set this "rich individuality" over

against the demands of the body.

For he continues his

description of the richly producing and consuming
individuality by saying that its "labour also therefore

and
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appears no longer as labour,
but as the full development
of
activity itself, in which natural
necessity in its direct
form has disappeared."- Here,
as in the Paris Manuscripts
and Th^_German_ld^
the demands of the body must
be
overcome as limitations on human
activity, if man is to
attain the complete individuality
of his species character.
It should be pointed out that
Marx's attitude toward
necessity, which denigrates the
demands of the body
and

celebrates the creation of rich human
needs, appears to be
reversal of that needs/wants distinction
which has been
identified earlier in the thought of Luther

a

and Franklin, or

more accurately, Poor Richard.

Unlike those earlier

perspectives on necessity, which sought to limit
the
multiplication of needs by granting to the "real,"

physical

needs a certain predominance, Marx held that the
creation of
new needs, some of which I would describe as limits
of
the

body, depended on man's moving beyond the realm of
"crude

practical need." 76

For Marx, "real" needs were not a limit

to be imposed upon the development of earthly conveniences;

they were, instead, an obstacle to such development which

must be overcome.
It must also be emphasized that Marx deeply appreciated

and applauded the expansive effect which capitalism had on

necessity.

He shared with the liberals Hobbes and Locke an

appreciation for the way in which

a civil

society which was

based on private property (i.e. a capitalist society) helped

380

beyond the expanded realm
of physical need,
or to put thi s
differently, the higher value
upon which modernity h as
settled is the value of
convenience, and it is satisfied
through the continued labor
of men in the capitalist
or

socialist production process,
and the increased consumption
of technological apparatuses.
Of course, this is not to
say
that there are not some
individuals who have come to value
something other than convenience,
or that convenience

absolutely dominates every facet
of the lives of
people.
other values are present
in modernity,

ssome

and s;ome

people may lead their lives in the
light of values other
than convenience.
But from my perspective, such
individuals
are not typically modern.
In a sense, Marx's description of
the "true realm of

freedom" has contributed to the failure of
modernity to
provide the conditions of that realm. The
need to

continually reduce the amount of time and energy
which men
expend upon bodily necessity, has become the end
in

itself.

And as

I

tried to show earlier, such assaults on the limits

of the body, especially temporal limits, are
never-ending.

From my perspective, it is no wonder that modern ascetics

have little time for "the development of human powers as an
end in itself;" they are too busy trying to be rid of their

bodies and the limits the body imposes on their freedom.

Marx's conceptions of freedom and necessity only contribute
to,

and cannot resolve, this dilemma.
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to develop, advance, or civilize
man.
quote from Grundrisse, the laudatory

In the following Ion
g

tone of Marx's

description of this particular feature
of capitalist
production reveals this appreciation,
as well

as the threat

which it poses.

All of the following, claims
Marx,

"is a

condition of production founded on
capital":
Hence exploration of all nature in
order
discover new, useful qualities in things; to
universal exchange of the products of
all alien
1
68 and lands; new (artificial)
preparation
of natural objects, by which they
are given new
use values.
The exploration of the earth in all
directions, to discover new things of use
as well
as new useful qualities of the old;
such as new
qualities of them as raw materials etc.; the
development, hence, of the natural sciences to
their highest point; likewise the discovery,
creation and satisfaction of new needs arising
from society itself; the cultivation of all the
qualities of the social human being, production of
the same in a form as rich as possible in needs
because rich in qualities and relations production for this being as the most total an
universal possible social product, for, in order
to take gratification in a many-sided way, he must
be capable of many pleasures
hence cultured
to a high degree - is likewise a condition of
production founded on capital. 77

S

^

.

.

.

In the above passage, Marx inadvertently indicates the

point where the perspective on technology which is being

developed in this essay, which focuses on the development of
modern necessity or needs, makes contact with those
perspectives on technology which concentrate on its
expansive character, such as Heidegger's and Ellul's.
Marx's juxtaposition of ideas such as "the discovery,
creation, and satisfaction of new needs" and "the
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exploration of all nature in order
to discover new, useful
qualities in things," reveals, at
least to me, how Marx's
"social human being ... as
rich as possible in needsparticipates in the modern project
of Enframing.
(See
Chapter 1, n.l, and Chapter
idjji.tix t
4
n
?7
n. j/.)
But ~
once again, this
is not the argument I want to
make.
Rather, I want to
emphasize how the development of new
needs, which
^

,

are

satisfied through the consumption of
technology, reveals
something about modernity's attitude toward
the body,

something about its notion of the self.

Marx's endorsement

of the proliferation of needs, or the
expansion of

necessity, shares with Hobbes

'

and Locke's conceptions of

civil society, that modern ascetic tendency to
deny the
body, or the temporal-spatial limits which are
imposed by
it.

In fairness to Marx,

I

must mention that later in his

career, when he was working on the third volume of Capital

.

Marx appears to have moved away from his earlier position on
necessity, at least to some degree.

He was still willing to

claim, as he had earlier, that "[t]he realm of freedom

really begins only where labour determined by necessity and
external expediency ends." 78

This is very similar to Marx's

claim in the Paris Manuscripts, that men only truly produce
in the absence of need.

And in Capital, volume

noted that needs develop as man himself does.

3,

Marx also

But here is

where Marx begins to differ from his earlier statements

concerning necessity.

whereas Marx celebrated the
expansion
of human needs in the Paris
Manuscripts and Grundrisse, in
the third volume of Coital,
he seems willing to accept
some
limitations on the development
of needs, or at least
those
new needs which are related
to physical necessity.
in this late discussion of
necessity, Marx recognizes

that physical necessity is not

a

static concept, but that

even such basic needs are
susceptible to development.
Earlier I described such basic or
real needs as demands of
the body, and their developed form,
or other developed
bodily needs, I described as limits of
the
body.

Marx,

of

course, does not use such terms, but
simply says that "the
realm of natural necessity expands with
his [man's]

development, because his needs do too." 79

But this expanded

natural necessity is for Marx, at least later
in his career,
part of the realm of unfreedom; these expanded,
developed
needs,

like the more basic physical needs, preclude
freedom,

and must be overcome through the further development
of the

forces of production.

After noting that the realm of

natural needs expands, Marx continues,
but the productive forces to satisfy these expand
at the same time.
Freedom, in this sphere, can
consist only in this, that socialized man, the
associated producers, govern the human metabolism
with nature in a rational way, bringing it under
their collective control instead of being
dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it
with the least expenditure of energy and in
conditions most worthy and appropriate for their
human nature.
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As

read this last passage, Marx
appears to be
claiming that even man's developed
needs, at least those
which are related to physical, bodily
necessity, must be
satisfied in the fastest, easiest manner.
in other words,
the "conditions most worthy and
appropriate for
human
nature" are the conditions which are most
convenient,
I

.

.

.

in

which the limits which are imposed by the
body interfere
with man's time in a minimal manner.
For Marx concludes
this discussion of necessity in the third
volume of Capital
by describing the conditions of freedom:
"The true realm of
freedom, the development of human power as an end
in
itself,

begins beyond it, though it can only flourish with
this

realm of necessity as its basis.

The reduction of the

working day is the basic prerequisite." 81
While it should be obvious that

I

share Marx's

recognition and expectation that new needs were and would be
developed in modernity (for my discussion of continually
expanding, modern necessity, see Chapter

2,

pp.

56-7),

Marx's anticipation of a reduction in the working day is
more difficult to accept.

Of course, there is no doubt that

the length of the working day has been shortened from the

brutal hours which necessitated state restrictions on the

hours of labor, and that the eight hour day has become the

standard in the most advanced economies.

But in the case of

the United States, this standard has been in place since
1938, and has not been reduced through half a century of
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improvements and refinements in
the forces of production.
Now as I read him, Marx
meant by the reduction of
the
working day, a continuous
process which would free up
more
and more time from the
realm of necessity, as the
forces of
production were developed.
(Marx did emphasize, however,
that necessity would never be
eliminated altogether. 82
)

m

my judgment, this reduction
in the length of the working
day
has not come to pass in either
the East or the West, and
does not look as though it is
about to.
There has not yet
emerged in modernity a way of being
that has provided a
realm of freedom in which man could
fully develop his human
faculties.
in fact, it seems to me that
moderns in both the
East and the West are ready to work
harder and longer in
order to satisfy the continually expanding
list of man's
needs, or more accurately, to satisfy the
need to

continually expand that list.

But my bias,

I

hope,

is

obvious

Explanations of Marx's unfulfilled expectations

concerning the length of the working day are certainly
available.

In the West, the control which capital exerts on

the development of needs, and in the East, the corruption
and inefficiency of the state, are obvious choices of

explanation which could be developed at length by those so
inclined.

What

I

would like to suggest as an explanation of

this short-coming of Marx's thought, however, is that men

have not come to find any higher, richer needs which exist
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beyond the expanded realm of
physical need. Or to put this
differently, the higher value upon
which modernity has
settled is the value of convenience,
and it is satisfied
through the continued labor of
men in the capitalist or
socialist production process, and
the increased consumption
of technological apparatuses.
of course, this is not to say
that there are not some individuals
who have come to value
something other than convenience, or
that convenience

absolutely dominates every facet of the
lives of some
people.
other values are present in modernity,

and some

people may lead their lives in the light of
values other
than convenience.
But from my perspective, such individuals
are not typically modern.
In a sense, Marx's description of the "true
realm of

freedom" has contributed to the failure of modernity to

provide the conditions of that realm.

The need to

continually reduce the amount of time and energy which men
expend upon bodily necessity, has become the end in itself.
And as

I

tried to show earlier, such assaults on the limits

of the body, especially temporal limits, are never-ending.

From my perspective, it is no wonder that modern ascetics
have little time for "the development of human powers as an
end in itself;" they are too busy trying to be rid of their

bodies and the limits the body imposes on their freedom.

Marx's conceptions of freedom and necessity only contribute
to,

and cannot resolve, this dilemma.
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Pr ° d Ction
crTft and
°nH pastoral
?
craft

to more ,hu ^n- forms of
organization.
0 ! th
contrary, it is scientific
and technoloaica?
progress that can help to provide
tSe answer.But its not just that
science and technology can be
of
help in providing the answer.
From Preteceille and
Terrains perspective, science and
technology really are not
part of the problem.
Preteceille goes so far as to say
that
to question science and technology,
and all the productive
and consumptive development that
they have provided, to
argue for a "regression of productive
forces, is nothing but
an individualist flight on the part
of the petit-bourgeois
elements edged out by the crisis." 85 And
in another essay,
'

.

Preteceille describes as "regressive and
illusory" any
attempts to solve "problems of energy, transport

or ecology,

suggesting a return to archaic forms of production,
and
denouncing technology in general rather than its
[by]

form and

use under capitalism." 86

But even if one does not criticize

technology in general, but limits one's criticism to the
values which underlie the development and deployment of

technology in capitalist/socialist modernity (i.e. the
domination of nature and convenience)

,

and even notes how

capitalism helped to promote these values, one would still
be out of touch with the real problems of modernity; one

would be deluded and regressive.
This same attitude toward modern necessity, and the

values which underlie it, is present in Mandel's Late
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Capitalism.
society,

»

After listing various sources
of "consumer
Mandel claims that
n ° f th

j

soc?et^ wh^h

t

SO " ca11

^

'consumer

«^iSi« toVcritique of
civilization) °?
civ?iiSnf
turns back the clock from
scientific to Utopian socialism
and from
historical materialism to idealism.
87
r
,

To be fair,

S ° Ci

^

it must be noted that Mandel
does recognize

that "the possibilities of developing
and differentiating
material consumption cannot be unlimited,"
but he does not
get into that in Late Capitalism. 88
But if Mandel is
willing to accept limits on the development
of needs, these
have not yet been reached. With consumer
society, claims
Mandel, there has occurred a "genuine extension
of needs," 89
and Mandel, I believe, anxiously anticipates
the

continuation of this "progress."

The needs themselves are

not open to question; the problem with consumer society
lies

solely in the relations of production, not in the values

which guide and direct that consumption.
Mandel explicitly cites Marx as the source of this

attitude toward consumer society, or as

modern necessity.

would put it,

I

He continues the quote above by saying

"Marx fully appreciated and stressed the civilizing function
of capital, which he saw as the necessary preparation of the

material basis for a 'rich individuality.
but Marx wrote over a hundred years ago.

1

" 90

Very well,

Mandel, as well as
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Preteceille and Terrail,
cannot fatho m the query
of whether
modern individuals nigh t
not be over-prepared
for that rich
individuality,
such a question could only
he uttered by a
barbarian.
There is no doubt in my
mind that my critical
perspective on consumption and
technology in modernity would
be considered regressive
and deluded, perhaps even
"vulgar
and mean," 91 from the point
of view of contemporary
Marxists, or at least those who
uncritically accept Marx's
attitude toward necessity.
But from my perspective,
to

engage in a little name-calling,
these charges against my
perspective are just one more example
of modern technofetishism, the inability to attain any
critical distance
from modern technological developments.
The ascetic
dimension of this techno-f etishism, however,
is not readily
apparent in those Marxist texts I have been
discussing.

The

denial of the body which

I

am claiming underlies the Marxist

attitude toward necessity is not clearly revealed
in these
attempts to forestall any criticism of modern needs.
However, this aspect of Marx's thought is revealed
in some
of the writings of Herbert Marcuse, even though Marx's

influence on Marcuse was very limited, and was certainly not
predominant.
To begin with,

I

must point out that Marcuse was not as

sanguine about the development of needs as were those

Marxists

I

examined above.

In An Essav on Liberation

.
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Marcuse explicitly acknowledges
that the proliferation o f
needs under modern capitalism
helps to defuse the
revolutionary potential of those
who are alienated and
exploited by capital. As Marcuse
puts it,

W

Stake are the needs themselves.
At
e tl0n iS
l0nger:
how
ca
"°
the
"
individual' 'sat?,?v
y H S ° Wn " eeds wit hout hurting
others bit r»ih
i
Ca " he Satisf his ™edl
y
without hurting
hurtina tV
himself,
without reproducing
iiZ
u
^rations and satisfactions his
an e loita tive apparatus
which? in
saclsfvino
satisfying his
h" needs, perpetuates
his servitude?' 2
Marcuse calls for "the ascent of
needs and satisfactions
very different from and even
antagonistic to those prevalent
in the exploitative societies." 93

this

s?a~

ESS?

?H

^

But like Marx, Marcuse appreciated
the way in which

capitalist development of production forces
helped to pave
the way for true freedom.
In an earlier work,
Eros and

Civilization

,

Marcuse claimed that "progressive alienation

itself increases the potential of freedom: the
more external
to the individual the necessary labour becomes,
the
less

does it involve him in the realm of necessity.

Relieved

from the requirements of domination, the quantitative

reduction in labor time and energy leads to

a

qualitative

change in human existence: the free rather than the labor
time determines its content." 94

Now even though "free time"

has not, in my mind, come to determine the content of human

existence, Marcuse did at least see something new in these

developments.

He did not simply foresee the same sort of
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needs being developed in a
non-exploitative environment.
Marcuse continues the above
quote as follows: "The expand!
ng
realm of freedom becomes truly
a realm of play - of
the f ree
Play of individual faculties.
Thus liberated, they will
generate new forms of realization
and of discovering the
world, which in turn will reshape
the realm of necessity,
the struggle for existence." 95
Marcuse foresaw the
development of a "new sensibility,"
of an aesthetic
appreciation or appropriation of the
world which would
challenge the instrumental approach of
modern industrial
96
civilization.
Marcuse, therefore, can not fairly
be
described as a techno-f etishist

Nevertheless, there does exist within Marcuse
-s thought
one particular element which I find not only
promotes

techno-fetishism, but also reveals the ascetic dimension
of
the Marxist attitude toward necessity. This
element
is

Marcuse"

s

attitude toward death, which he articulated in

Eros and Civilization and in an essay entitled "The Ideology
of Death."

In these works, both of which were written in

the 1950' s, Marcuse presents death as the ultimate
necessity, the ultimate limit.

In Eros and Civilization

.

Marcuse describes death in temporal terms, as "the final

negativity of time." 97

As such, death is the ultimate limit

to human freedom; it is the "one innermost obstacle [which]

seems to defy all project of a non-repressive development.
.

.

.

The brute fact of death denies once and for all the
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reality of a non-repressive
existence 9 « The reason why
death is such a spoiler to
the goal of human freedom,
is
that " [t] he mere anticipation
of the inevitable end,
present
in every instant, introduces
a repressive element
into all
libidinal relations and renders
pleasure itself painful..' 99
Now while the influence of
Freud is obviously more
prominent than that of Marx in
Marcuse' s Eros
.

and

Civilization

,

the idea that death is the
ultimate obstacle

to non-repressive development
is quite similar to Marx's
attitude that necessity should be
overcome and minimized

through technological developments.

m

"The Ideology of

Death," where the Freudian concern
for libidinal relations
is less pronounced than the Marxist
concern with state-level
domination, Marcuse discusses necessity as
follows:

"Necessity indicates lack of power: inability to
change what
is - the term is meaningful only as the
coterminus of
freedom." 100
a

Death, as the ultimate biological necessity,

limit to freedom.

But, Marcuse emphasizes, death does not

enjoy any special status in the realm of necessity.
is,

as Marcuse puts it,

freedom." 101

is

Death

"a technical limit of human

For Marcuse, therefore, death is nothing more

than one facet of physical, bodily necessity; it is just

another limit which the body imposes on human freedom.
Actually, Marcuse'

s

claim is that death would be

thought of in such terms, and that overcoming or surpassing
the limit of death "would become the recognized goal of the

3

individual and social endeavor,

88

if the prevailing

attitude toward death, "the
ideology of death," could
be
overcome.
B y the ideology of
death, Marcuse is referring
to
the use to which death
has been put throughout
the history
of Western philosophy,
beginning with Socrates and
culminating in Heidegger. This
ideology renders the issue
of death a support for
existing political orders by
inverting death, as a bit of
biological necessity, into
death as the end, or telos, of
human life.
Through this
"ontological inversion," death was
transformed
from an

empirical fact into an ontological
necessity.

Death comes

to be treated as pertaining "to
the essence of human life,
to its existential fulfillment;"
death becomes "the very
token of his [man's] freedom." 103 (my
brackets)
Displaying
a Marxist tendency to denigrate
bodily needs, Marcuse judges

this ontological inversion as follows: "A
brute biological
fact, permeated with pain, horror and
despair,

is

transformed into an existential privilege." 104
But of course, what bothers Marcuse is not just
the

fact that in the ideology of death, something
brutish and

basic has become ontologically significant.

Along with

this, the acceptance of the necessity of death plays
into

the hands of the dominant forces in society.

Noting some of

the various historical forms which the ideology of death has
taken, Marcuse, in Eros and Civilization

,

writes:

Whether death is feared as constant threat [recall
Hobbes' use of death in the state of nature], or
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SU P reme sacrifice, or
accepted as
till JSf education
h
for consent to death
?S£
Z'x
introduces an element of surrender
into life from

un?reed^

P af
o f ^e r eaLfo?

—

dL?h

is a token of

And in "The Ideology of Death,"
Marcuse claims that "no
domination is complete without the
threat of death and the
recognized right to dispense death death by legal verdict,
in war, by starvation.
And no domination is complete
unless
death, thus institutionalized, is
recognized as more than
natural necessity and brute fact, namely
as justified and
106
justification. "
As a counter to this submissive posture
toward death,

Marcuse offers "some kind of -normal- attitude
toward death
- normal in terms of the plain observable
facts, although
commonly repressed under the impact of the prevailing
ideology and the institutions supported by it." 107

what

Marcuse has in mind here, of course, is that attitude
toward
death which sees it as a limit of the body which is to be

overcome through technological development.

According to

this normal attitude, death will become "a necessity against

which the unrepressed energy of mankind will protest,
against which it will wage its greatest struggle." 108
Now from my perspective, Marcuse- s choice of the word
"normal" to describe that non-ideological attitude toward

death is a fortuitous one, and it is a choice with which
fully agree.

As

I

tried to indicate earlier, that same

I
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attitude was present in both
Hobbes and Locke.
Recall that
both of these theorists' found
as one of the primary
benefits of civil society, the
fact that it could prolong
life by allowing its members
to avoid the risk of
premature
death, a risk which prevailed
in the state of nature.
There
is no doubt that these liberal
theorists used the fear
of

death to impel men towards civil
society, and in that sense,
they may be ideologists of death.
But do not forget that
Hobbes, at least, drew the line of
state authority at the
point of death. The state could not,
according
to Hobbes,

compel an individual to kill himself,
or to submit to those
who might kill him. There was always
available to the
individual the right to resist.
For Hobbes, the state may
have had the power of life and death, but its
legitimacy was
based on the fact that it allowed men to avoid
death, and
live longer.
It also is worth recalling here that Hobbes,

despite his attempt to subsume Christian doctrine under
his

modern political order, could not fully endorse martyrdom;
he could not accept death as the "supreme sacrifice."

Marcuse's attitude toward death as a technical limit,
therefore, is normal not just in the sense that it is based
on "plain observable facts"

(whatever they might be)

,

but is

also normal in the sense that it conforms to the ascetic
norms of modernity.

Marcuse's goal of overcoming the

brutish, biological necessity of death seems to me to be the

culmination of modernity's attempt to deny the body and its

limits.
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m

regard to the limit of death,
modernity has
become adept at not only
prolonging life, through the
development of technologies such
as organ transplant,
:s and
life-support systems. The limit
of death has also been
pushed back at the other end,
as the point of "fetal
viability" has receded in the face
of technological

developments.
progress,

it is probably futile to
argue against such
but at least it can be pointed

out that these

developments have not really weakened
the hold which the
modern, technological order has over
individuals.

The

recession of the point of fetal viability
has recently been
suggested as a reason for limiting a
pregnant woman's right
to abort the pregnancy; the proliferation
of life-support
technology has made it necessary for individuals
to take

legal steps to protect their ability to die
with dignity, o
actually, to die at all.

What

I

am suggesting is that the technological

victories which modernity has achieved over death have not
been unequivocal advances in freedom, even as Marcuse uses
this term.

These developments have not engendered "new

forms of realization and of discovering the world;" they

have not fostered a "new sensibility" or an "art of living"
(see note 96 of this chapter)

.

Technological development

continues to set the natural world in order, to set it up
"standing reserve," and the consumption of technology

continues to allow men to overcome the limits of the body.

a
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If

may speculate on what the
future holds for man's
struggle against death, I
think that death will eventually
be overcome as a limit,
the body will indeed be
eliminated
as the source of limits
or necessity.
But these
I

"achievements" will only be won
for man at the cost of a
greater dependency on the
technological order, socialist or
capitalist, which provides them.
Here I will defer to a
writer much more attuned to
technological development than I
am, and allow his description
of the future to make these
points for me. The following is
from the scientist Robert
Jastrow's The Enchanted Loom: Min d in
the Universe;
1 St t S
* uman brain
ensconced in a computer,
hL
has K
been ?liberated from the weaknesses of
mortal
flesh.
Connected to cameras, instruments and
engine controls, the brain sees, feels,
and
responds to stimuli.
It is in control of its own
destiny.
The machine is its body; it is the
machine's mind. The union of mind and machine
has
created a new form of existence, as well
designed
for life in the future as man is designed
for life
on the African savanna.
It seems to me that this must be the mature
form of intelligent life in the Universe.
Housed
in indestructible lattices of silicon, and no
longer constrained in the span of its years by the
life and death cycle of a biological organism,
such a kind of life could live forever.
It would
be the kind of life that could leave its parent
planet to roam the space between the stars. Man
as we know him will never make that trip, for the
passage takes a million years. But the artificial
brain, sealed within the protective hull of a star
ship, and nourished by electricity collected from
starlight, could last a million years or more.
For a brain living in a computer, the vovage to
another star would present no problems.
'

For those left behind on the "parent planet," however,

those who have yet to be "liberated from the weaknesses of
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mortal flesh," there certainly
would be some problems. a s
the planet becomes less hospitable
to human life, due to th e
abuse it has suffered from man's
attempt to deny the limit s
of the body through unceasing
technological development, men
will need to be rid of their
bodies, so that they can
"advance" to the new form of existence
which thrives among
the stars.
But this will not mark the end
of necessity, or
the development of new needs. Why
settle for a million-year
life-span? That limit can surely be
pushed back. And as
for the time it takes to travel between
stars, it will
surely be necessary to shorten this. There
really will be
no end to the development of needs in space,
just as there
have been none here on earth. And if any ends or
limits

should arise, like death for the soon-to-be-obsolete

embodied man, it will have to be overcome.

From my point of

view, overcoming "the technical limit" of death will not

mark the end of necessity, but will simply move it onto
another plane.
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describe the tension in Hobbes- thought,
I agree
This
tension cannot be described as
ambivalence, the iem fused
to describe the different tension
I identified in Se
thought of Luther and Calvin.
(See Chapter 5, pp.23?-49
in the case of these reformers, there
was a sirong reeling
9
ireC ' ionS " the love and contempt,
for
In " obbes however, there is not
Y
a strong
fll^l i
s <friptural theology.
I agree with Milner that
nnp
one of h
Hobbes- purposes in Leviathan - Milner
calls it the
lnt ntl
4 ° 0)
is
to
P
contro1
religion,
"
and
*
f
°f in
to put Christianity
the service of the commonwealth. An
ambiguity in Hobbes- thought results from this
render Christianity as a constant and consistentattempt to
support of
civil authority.
But there is no ambivalence in Hobbes as
concerns the independent value of Christianity as a
theological system. The value of Christianity for Hobbes
lies in the use to which it can be put in establishing
and
maintaining civility, order. This will become apparent in
my argument below.
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Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan; Or the Matter. Forme and Power
2.
of a Commonweal th Ecclesiasticall and Civil ed. Michael
Oakeshott (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 98.
,

3.

Ibid., p.

103.

4

Ibid.

99

.
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p.

Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its
5.
Basis and Genesis trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1952), Chapter 2, "The Moral
Basis," pp. 6-29.
In this chapter, Strauss argues that for
all the attention paid to Hobbes scientific approach to
politics, his political philosophy is ultimately grounded in
a "moral and humanist antithesis of fundamentally unjust
vanity and fundamentally just fear of violent death."
(p.
I appreciate Strauss- elaboration of the role which the
27)
,

1
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however,
it

is much more
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Hobbes, p.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid., p.
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103.
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Ibid., p.

102.

11.

Ibid., p.

103.

12.

Ibid.

13.

Ibid., p.

14.

Ibid.

15.

Ibid., p.

102.

16.

Ibid., p.

100.

104.

^•Strauss, pp. 20-1. Strauss continues his description
of the struggle to the point where a master-slave
relationship emerges, in which one of the combatants,
for
fear of his life, submits to the other.
Strauss' account of
this development is helpful not only for understanding
Hobbes' political philosophy, but also for understanding
Hegel's phenomenology of self-consciousness, which hinges
on
the master-bondsman relationship.
For now, let me just say
that on Strauss' reading, Hobbes seems to share with Hegel a
keen awareness of the role which death plays in self-

consciousness

.

18.

Hobbes, p. 105.

19.

Ibid.

Hobbes writes at the beginning of the second part of
20.
Leviathan, "Of Commonwealth," that the only way for men to
form a commonwealth is "to confer all their power and
strength upon one man, or upon assembly of men, that may
reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, into one
will."
The covenant by which such a conferral is
(p. 132)
accomplished, claims Hobbes, is "as if every man should say
to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing
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t0 this man ' or to this assembly
of men on thi*
!^-f'
condition, that thou give up thy
right
to
him i«2
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all his actions in like manner!?
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132)
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Although Hobbes uses the verb
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right
which
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he had not bof
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because there is nothing to « whirh
right by natUre: but only ^andeth
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his way, that F*
he may enjoy his own original right
without
M
ra
r °\ him
104
So when members of a
(P
covenant transfer (p. 104) or confer
(p. 132) their right to
a sovereign authority, they do
not transfer their righ? in
the sense of increasing the sovereign's
rights.
Rather
they step aside and renounce their right
in a given area
such as the making of laws, and allow
the sovereign to
exercise his right in that area without
interference or
hindrance
in his definition of "transferring
Hobbes makes it clear that what is transferred right,"
is not the
right itself, but the benefit that arises
from the
renunciation of the right. A man transfers, as
simply renounces, his right, "when he intendeth opposed to
the
thereof [his renunciation] to some certain person, benefit
or
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Hobbes, pp. 139, 151-2.
21
In the case of this particular
right of the sovereign, the right to punish, Hobbes makes
very clear the point I was trying to make in the preceding
footnote.
Hobbes emphasizes that "the right which the
commonwealth
hath to punish, is not grounded on any
concession, or gift of the subjects.
... For the subjects
did not give the sovereign that right; but only in laying
down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, as he should
think fit, for the preservation of them all."
(p. 229)
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105.

ch°iceof the word "commodious" to
describe

back to the self, and came to mean
personal comfort or ease
or "commodiousness."
choosing commodious to describe
life in a commonwealth, Hobbes seems
to
modern sense of convenience, as personal be invoking the
Hobbes
had not quite made that shift in regard ease
to the use of
convenience itself.
the sentence immediately following
the one quoted in my text, in which the
idea of commodioCs
living appears, Hobbes writes, "And reason
suggesteth
convenient articles of peace upon which men may
be drawn to
agreement."
It is obvious that Hobbes, although
(p. 102)
writing in the seventeenth century, is here using
convenient
in its pre-modern sense, of being appropriate
to the
rational order of nature, not being conducive to
personal
ease.
Nevertheless, the rational laws which Hobbes finds in
nature do indeed promote convenience in the modern sense
of
the word.
One does not have to wait until Franklin,
however, to find evidence for the etymological shift in
convenience. As I will soon indicate, Locke, writing later
in the seventeenth century than Hobbes, had made that shift.
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33.

Hobbes, p. 424.

34.

Ibid.

35.

Ibid., p. 425.

36.

Ibid.

37.
Ibid., p. 428.
For Hobbes' scriptural support for this
claim, see pp. 428-32.
38.

Ibid., p. 426.
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Milner claims in his article "Hobbes
Ha Religion,
D ?
and
» (see note 1) that to the best of
his
HOhb S nSVer mentions the fallen nature
of man.
Hnhhi«
t
Hobbes T'
does mention
it, but the concept of the fall
does not
really play a significant role in his thought.
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Thomas Pangle, in his recent The Spirit of MnH om
Republicanism; The Moral Vis ion of th e American
rs and
the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago: The University
of Chicaqo
Press, 1988), points out that "Locke devoted a
very
substantial portion of his published (and unpublished)
writings to the project of forging and promulgating a
new
•reasonable' Christian theology."
(p. 151)
the third
part of this book, Pangle examines this Lockean project,
and
ultimately concludes that "the truth or even the rational
plausibility of the key articles of faith - the very
articles that are crucial from the point of view of the
usefulness of religion - Locke promises over and over to
show without ever redeeming his pledge."
This
(p. 214)
blatant failure on Locke's part leads Pangle to reconsider
the importance which Locke placed on Christianity as a
foundation for rational, moral activity (p. 201), and to
"wonder whether Locke does not in fact look forward to, and
attempt to help foster, a world where the educated classes
would talk less and less of the afterlife and hence less and
less of 'natural law.'"
(p. 215)
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much
every man his equal, and the greater
part no
strict observers of equity and justice, the
enjoyment
of the
property he has in this state is very unsafe
very
insecure."
Two Treatises II, 123, 179)
Men
civil society, therefore, in order to protect unite to form
their
property, by which Locke means not just chattel
but men's lives and liberties as well. Men form property
a
society "for the mutual preservation of their lives civil'
liberties, and estates," writes Locke.
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Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity

Locke, Two Treatises,
160; and II, 127, 180.
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II,

13,
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See also II, 90

In each of the three citations in the preceding note,
53.
Locke identifies as the source of the inconveniences of the
state of nature, the condition that each man has the right
to be his own judge in any conflict in the state of nature.
Men are equal in their ability to exercise this natural
right to punish offenses against the laws of nature.
In regard to Hobbes' recognition of natural liberty and
equality as the source of the incommodities of the state of
nature, see pp. 5-6 of this chapter.
54.
For Augustine's view that all men were damned through
Adam's sin, see Chapter 5, pp. 260-1. For Luther's teaching
that the punishments which were inflicted upon Adam were
multiplied and increased over the years, see Chapter 5, pp.
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Locke, Two Treatises on Government, I,
46, 32-3
Locke
F lme ,s interpretation of
Genesis
3 Il6 reqSres
f
that the usualt rules
of grammar be inverted.
On Filmer's
reading, when God speaks to Adam in the
singular, it must be
read to mean mankind in general. This is
the only
patriarchal authority for Adam's posterity can be way
derived
from this passage in scripture, claims Locke.
61.
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62.

Ibid.,
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Ibid.
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Ibid.

65.

See note 56 of Chapter
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47,

33.
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Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Enaels Reader
66.
second edition, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton &
Company, Inc., 1978), pp. 70-81.
67.

Ibid., p. 75.

68.

Ibid., p. 76.
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Ibid.
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Ibid., p. 77.
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(New York?
Vintage Books, 1973), p. 325.
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Ibid.
75.
The final clause of this quote
reads "becau^p »
historically created need has taken the
place
of a natura?
one."
it is because of this substitution
of
historicafror
natural need that natural necessity
disappeared? This
n
S
h Storic
and na
needs also appeared
in The Ge™r?S
t
German Ideology
where Marx and Engels wrote "as
8
1
(WhiGh
the action of
satisfying, and the acquisition of an
instrument),
new needs
are made; and this production of new
needs is the first
historical act." (pp. 16-7)
For Marx, therefore,
historicity of human being, as opposed to animal the
lifeactivity, is based on the development of new
needs
Immediately below in the text, it will be indicated
how much
Marx appreciated the development of needs under
capitalism.
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Marx and Engels, The Marx-Enaels Reader
Marx, Grundrisse
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Karl Marx, Capital: A Critiqu e of Political Economy
78.
volume three, trans. David Fernbach (New York: Vintage
Books, 1981), pp. 958-9.
The particular passage in Capital
from which this quote is taken, and upon which I will focus,
is also found in Tucker's Marx-Enaels Reader
pp. 439-41, in
a different translation.
,

,

79.

Ibid., p. 959.
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Ibid.

81.

Ibid.

82.
Marx emphasizes this point in the third volume of
Capital "But this always remains a realm of necessity."
:
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Preteceille and Terrail,
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Ibid., p. 99.
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Terrail uses these terms, which he
91.
borrows from Marx's
discussion of pre-capitalist economic formations
?o
describe the point of view which could
recognize in the
ancient world any superiority to modernity,
with the
"unrestricted development of the capacities
!
and
Producers." Preteceille and Terrail,
pp. 49i»7K
While my argument has not taken the shape
50
of a contest
between antiquity and modernity, nor has it been
terms of a hierarchical relation which elevates cast in
physical needs over developed, refined ones, I real
think'
Preteceille and Terrail would nevertheless take my
of modern consumption practices to be of as little critique
value as
such arguments.
i

92.

Herbert Marcuse, An Essav on Liberation (Boston: Beacon

Press,
93.

1969)
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Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical
Inquiry Into Freud (New York: Vintage Books, 1962;
originally published Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 203-4.
94.

95.

Ibid., p. 204.

96.
Marcuse, An Essav on Liberation Chapter 2, "The New
Sensibility," pp. 23-48. See also Herbert Marcuse, OneDimensi onal Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced
Industr ial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 230-1,
where Marcuse claims: "Within the established societies, the
continued application of scientific rationality would have
reached a terminal point with the mechanization of all
socially necessary but individually repressive labor
("socially necessary" here includes all performances which
can be exercised more effectively by machines, even if these
performances produce luxury and waste rather than
necessities)
But this stage would also be the end and
limit of the scientific rationality in its established
structure and direction.
Further progress would mean the
break, the turn of quantity into quality.
It would open the
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Robert Jastrow, The Enchanted Loom: Mind in the
Universe
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981),
pp. 166-7.
I first read this passage in an article
by David Lavery
entitled "Departure of the Body Snatchers, or the
Confessions of a Carbon Chauvinist," The Hudson Review
Autumn, 1986.
In this article, Lavery recounts his
encounter with a body-snatcher during a panel discussion on
"Computers, Robots, and You." Faced with Lavery'
reluctance to abandon his body in order to live in
"indestructible lattices of silicon," the body-snatcher
responded by calling Lavery a carbon chauvinist.
.

CHAPTER

7

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this essay,

I

mentioned that

I

expected much resistance to my
argument, since it challenged
both the liberal idea of the
sovereign consumer, and the
primary value of that consumer.
I also mentioned that
the
success of my argument could be
judged by
the level of such

resistance which

I

could evoke from readers, and then

deflect toward the technological order.

At this late point,

the best indication of the success of
my argument appears to
be more specific, and to center around
the evaluation of the
new frontier - space. What I hope to have
accomplished is
to evince some hesitance, if not resistance,
to the headlong rush to set the universe in order for
man, to call into
the question the propriety of establishing a
new form of

existence among the stars.
the American West in Chapter

My reading of the "settling" of
4,

I

hope, has shed some light

on the way in which the "progress" that can be achieved
by

settling space has a regulatory, disciplinary character.
Such progress is achieved only by more tightly and narrowly

regulating the selves that inhabit the frontiers.

I

hope

that at this point in my argument, Robert Jastrow's vision
of "the human brain, ensconced in a computer," appears as

more of a threat than

a

promise.
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In fairness to Arendt, whom

early on,

I

treated rather roughly

must point out that she was as
troubled as
by the technological trajectory
of modernity.
I

m

I

am

the

"Prologue" to The Human C ondition,
Arendt noted with some
dismay the reaction to the launch of
Sputnik in 1957.
In
the year following this launch,
Arendt wrote:
The immediate reaction, expressed on
the spur of
the moment, was relief about the
first "step
toward escape from men's imprisonment to
the
earth." And this strange statement,
far from
being the accidental slip of some American
reporter, unwittingly echoed the extraordinary
line which, more than twenty years ago,
had been
carved on the funeral obelisk for one of
Russia's
great scientists: "Mankind will not remain
bound
to the earth forever."

This attitude toward the earth marked something
quite
new.

According to Arendt, "nobody in the history of mankind

has ever conceived of the earth as a prison for
men's bodies
or shown such eagerness to go literally from here to
the

moon." 2

And Arendt wondered whether the modern age, which

began with man's turning away from the Christian God who was
"the Father of men in heaven," might not "end with an even

more fateful repudiation of an Earth who was the Mother of
all living creatures under the sky?" 3

For Arendt,

"[t]he

earth is the very quintessence of the human condition." 4

Now while

I

share Arendt

»

s

concern about the modern

attempt to slip the bounds of earth, it is not just the fact
that the earth is being repudiated which bothers me.

The

assault on the limits imposed by the earth is, to me, of

a

406

Piece with the modern assault on the
limits imposed by the
body.
The value of convenience, and the
contempt
for the

body which underlies this value,
are central to these
developments of modern technology.
But as I argued in
Chapter 2, Arendt s own contempt for
the body and the real m
of necessity blinds her interpretation
of modernity to th e
role which the value of convenience
plays in the
•

reinforcement and development of the modern,
technological
order.

(This,

of course,

is not to deny that all

perspectives, especially my own, have blind
spots.)
is not just that Arendt misses what

I

But it

find to be important;

her attitude toward the body and necessity
promotes the very
trend I want to challenge. Arendt s attempt to
sweep bodily
necessity back under the rug, so to speak, complements
the

attempt to deny the body through the consumption of
technology.

By removing bodily necessity from critical

reflection, Arendt unwittingly promotes the repudiation of
the earth, as well as the technological denial of the body.
But while

I

have tried to foster an awareness of the

way which the modern order uses the value of convenience to

maintain the shape of the modern self, my argument was also
intended to avoid any suggestion that the threat posed by
the technological order is simply an external one, which is

directed by capital or the state.

On the contrary, the

modern individual, as an avid consumer of technological
apparatuses, implicates its self in the technological order.

407

The asceticism of the modern,
post-Christian self, which
seeks to deny and discipline the
body through the
consumption of ever-more convenient
technology, in a sense,

whips its self into shape.

There is a fundamental contempt

for the body which has played a
significant role in the

establishment and entrenchment of the modern
order.
while this contempt for the body is nothing

And

new (recall

Aristotle's condemnation of the slavish
attachment to the
body)
it does appear to me to be a problem
with which
modern selves must come to grips. Resistance
,

to the

technological order can begin,

I

have tried to show, by

critical reflection on the value of convenience,
and what
the prominence of this value indicates about the
modern

attitude toward the body and necessity.
It should be noted that my criticism of the value of

convenience has not been cast in terms of human freedom.
While

I

appreciate the Marxist-Marcusean ideal of unleashing

the developmental possibilities of a wide range of human

faculties, my argument against the value of convenience has
not been that such development has been restricted by the

dominance of this value.
of human freedom.

I

am not calling for an increase

On the contrary, my argument calls for

a

revaluation of that ideal of freedom which treats it as the
antithesis of necessity.

I

want to call into question the

modern denigration of necessity, which is central to my

understanding of the value of convenience, and argue for the

408

value of necessity and limits.

I

want to challenge the

development of convenience, in
which the limits of the body,
and ultimately the body itself,
are overcome, and call

instead for an appreciation of
the body and its limits (not
to mention an appreciation
for the way in which those
limits
have been used to maintain
relations of
power.)

Marcuse, of course, would see
such a revaluation of
necessity as a submissive, defeatist
attitude, one which
would play into the hands of the
powers that be.
But since
my concern is not limited to the
capitalist form
of

technological development, but the modern
technological
order, which is extended and maintained
by both socialist
and capitalist states (think, for example,
of the recent
calls for joint exploration, and perhaps
colonization, of
space by the United States and the Soviet Union)
,

I

see the

acceptance of the body and its limits as a route of
resistance to that order.

The promise of immortality, which

for so long was the exclusive claim of Christianity
against

the secular state, will soon enough become the provenance
of
the technological order.

The extreme power of that order

will shift from the imposition of death to the imposition of

eternal life.

This power can be resisted, in my view, by

clinging to one's body and accepting its limits, especially
death.

At the less extreme level of ordinary consumption
practices,

I

hope to have indicated that the ideals of
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unlimited consumption and an endless
proliferation of needs
are inextricably bound up with the
technological order's
regulation of the modern self. This
subject, who must be
fitted for a new form of existence among
the stars,

just as

peasants had to be fitted to the modern
industrial order,
will require new needs which will allow
him to overcome his
body to ever greater lengths, and eventually
to
leave it

behind as a sort of brutish husk or shell.

Despite the

increases in bodily pleasures which modernity
has provided
through the development of technology, it is
crucial,

from

my point of view, to recognize that there is
an ascetic

dimension to such consumption, which denigrates and
denies
the body.
Modern subjects, the consumers of technology,

are

not hedonists, as is so often claimed, or at least
they are

not simply hedonists.

At a certain level,

it is not the

pleasure of the body which drives modern consumption, but
the desire to be rid of the body and its limits altogether.
To accept the body and the limits which it imposes, to no

longer treat such limits as conditions of unfreedom, is to

begin to challenge the hold of the technological order.

Endnot

Arendt, The Human Condition,
p
Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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